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ABSTRACT 
 
 
LINDSAY CATHERINE BARAN S&P 500 index reconstitutions:  an analysis of 
outstanding hypotheses (Under the direction of DR. TAO-HSIEN DOLLY KING) 
 
 
The market reaction to announcements of S&P 500 index changes shows a 
sustained price increase for added firms and a short-term price decline for newly removed 
firms.  We explore the outstanding hypotheses regarding liquidity, certification, and 
investor awareness using new evidence.  We show that the cost of equity declines 
following inclusion and increases following removal from the index and these changes 
are related to liquidity improvements and deterioration rather than changes in investor 
awareness.  Secondly, we conclude that information asymmetry declines following 
addition but does not change significantly following deletion.   Specifically, we show 
that, after controlling for other pertinent factors, stock analyst earnings forecast errors 
shrink when a firm is added to the S&P 500 index.  These findings support the 
certification hypothesis to explain stock market response to index reconstitution.  Finally, 
we explore changes in bond yields to distinguish between the type of information 
certified by Standard and Poors, but our results are inconclusive.  Taken together, we find 
additional support for both the liquidity and certification hypotheses proposed in extant 
literature about S&P 500 index reconstitutions.   
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CHAPTER 1:  COST OF CAPITAL AND S&P 500 INDEX REVISIONS 
 
 
 Since inception, Standard and Poor’s has changed the composition of its S&P 500 
Index as companies are selected in and out of the index.  Numerous studies examine the 
price effects of these index changes.  Earlier studies such as Harris and Gurel (1986) and 
Shleifer (1986) document the strong and persistent price increase of newly included 
firms. On the other hand, Jain (1987) and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) show that 
excluded stocks experience a temporary decline in price.  In the literature, five 
outstanding hypotheses seek to explain the market reactions to the S&P 500 Index 
changes.  Standard and Poor’s maintains that they do not use information about future 
prospects when selecting firms to be added or deleted from their index.   
The five hypotheses used to explain the price reactions around index changes can 
be broadly categorized as undermining or supporting the efficient market hypothesis.  
The imperfect substitutes hypothesis stands alone against the efficient market theory as 
the hypothesis suggests a downward-sloping demand curve for the S&P 500 stocks.  In 
particular, the hypothesis states that, with no information in the announcements about 
future firm performance or risk, stocks that are included in the index are preferred by 
investors and cannot be easily substituted.  Therefore, in the index revision events, the 
inclusion stocks experience a positive price reaction while the exclusion stocks show a 
negative price reaction.  This implication contradicts with Scholes’ (1972) finding that 
stocks are perfect substitutes and have flat long-run demand curves.  In the case of perfect 
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substitutes and perfect elasticity of demand, shocks to supply or demand that do not 
convey information to the market should not affect prices.  Thus, the increased demand 
by index funds when a firm is added to the S&P 500 Index should not cause a long-run 
effect in price unless information transmission occurs in the announcement of the index 
inclusion. 
The price pressure hypothesis is consistent with Scholes’ (1972) flat demand 
curves but only holds if price improvements at addition are completely reversed in the 
short run.  Index fund rebalancing might create a temporary imbalance of supply and 
demand to raise prices, but, barring any information conveyed in the inclusion decision, 
these price changes should be short-term.  The remaining hypotheses propose that 
information is conveyed when Standard and Poors makes changes to the index, and this 
information corroborates Scholes’ (1972) proposition of long-run flat demand curves. 
Within these supporters of market efficiency, scholars search for alternative explanations 
that are consistent with stocks being perfect substitutes.  To date, four hypotheses have 
been proposed in the literature. Proponents of the liquidity hypothesis claim that the 
documented permanent improvements (declines) in liquidity explain the increase 
(decrease) in stock prices following an addition (deletion) to the S&P 500 Index.  The 
certification hypothesis encompasses several types of information about the firms that are 
included in (excluded from) the Standard and Poor’s Index.  For inclusion stocks, better 
future cash flows, a lower level of information asymmetry, and closer monitoring of the 
firms are forms of positive news that may be conveyed to the markets and support a 
sustained price increase.  For deleted stocks, a price decline following the removal is 
supported by the negative information conveyed in the index revision.  Advocates of the 
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investor awareness hypothesis assert that investors’ attention to newly added index stocks 
is piqued and that they do not immediately revoke attention when stocks are removed.  
The asymmetric effect of permanent price increases at additions and temporary price 
decreases at deletions stem from the asymmetric changes in investor awareness.  We 
discuss these hypotheses and related literature in detail in the following section.   
In this paper, we examine the cost of equity capital surrounding index additions 
and deletions to further explain the price reactions.  In particular, our analysis of cost of 
capital around index revisions provides evidence about the liquidity and investor 
awareness hypotheses.  Our paper is related to studies by Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) 
and Chen, et al (2004).  Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) examine the relationship between 
increased stock liquidity following S&P 500 Index inclusion and expansion of the 
investment opportunity set.  They find a positive correlation between increases in stock 
liquidity and proxies for investment opportunities including capital expenditures and 
research and development expenses.  They argue that if stock liquidity increases, then the 
cost of equity capital, and therefore the overall cost of capital for the firm, would 
decrease.  The decrease in cost of capital expands the set of value-creating investment 
opportunities for the firm.  While Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) document the relation 
between liquidity and investment opportunities, they do not directly examine the cost of 
capital around index inclusion events.  In addition, they do not examine index deletion 
firms.  On the other hand, our study is also related to that of Chen, et al (2004) who find 
asymmetric price reactions at additions and deletions that support the investor awareness 
hypothesis.  They claim that the excess returns around index changes are due to either 
changes in expectations of future cash flows or changes in the required rate of return. 
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They provide three explanations for a change in the cost of equity capital: shifts in 
liquidity, information asymmetry, and monitoring.   
Both the liquidity and investor awareness hypotheses suggest a link between stock 
price reactions and cost of capital.  Based on the liquidity hypothesis, stock liquidity 
changes as a result of index changes, explaining the stock price reactions.   An increase 
(decrease) in stock liquidity for inclusion (deletion) stocks can lead to a drop (rise) in cost 
of equity.  We expect to find a decrease in the cost of equity capital for firms added to the 
S&P 500 and an increase in the cost of equity capital for firms deleted from the index.  
Finding symmetric changes in cost of equity at addition and deletion supports the 
liquidity hypothesis.  On the other hand, the investor awareness hypothesis suggests that 
investors require a smaller shadow premium (and therefore a smaller required rate of 
return) on the stock when the firm is added to the index and do not require a larger 
shadow premium on the deleted stocks.  We expect to find a decrease in the cost of equity 
for added stocks and an insignificant change in cost of equity for deleted stocks.  Thus, 
asymmetric changes in cost of capital support the investor awareness hypothesis.   
In this study, we estimate cost of equity using two methods: buy-and-hold returns 
and market/four-factor model.  From existing literature, we find support for the use of 
these two methods to measure the cost of equity.  Based on the buy-and-hold returns, the 
returns for firms added to the S&P 500 Index decline significantly after the inclusion 
events.  More importantly, we find that the drop in buy-and-hold returns for the inclusion 
firms is significantly larger than that for their matched firms.  For firms deleted from the 
index, buy-and-hold returns are significantly higher following the removal of the stock 
from the index.  Similarly, the buy-and-hold returns for the deleted firms increase 
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significantly more than those of matched firms.  Our second method to estimate changes 
in the cost of equity uses the market and the four-factor models.  Based on this method, 
our results strongly support the results of the buy-and-hold returns.  We find that the 
estimated cost of equity for added firms decreases significantly after the inclusion events.  
Similarly, the cost of equity for firms deleted from the index experiences a significant 
jump after the deletion events.  These findings are consistent with liquidity hypothesis 
rather than the investor awareness hypothesis.   
To examine the factors that explain the change in cost of capital for the index 
addition and deletion firms, we explore several liquidity measures and shadow cost as 
suggested by Chen, et al (2004).  We examine these measures around the index revision 
events and link them to the changes in cost of capital.   First, we test the change in the 
liquidity and shadow cost proxies, and we find that liquidity increases for newly added 
stocks and falls for newly removed ones.  For the shadow cost proxy, we show an 
asymmetric change around additions and deletions.  Shadow cost declines significantly 
upon addition but remains relatively constant upon deletion.  Using regression analysis, 
we show that, after controlling for changes in these liquidity and shadow cost variables, 
cost of capital changes are negatively related to excess returns for addition firms.  
However, this relationship does not hold for newly removed firms.  These results show 
that cost of capital changes are a significant factor in explaining the price increase of new 
S&P 500 firms.   
In the final component of our analysis, we show that the drop in the cost of equity 
for added stocks is driven by turnover increases, and the increase in the cost of equity for 
removed stocks is impacted by the illiquidity ratio and trading volume changes.  This 
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result persists even after controlling for changes in leverage, information asymmetry, and 
firm risk.  To sum up, we find symmetric changes in the cost of equity around index 
revisions and liquidity proxies, rather than shadow cost changes, are significant in 
explaining the cost of equity changes, our study supports the liquidity hypothesis over the 
investor awareness hypothesis.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 1.1 discusses the 
literature related to index inclusion and deletion events.  Section 1.2 presents the sample 
selection process and descriptive statistics of the sample.  Section 1.3 discusses the 
methodology and presents our empirical results.  In Section 1.4, we conclude the paper. 
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1.1 Literature Review 
 
 
 From the extensive literature on the price impacts of the S&P 500 Index changes, 
we identify five competing hypotheses: imperfect substitutes, liquidity, certification, 
investor awareness, and price pressure.  The imperfect substitutes hypothesis argues 
against market efficiency as proposed in Scholes (1972), while the remaining four 
hypotheses support market efficiency.  These hypotheses discuss potential sources of 
information conveyed in index reconstitutions that make observed price patterns 
consistent with perfect elasticity of demand for stocks.  We describe each hypothesis in 
detail below. 
The imperfect substitutes hypothesis claims that stocks are not perfect substitutes 
for one another and that investors’ demand for S&P 500 stocks exceeds that for non-
index stocks.  This hypothesis is consistent with a permanent price increase at index 
additions and a permanent price decline following deletions.  Shleifer (1986) and Lynch 
and Mendenhall (1997) provide support for this hypothesis, while Edmister, et al (1994) 
and Hrazdil (2007) conclude that the long-run demand curves for stocks are flat.  In 
particular, Shleifer (1986) shows that abnormal returns are positively related to the 
amount of index fund purchases of a newly included stock and are not correlated with 
bond ratings.  Based on this evidence, he proposes that demand curves for these stocks 
are downward sloping and rejects the certification hypothesis.  Lynch and Mendenhall 
(1997) look at a sample of index changes following October 1989 when Standard and 
Poors began pre-announcing index changes.  While a portion of the initial price increase 
is due to temporary price pressure, they conclude that demand curves for stocks are 
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downward sloping because some of the initial price increase remains.  They find opposite 
price reaction for stocks deleted from the index. 
On the other hand, Edmister, et al (1994) argue that previous research supporting 
the price pressure and imperfect substitutes hypotheses rely upon biased measures of 
abnormal returns.  The re-estimate the abnormal returns using a future estimation period 
and reject both hypotheses.  They reject the price pressure hypothesis because excess 
returns are not reversed in the short run.  They also reject the imperfect substitutes 
hypothesis because they find no relation between excess returns and variables measuring 
increased demand for newly added stocks.    Hrazdil (2007) studies the change in S&P 
500 weighting method from a market-based to a free-float based system.  If stocks had 
downward sloping demand curves, abnormal returns should be correlated with the change 
in the index weight.  However after controlling for other factors, Hrazdil (2007) finds no 
relation between abnormal returns and index weight changes. 
The liquidity hypothesis is similar to the price pressure hypothesis because it 
posits that the price increases associated with index inclusions are due to increases in 
liquidity from more active trading of the index stocks.  Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) 
theoretical model suggests that share price increases as bid-ask spread decreases.  In 
contrast to the price pressure hypothesis, the liquidity benefits can be sustained and this 
hypothesis suggests a permanent price increase after index additions.  Erwin and Miller 
(1998), Hedge and McDermott (2003), and Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) find support 
for this hypothesis.  
Erwin and Miller (1998) show that liquidity can explain the documented price 
increase at inclusion events.  They examine the bid-ask spreads of stocks that are added 
9 
 
to the index.  They find that, for stocks without previously traded options, bid-ask spreads 
decrease and the increase in price and trading volume for these stocks are sustained.  On 
the contrary, stocks with traded options experience a temporary increase in price and no 
significant decrease in bid-ask spreads after the inclusion.  The presence of traded options 
mitigates the benefit of liquidity improvements, so stocks with no traded options at the 
time of the inclusion benefit more from the greater liquidity.  Hedge and McDermott 
(2003) show that the cumulative abnormal returns around index additions are negatively 
related to the change in bid-ask spreads.  They also find that decreases in the spread are 
permanent benefits of increased liquidity, and that a large portion of the drop in spreads is 
due to the reduction in the direct costs of transactions rather than in the asymmetric 
information component.  Finally, Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) report that firms added 
to the S&P 500 Index experience an increase in liquidity and growth opportunities, which 
supports a permanent price increase associated with additions.  They suggest that the link 
between liquidity and growth opportunities is the cost of capital.  In particular, Becker-
Blease and Paul (2006) hypothesize that firms have a lower cost of capital due to better 
liquidity and therefore are able to take on more projects (measured by capital expenditure 
and R&D expense) after the additions.  They did not provide a test on whether the cost of 
capital for added firms falls as a result of greater liquidity. 
The certification hypothesis supports a positive and sustained price reaction to 
index additions because inclusion announcements contain positive information about 
selected firms.  Similarly, deletion firms accrue losses because negative information is 
conveyed in the announcement.  While signalling information about future performance 
is contrary to the stated practice of Standard and Poor’s, work by Dhillon and Johnson 
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(1991), Denis, et al (2003), Kappou, et al (2007), and Cai (2007) supports this hypothesis.  
On the other hand, Hrazdil and Scott (2007) provide evidence against this hypothesis.  In 
one of the earlier studies of the certification hypothesis, Dhillon and Johnson (1991) 
examine the returns to bonds and options to distinguish between the price pressure and 
certification hypotheses.  Assuming no positive information, stock options and bonds are 
not susceptible to the price pressure or downward-sloping demand due to index 
rebalancing.  However, Dhillon and Johnson find that call option and bond prices both 
increase at the announcements of index inclusion, while put prices fall.  These findings 
support the certification hypothesis. 
In recent studies, Denis, et al (2003) and Kappou, et al (2007) find that earnings 
per share rise in the period following index inclusion events.  In addition, Denis, et al 
(2003) show that analyst earnings forecasts increase at the same time.  Denis, et al (2003) 
point out that it is unclear as to the source of the increase in earnings per share and 
analysts forecasts.  They suggest that the increased earnings may be due to superior 
monitoring by the market or the fact that these firms are selected by Standard and Poors 
for their better earnings potential.  Furthermore, Cai (2007) suggests that inclusion events 
convey positive information about both the industry and selected company.  Hrazdil and 
Scott (2007) refute the findings of Denis, et al (2003) by showing that the increases in 
earnings per share are due to managerial manipulation of the discretionary accruals.  
They suggest inclusion announcements convey no real information about company 
performance.   
Chen, et al (2004) find permanent price increases for addition stocks but no 
permanent decline in prices for deletion stocks.  Given this finding, they propose an 
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alternate explanation regarding the asymmetric effects of index additions and deletions.  
The investor awareness hypothesis stems from the Merton (1987) model of market 
segmentation where investors demand a shadow premium because they are only aware of 
and invest in a subset of stocks.  When stocks are added to the index, investors become 
more aware of them and the shadow premium should decrease.  Therefore, the required 
rate of return for the stock falls.  When a stock is removed from the index, investors do 
not remove it from their sphere of awareness so a symmetric decrease in stock prices is 
not expected. 
The price pressure hypothesis supports a temporary price increase for added 
stocks to the index due to heavy buying pressure by index funds.  Under this hypothesis, 
the effect of the increased demand of the selected stocks should dissipate in the short run 
and thus the positive price effects should be temporary.  Similarly, the hypothesis 
suggests a temporary price drop for stocks that are removed from the index.  Harris and 
Gurel (1986) and Elliott and Warr (2003) find empirical support for this hypothesis.  In 
particular, Harris and Gurel (1986) argue that the price pressure, driven by the 
rebalancing of index funds, leads to a short-term positive price reaction that is reversed 
within two weeks of the index change.  Since Standard and Poor’s states that they do not 
use forecasts of future performance as a selection criteria for choosing firms for the 
index, Harris and Gurel’s evidence of increased trading volume and price increases 
supports the price pressure hypothesis.  In addition, they document a positive relation 
between the magnitude of the change in trading volume and prices and the size of index 
funds in the market.  Elliott and Warr (2003) examine the differences in price pressure 
between the added firms on the NYSE and those on the Nasdaq.  They find that Nasdaq 
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stocks experience a larger and more sustained price impact.  They attribute the difference 
to the greater ability of the auction markets to absorb large increases in demand but 
conclude that price pressure drives the positive reaction of stocks added to the S&P 500. 
Finally, another strand of literature studies the changes in equity betas 
surrounding S&P 500 Index revisions.  Vijh (1994) finds, for the period of 1985 to 1989, 
the betas of newly included stocks to the S&P 500 increase and shows that some of this 
increase is due to increased trading volume in index stocks.  He concludes that the market 
beta of S&P 500 stocks is overstated following index inclusion.  Barberis, et al (2005) 
further examine changes to betas of newly added S&P 500 stocks and find increased 
correlation with other S&P 500 stocks and decreased correlation with non-S&P 500 
stocks.  A rational view of markets suggests that an increase in market betas would occur 
with increased co-movement of fundamentals or cash flows of a particular stock.  
Nevertheless, Barberis, et al (2005) shows that a “sentiment-based” theory of stock 
movement has support.   
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1.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 Our sample consists of firms that are added to or deleted from the S&P 500 Index 
from 1990 through 2007.  We begin our sample period in 1990 because Standard and 
Poor’s revised their method of announcing index revisions in October 1989.  Prior to this 
revision, Standard and Poor’s announced index changes after trading closed on the day 
immediately prior to the revision.  Following the change in 1989, index changes are pre-
announced several days prior to the actual revision of index constituents.  According to 
Benish and Whaley (1996), this change alleviates some buying pressure caused by index 
funds attempting to purchase shares of the newly added stock on the morning of the 
change.  Using a monthly list of S&P 500 Index constituents from Compustat, we 
identify the months in which the index constituents change.  We then verify, using news 
articles in Lexis-Nexis, the announcement and effective revision dates for all index 
changes.  This process produces 842 total sample firms with 419 index additions and 419 
deletions.  Panel A of Table 1 provides a breakdown of the number of index revisions by 
year in our sample.  We further exclude those sample firms that are associated with the 
following types of index changes: (1) When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an 
existing index firm (11 cases involving 11 added and 11 deleted firms), (2) when an S&P 
500 firm acquires another index firm and the acquired firm is removed from the index (5 
cases involving 5 deleted firms), (3) when two existing index firms merge and the 
resulting merged firm remains on the index (9 cases involving 9 added and 18 deleted 
firms), and (4) when an index firm is replaced by a spun-off subsidiary (17 cases 
involving 17 added and 17 deleted firms).  The final sample contains 382 added firms and 
368 deleted firms.  Panel B presents the sample screening process described above. 
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TABLE 1:  Number of Events by Year 
 
The sample consists of all firms added to or deleted from the S&P 500 during the period 
of 1990 - 2007.  Panel A includes all additions and deletions.  Panel B describes the 
events that were removed from the original sample and provides the final sample.  Deals 
were removed if an outside firm acquires an S&P 500 firm and replaces it on the index, if 
an S&P firm acquires another S&P firm and the acquired firm is removed from the index, 
if two S&P 500 firms merged and the merged firm remains on the index, and if an S&P 
500 firm spins off a subsidiary and the subsidiary replaces the parent firm. 
  
Panel A:  Number of Additions and Deletions by Year
Additions/Deletions
1990 11
1991 11
1992 7
1993 12
1994 16
1995 31
1996 23
1997 28
1998 42
1999 41
2000 56
2001 28
2002 22
2003 9
2004 19
2005 19
2006 31
2007 13 1
Total 419 SAMPLE
Panel B:  Sample Screening Process
Reason for Removal Additions Deletions
Final Sample Total 382 368
A non-index firm acquired and replaced 
an index firm.
Two index firms merge and the 
remaining merged firm remains in index.
0 5
189
17
An S&P 500 firm acquires another index 
firm and the acquired firm is removed 
from index.
11 11
Spun-off subsidiary replaces index firm. 17
15 
 
 In addition, we create a sample of matched peers for the sample firms by 
matching on industry and firm size.  For each sample firm, we collect a pool of industry 
peers in the same three-digit SIC code.  We then select the peer with a firm size 
(measured by total assets) that is closest to that of the sample firm.  We require that the 
selected match has valid data in Compustat for the fiscal year prior to the event date as 
well as valid stock returns in CRSP for the period of seven months prior to and after the 
announcement of the index revision.  Finally, we require that the matched firm is not a 
member of the S&P 500 Index in the five years prior to and after the event.  Our annual 
accounting data is from Compustat, daily and monthly stock returns are retrieved from 
CRSP, and marginal tax rates are the before-interest-expense tax rates from John 
Graham’s website.  If these tax rates are missing, tax rate is computed from Compustat 
data as the tax expense divided by total pretax income.  Any remaining missing or 
negative tax rates are filled in with the median tax rate of the existing inclusion or 
deletion sample.   
 Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample and matched firms for the 
inclusion sample in Panels A and B, respectively.  For the deletion sample, the same 
statistics are reported in Panels C and D.  On average, sample firms are larger in terms of 
assets, sales, and market value of equity than the matched pairs, and this holds for both 
the inclusion and deletion samples.  Also, both sets of sample firms have lower leverage 
than their matched counterparts.    
16
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1.3 Methodology and Empirical Results 
 
 
 According to Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) and Chen, et al (2004), the cost of 
equity capital should decrease for firms added to the S&P 500 due to increases in 
liquidity, decreases in information asymmetry, and increases in investor awareness of the 
firms.  The cost of equity capital should increase for deleted firms because of declines in 
liquidity.  In this section, we present the findings of the cost of capital around index 
revision events and discuss how our results relate to the liquidity and investor awareness 
hypotheses.   
Cost of Equity Before and After Index Revisions: Buy-and-Hold Returns  To 
measure the cost of equity, we use two different methods.  First, we follow Errunza and 
Miller (2000) who use buy-and-hold returns for a period prior to and after the ADR 
listing of international firms.  They use changes in the buy-and-hold returns as a proxy 
for changes in the cost of equity.  We compute buy-and-hold returns for a period of one 
year and two years prior to and after the announcement date excluding a one month 
window around the announcement for both the sample and matched group of firms.  All 
buy-and-hold returns are annualized.  Table 3 reports the buy-and-hold returns for firms 
added to and deleted from the S&P 500 Index.  We report the returns measured over the 
following windows: a twelve-month window before (from month -13 to month -2, where 
month 0 is the announcement month), a twelve-month window after (month +2 to month 
+13), a 24-month window before (month -25 to month -2), and a 24-month window after 
(month +2 to month +25).  Panel A includes buy-and-hold returns for all added firms and 
adjusted returns for the same firms.  Adjusted buy-and-hold returns are the difference 
between the sample firm buy-and-hold returns and those of the matched pair firms, and 
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TABLE 3:  Buy and Hold Returns 
 
The sample consists of all firms added or deleted from the S&P 500 during the period of 
1990 - 2007.  We exclude added firms and deleted firms where the added firm acquires 
the deleted firm, where two index firms merge and the merged firm remains, and where 
an added firm is a subsidiary spun-off from a deleted firm.  We match each sample firm 
with a matching pair firm in the same 3-digit SIC code and the matched pair is the closest 
possible match in asset size.  Matched firms cannot be constituents of the S&P 500 for a 
period of 10 years surrounding the event.    Buy and hold returns are calculated for two 
windows before and after the event date, where month 0 is the announcement month.  All 
buy and hold returns are annualized.  For a given window, if the sample firm is missing 
25% or less of the total monthly returns, we compute the buy-and-hold return for the 
shorter window based on valid returns.    Panel A contains results for newly included 
firms to the index before winsorization.  Panel B  contains results  where buy and hold  
returns are  winsorized to  remove extreme observations greater [less] than the 99th [1st] 
percentile.  Panel C contains results for firms removed from the index before 
winsorization, and Panel D includes the same sample with winsorized buy-and-hold 
returns.  The unadjusted mean is the mean for the sample firms.  The adjusted mean is the 
difference between the sample return and that of the matched pair.  We measure 
statistical signficance using a t-test for the difference of each variable from before and 
after the announcement date. [* indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, 
and *** at the 1% level.] 
 
 
 
Panel A:  Inclusion Firms
[-13, -2] [+13, +2] Difference N
Unadjusted Mean 0.5852 *** 0.1126 *** -0.4726 *** 298
Adjusted Mean 0.2751 *** 0.0328 -0.2423 ***
[-25, -2] [+25, +2] Difference N
Unadjusted Mean 0.4554 *** 0.0784 *** -0.3770 *** 229
Adjusted Mean 0.2501 *** 0.0264 -0.2237 ***
Panel B:  Inclusion Firms - Winsorized at 1/99% level
[-13, -2] [+13, +2] Difference N
Unadjusted Mean 0.5625 *** 0.0968 *** -0.4657 *** 298
Adjusted Mean 0.2824 *** 0.0217 -0.2607 ***
[-25, -2] [+25, +2] Difference N
Unadjusted Mean 0.4435 *** 0.0721 *** -0.3714 *** 229
Adjusted Mean 0.2413 *** 0.0194 -0.2219 ***
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
 
 
  
Panel C:  Deletion Firms
[-13, -2] [+13, +2] Difference N
Unadjusted Mean -0.0910 ** 0.3480 *** 0.4390 *** 103
Adjusted Mean -0.1490 *** 0.1699 0.3190 ***
[-25, -2] [+25, +2] Difference N
Unadjusted Mean -0.0980 *** 0.1339 *** 0.2310 *** 85
Adjusted Mean -0.0900 ** 0.0451 0.1350 **
Panel D:  Deletion Firms - Winsorized at 1/99% level
[-13, -2] [+13, +2] Difference N
Unadjusted Mean -0.0900 ** 0.2922 *** 0.3820 *** 103
Adjusted Mean -0.1500 *** 0.1139 0.2640 ***
[-25, -2] [+25, +2] Difference N
Unadjusted Mean -0.0950 *** 0.1307 *** 0.2260 *** 85
Adjusted Mean -0.0890 ** 0.0496 0.1390 **
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Panel B shows the results for these firms when the buy-and-hold returns are winsorized at 
the 99 and 1% levels.  Panels C and D provide the same results for deleted firms.  For a 
given sample firm in the inclusion and deletion samples, the unadjusted return is the raw 
return measured over the window.  The adjusted return is the unadjusted return of the 
sample firm minus the unadjusted return of the matched pair.  The results in Panels A and 
B suggest that the unadjusted buy-and-hold returns for the inclusion sample firms are 
consistently higher in the pre-event period and fall during the post-event period.  The 
difference between the pre- and post-event buy-and-hold returns is significantly different 
at the 1% level for sample firms.  For example, Panel A shows that the mean pre-event 
return for inclusion firms over the 24-month window was 45.54% annually, while the 
post-event return was 7.84% annually.  Similarly, adjusted returns for inclusion firms 
decline significantly in the post-event period.   In the two-year window, the adjusted buy 
and hold return declined by 22.37% (significant at the 1% level), which indicates that this 
proxy for the cost of equity of newly included firms decreases more than the matched 
sample.  The winsorized returns in Panel B show similar results.  The pre-inclusion 
returns for added firms are significantly higher than those of the matched firms, but 
following inclusion to the index no significant difference remains between these returns.  
Hedge and McDermott (2003) suggest that Standard and Poors often selects firms after 
periods of positive momentum which may explain this finding of high returns for added 
firms. In addition, high returns in the pre-inclusion period increase firm value and may 
cause the added firm to surpass the Standard and Poors’ minimum size threshold.   
 For deleted firms, buy-and-hold returns are significantly higher in the post-
deletion period for all but one sample period.  In Panel C, deleted firms have a buy-and-
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hold return of -9.8% prior to removal and 13.39% following removal for the two-year 
sample period.   The increase in buy-and-hold returns for newly deleted S&P 500 firms is 
23.10%, which is significant at the 1% level.  The adjusted buy-and-hold returns for the 
deletion firms also show that this proxy for the cost of equity increases by 13.50% 
(significant at the 5% level) more for sample firms than matched firms.  Similar results 
are obtained using the winsorized sample shown in Panel D.  Consistent with the liquidity 
hypothesis we find significant increases in the cost of equity for newly deleted firms and 
decreases in the cost of equity for newly added firms to the S&P 500 Index.  Note that it 
is somewhat difficult to interpret the buy-and-hold returns as the cost of equity when 
these realized returns are negative for some of the deletion firms.  Therefore, we use an 
alternative method to estimate the cost of equity and report the results next. 
Cost of Equity Before and After Index Revisions: Market and Four-Factor Models  
We follow Grullon and Michaely (2004) and estimate the market and three-factor models 
to compute changes in the cost of equity.  Since Hedge and McDermott (2003) suggest 
that companies are often included in the S&P 500 following a period of positive 
momentum, we estimate the Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model to account for the 
possibility of positive momentum in inclusion stocks and negative momentum in deletion 
stocks.  .  Using daily returns for one year prior to and following the announcement date 
of the index revision, we compute the coefficients for the market model  
rit - rft = α-i+αΔiDt+b-i(rmt - rft)+bΔiDt(rmt - rft) + et 
and the four factor model 
rit - rft = α-i + αΔiDt+ b-i(rmt - rft) + bΔiDt(rmt - rft) + s-iSMBt + sΔiDtSMBt + h-iHMLt + 
hΔiDtHMLt +u-iUMDt + uΔiDtUMDt + et 
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where rit is the daily return on a stock i, rft is the daily return on the one-month U.S. 
Treasury bills, rmt is the daily return on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted index, 
SMBt is the difference between the daily return on a portfolios of small and large firms, 
HMLt is the difference between the daily returns of the portfolios of high book-to-market 
and low book-to-market stocks, UMDt is the difference between the daily returns of the 
portfolios of high and low momentum stocks, and Dt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if t is 
greater than the announcement date of the inclusion or deletion event.  To calculate the 
cost of capital for these models, we compute the average daily risk premium for the 
market, SMB, HML, and UMD factors over the period from 1990 through 2007 and use 
these average values to determine the expected annual return.  Table 4 reports the change 
in the cost of capital based on the market and four-factor models, respectively.  In 
particular, we present the change in cost of equity before and after for the inclusion 
sample in Panels A (no winsorization) and B (1%/99% winsorization).  For the inclusion 
sample, the unadjusted change in cost of capital has a mean of -44.1% (significant at the 
1% level) and a median of -19.29% (significant at the 1% level).  More importantly, the 
mean (median) adjusted change in cost of equity is -22.3% (-9.07%) significant at the 5% 
(1%) level.  We find similar results using the four-factor model.  In particular, the 
inclusion firms experience a significant drop in the estimated cost of capital with a mean 
(median) adjusted change of -15.8% (-3.08%), which is significant at the 5% (10%) level.  
The winsorized results in Panel B are generally similar to the results in Panel A. 
 For deletion firms, the results on the change in cost of capital are reported in 
Panels C and D of Table 4.  The results clearly suggest that the deleted firms experience a 
significant increase in the cost of capital after the deletion events.  Panel C shows that the 
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TABLE 4:  Changes in Cost of Capital 
 
The sample consists of all firms added or deleted from the S&P 500 during the period of 
1990 - 2007.  We exclude added firms and deleted firms where the added firm acquires 
the deleted firm, where two index firms merge and the merged firm remains, and where 
an added firm is a subsidiary spun-off from a deleted firm.  We match each sample firm 
with a matching pair firm in the same 3-digit SIC code and the matched pair is the closest 
possible match in asset size.  Matched firms cannot be constituents of the S&P 500 for a 
period of 10 years surrounding the event.  The table reports the mean and median values 
of the cost of capital measured by the market model 
rit - rft = α-i+αΔiDt+b-i(rmt - rft)+bΔiDt(rmt - rft) + et 
and the four-factor model 
rit - rft = α-I + αΔiD t+ b-i(rmt - rft) + bΔiDt(rmt - rft) + s-iSMBt + sΔiDtSMBt + h-iHMLt + 
hΔiDtHMLt +u-iUMDt + uΔiDtUMDt + et 
where rit is the daily return on a stock i, rft is the daily return on the one-month U.S. 
Treasury bills, rmt is the daily return on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted index, 
SMBt is the difference between the daily return on a portfolios of small and large firms, 
HMLt is the difference between the daily returns of the portfolios of high book-to-market 
and low book-to-market stocks, UMDt is the difference between the daily returns of the 
portfolios of high and low momentum stocks, Dt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if t is 
greater than the announcement date of the inclusion or deletion event.  We estimate the 
model using daily returns for one year prior to and following the announcement date.  
The cost of capital for the market and four-factor models are calculated using the mean 
daily market, SMB, HML, and UMD risk premia over the period from 1990 through 
2007.  The adjusted cost of capital is equal to the unadjusted cost of capital for the sample 
firms minus the estimated cost of capital for the matched firms. We measure statistical 
signficance using a t-test for means and the Wilcoxon ranked sign test for the medians for 
before and after the event.  We use the mean difference t-test for difference in means and 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for difference in medians. [ * indicates significance at the 
10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.] 
 
Market Model N Before Change After
 Unadjusted Mean 345 0.7862 *** -0.4410 *** 0.3454 ***
 Adjusted Mean 340 0.3111 *** -0.2230 ** 0.0881 *
 Unadjusted Median 345 0.4156 *** -0.1929 *** 0.2067 ***
 Adjusted Median 340 0.1529 *** -0.0907 *** 0.0350 **
Four Factor Model N Before Change After
 Unadjusted Mean 345 0.7324 *** -0.3490 *** 0.3835 ***
 Adjusted Mean 340 0.2771 *** -0.1580 ** 0.1191 ***
 Unadjusted Median 345 0.4224 *** -0.2034 *** 0.2430 ***
 Adjusted Median 340 0.1359 *** -0.0308 * 0.0554 ***
Panel A:  Inclusion Firms
Cost of Capital 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
 
  
 
 Market Model N Before Change After
 Unadjusted Mean 345 0.7568 *** -0.4360 *** 0.3208 ***
 Adjusted Mean 340 0.3149 *** -0.2460 *** 0.0689 * 
 Unadjusted Median 345 0.4156 *** -0.1929 *** 0.2067 ***
 Adjusted Median 340 0.1529 *** -0.0980 *** 0.0350 **
 Four Factor Model N Before Change After
 Unadjusted Mean 345 0.7058 *** -0.3250 *** 0.3805 ***
 Adjusted Mean 340 0.2673 *** -0.1420 ** 0.1253 *** 
 Unadjusted Median 345 0.4224 *** -0.2034 *** 0.2430 ***
 Adjusted Median 340 0.1359 *** -0.0308 ** 0.0565 ***
 Market Model N Before Change After
 Unadjusted Mean 141 0.0613 0.6113 *** 0.6726 ***
 Adjusted Mean 140 -0.1600 ** 0.4761 *** 0.3161 ** 
 Unadjusted Median 141 0.0735 0.1369 *** 0.2325 ***
 Adjusted Median 140 -0.0750 ** 0.1425 *** 0.0757
DEL_FFCocChange Four Factor Model N Before Change After
 Unadjusted Mean 141 0.0843 * 0.4054 *** 0.4898 ***
 Adjusted Mean 140 -0.1350 ** 0.3418 *** 0.2067 * 
 Unadjusted Median 141 0.0015 0.1888 *** 0.2159 ***
 Adjusted Median 140 -0.0937 ** 0.1632 ** -0.0042
 Market Model N Before Change After
 Unadjusted Mean 141 0.0619 0.5910 *** 0.6529 ***
 Adjusted Mean 140 -0.1300 ** 0.4275 *** 0.2978 ** 
 Unadjusted Median 141 0.0735 0.1369 *** 0.2325 ***
 Adjusted Median 140 -0.0750 ** 0.1492 *** 0.0790
 Four Factor Model N Before Change After
 Unadjusted Mean 141 0.0848 * 0.3847 *** 0.4695 ***
 Adjusted Mean 140 -0.1260 ** 0.3107 *** 0.1849 * 
 Unadjusted Median 141 0.0015 0.1888 *** 0.2159 ***
 Adjusted Median 140 -0.0937 ** 0.1632 ** -0.0042
Panel B:  Inclusion Firms - Winsorized at 1/99% level
Cost of Capital 
Panel D:  Deletion Firms - Winsorized at 1/99% level
Panel C:  Deletion Firms
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unadjusted change in the cost of capital is significantly positive based on either the 
market or four-factor models.  We observe the same conclusion in the adjusted cost of 
capital.  For example, the adjusted change in cost of capital for deletion firms based on 
the market model has a mean (median) of 47.61% (14.25%), which is significant at the 
1% (1%) level.  Based on the four-factor model, the deleted firms experience a significant 
mean change in cost of capital of 34.18% (16.32%) after their stocks are removed from 
the index.  The winsorized results in Panel D confirm the results in Panel C.  Therefore, 
using the market and four-factor models, we show that the cost of capital for the added 
(deletion) firm declines (increases) significantly after the index change.   
 Overall, the buy-and-hold returns and cost of capital based on market and four-
factor models indicate a symmetric pattern in the change in cost of capital for added and 
deleted firms.  In other words, we observe a significant decline in the cost of equity for 
added firms and a significant increase in the cost of equity for deleted firms.  These 
changes are significantly different from those of the matched peers.  Thus, the evidence 
supports the liquidity hypothesis as we observe a symmetric reaction in cost of capital for 
newly included and removed firms.  However, one cannot rule out the investor awareness 
hypothesis without further examination.  If, for example, the decrease in cost of equity 
following addition is driven by both increases in liquidity and decreases in shadow cost, 
and the increases in the cost of equity following deletion are driven by declines in 
liquidity only, this finding would support both the liquidity hypothesis and investor 
awareness hypothesis simultaneously.  To study what drives the changes in cost of capital 
for the sample firms, we next analyze various liquidity measures and the shadow cost 
suggested by Chen, et al (2004). 
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Liquidity and Shadow Cost Changes  Based on the liquidity and investor 
awareness hypotheses, changes in cost of equity for addition and deletion firms can stem 
from one of two main sources: change in liquidity and change in shadow cost.  To 
examine the two sources of changes in cost of equity, we report the change in three 
liquidity measures and shadow cost.  The three liquidity measures and shadow cost are 
measured for 12 months preceding the event announcement ending one month prior to 
the announcement date.  Similarly, we measure the liquidity and shadow cost for 12 
months following the event beginning one month after the completion date.  In particular, 
the three liquidity measures are illiquidity ratio, trading volume, and turnover.  The 
illiquidity ratio is the average of the absolute value of the daily return divided by the 
dollar volume traded on that day.  The illiquidity ratio is further multiplied by 10
7
.  
Volume is the log of the average of the daily dollar amount traded.  The dollar amount 
traded is calculated for each day as the number of shares traded multiplied by the closing 
price.  The turnover ratio is the average of the monthly share volume traded divided by 
the number of shares outstanding during that month.  On the other hand, shadow cost is 
the ratio of the product of the residual standard deviation and firm size divided by the 
product of the S&P 500 Index market capitalization and the number of shareholders.  The 
residual standard deviation is the standard deviation of the difference between the firm's 
return and the S&P 500 total return.  Firm size is measured as the number of shares 
outstanding multiplied by the closing price on the announcement date.  The S&P 500 
Index market capitalization is measured in dollars on the announcement date.  The 
number of shareholders is measured before the event date at the closest point prior to the 
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event, and the number of shareholders after the event is measured a minimum of nine 
months after the announcement date.   
 Table 5 reports the unadjusted and adjusted mean (median) of the three liquidity 
measures and shadow cost for the inclusion and deletion firms, respectively.  The 
unadjusted mean (median) of a given variable is the sample firm average (median).  The 
adjusted mean (median) is the mean (median) difference between the sample firms and 
their matched pairs.  We report the results in this table and for all multivariate regressions 
with variables winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.  For inclusion firms, we observe a 
drop in illiquidity ratio and an increase in volume and turnover.  This observation is 
generally significant for the unadjusted and adjusted means (medians).  As developed by 
Amihud (2002), the illiquidity ratio measures the price impact per dollar of trading 
activity on a particular date, and larger values indicate deteriorating liquidity.  Contrarily, 
increases in turnover and volume signal liquidity improvements. In other words, the 
results suggest that added firms experience better stock liquidity after the inclusion events, 
which is consistent with the literature.  On the other hand, we also find that the shadow 
cost is significantly lower after the inclusion events, which suggests that investors are 
more aware of the added firms after the index revisions.   
 For deleted firms, we find that the illiquidity ratio is significantly higher and 
volume drops significantly after their stocks are excluded from the index, which suggests 
a decrease in liquidity for the deleted stocks.  Interestingly, turnover for deleted firms 
increases after the announcements.  The result implies that, although total trading volume 
decreases after the stock is deleted from the index, the stocks remain relatively active as 
indicated by an increase in turnover.  Since deleted firms experience a large albeit 
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TABLE 5:  Liquidity and Shadow Cost Measures 
 
The sample consists of all firms added or deleted from the S&P 500 during the period of 
1990 - 2007.  We exclude added firms and deleted firms where the added firm acquires 
the deleted firm, where two index firms merge and the merged firm remains, and where 
an added firm is a subsidiary spun-off from a deleted firm.  We match each sample firm 
with a matching pair firm in the same 3-digit SIC code and the matched pair is the closest 
possible match in asset size.  Matched firms cannot be constituents of the S&P 500 for a 
period of 10 years surrounding the event.  The unadjusted mean (median) for each 
variable is the sample firm average (median) value, and the adjusted mean (median) for 
each variable is the mean (median) difference between the sample and matched firms.  
The three liquidity measures and shadow cost are measured for a year before and after the 
inclusion or deletion event beginning one month prior to or after the announcement 
month.  The illiquidity ratio is the average of the absolute value of the daily return 
divided by the dollar volume traded on that day.  The illiquidity ratio is multiplied by 107.   
Volume is the log of the average daily number of shares traded multiplied by the closing 
price.  The turnover ratio is the average monthly share volume traded divided by the 
number of shares outstanding.  Finally, the shadow cost is the ratio of the product of the 
residual standard deviation and firm size divided by the product of the S&P 500 index 
market capitalization and the number of shareholders.  The residual standard deviation is 
the standard deviation of the difference between the firm's return and the S&P 500 total 
return.  Firm size is measured as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the 
closing price on the announcement date.  The S&P 500 index market capitalization is 
measured in dollars on the announcement date.  The number of shareholders is measured 
before the event date at the closest point prior to the event, and the number of 
shareholders after the event is measured at least nine months after the announcement date.  
[ * indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.]  
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
  
N
Unadjusted Mean 354 0.0116 *** -0.0050 *** 0.0071 ***
Adjusted Mean 350 -0.3090 ** -0.3370 ** -0.6980 ***
Unadjusted Median 354 0.0068 *** -0.0021 *** 0.0039 ***
Adjusted Median 350 -0.0173 ** 0.0009 ** -0.0161 ***
N
Unadjusted Mean 354 14.6840 *** 0.4592 *** 15.2590 ***
Adjusted Mean 350 0.9168 *** 0.2508 *** 1.1608 ***
Unadjusted Median 354 16.5402 *** 0.3299 *** 16.9765 ***
Adjusted Median 350 0.9492 *** 0.2516 *** 1.2470 ***
N
Unadjusted Mean 354 180.2300 *** 25.7560 *** 201.8100 ***
Adjusted Mean 350 42.5750 * 13.5290 * 54.1130 ***
Unadjusted Median 354 107.3501 *** 16.0793 *** 134.4867 ***
Adjusted Median 350 22.1346 ** 8.0131 ** 32.7602 ***
N
Unadjusted Mean 284 15.6380 *** -5.0230 *** 10.6290 ***
Adjusted Mean 242 8.8365 *** -4.1630 *** 3.9546 **
Unadjusted Median 284 4.9310 *** -0.1386 *** 3.5959 ***
Adjusted Median 242 1.8948 *** -0.2450 *** 1.2142 ***
Change After
Volume
Panel A:  Inclusion Firms
Illiquidity Ratio
Before
Turnover
Before Change After
Shadow Cost
Before
After
Change After
Before Change
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TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
  
N
Unadjusted Mean 161 0.1096 ** 0.8548 ** 1.0364 **
Adjusted Mean 159 -0.8480 0.1687 -1.2820 **
Unadjusted Median 161 0.0082 *** 0.0040 *** 0.0459 ***
Adjusted Median 159 -0.0175 ** 0.0085 ** -0.0166 ***
N
Unadjusted Mean 161 15.8140 *** -0.3520 *** 14.6080 ***
Adjusted Mean 159 2.0039 *** -0.2580 *** 1.8964 ***
Unadjusted Median 161 16.7373 *** -0.1819 *** 15.1582 ***
Adjusted Median 159 1.3078 ** -0.1000 ** 1.1283 ***
N
Unadjusted Mean 161 136.0500 ** 43.4130 ** 163.3400 ***
Adjusted Mean 159 31.2320 ** 43.5690 ** 44.9080 **
Unadjusted Median 161 103.4638 *** 8.5867 *** 95.1455 ***
Adjusted Median 159 29.1191 *** 11.5839 *** 18.2102 **
N
Unadjusted Mean 107 1.8457 -0.3740 1.3332 ***
Adjusted Mean 91 -3.4620 0.0109 -4.3600 ***
Unadjusted Median 107 0.4808 * 0.0351 * 0.4746 ***
Adjusted Median 91 -0.1684 0.0441 -0.2297 ***
Volume
Before Change After
Panel B:  Deletion Firms
Illiquidity Ratio
Before Change After
Shadow Cost
Before Change After
Turnover
Before Change After
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temporary price decline following removal from the index, the illiquidity ratio and 
volume, which are both calculated with share price, may not be a clear indicator of 
liquidity changes.  We believe that turnover is a better measure of liquidity changes 
because it is independent of price changes.  Moreover, the shadow cost of deleted stocks 
is not significantly different before and after the deletion events.  Overall, the findings 
suggest that liquidity of the deleted stocks decreases after the deletion announcements, 
however, these stocks remain actively traded and their shadow cost does not change 
significantly. 
 The findings of the change in liquidity measures and shadow cost for inclusion 
and deletion firms lend support for both the liquidity and investor awareness hypotheses.  
In particular, the increase (decrease) in liquidity for inclusion (deletion) stocks is both 
economically and statistically significant, suggesting a symmetric change in liquidity in 
the sample firms.  This evidence is consistent with the liquidity hypothesis.  In addition, 
we find that both added and deleted firms experience an increase in stock turnover.  More 
importantly, the shadow cost of the added stocks drops significantly while that of the 
deleted stocks experiences no significant change.  These findings support the investor 
awareness hypothesis that while inclusion stocks are added to the investors’ awareness at 
the index revisions, deleted stocks are not taken out of the investor’s awareness when 
they are excluded from the index. 
Relating Cost of Equity Changes to Announcement Returns Our motivation for 
studying the changes in cost of equity around S&P 500 Index revisions is to account for 
the price reaction to the reconstitution announcements.    In this section, we examine the 
determinants of excess returns around the event dates.  In particular, we explore whether 
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changes in liquidity and investor awareness are directly related to excess returns or rather 
if these factors influence the announcement returns indirectly through affecting the cost 
of capital.   
The pattern of decreases in the cost of equity for newly added S&P 500 firms and 
increases in the cost of equity for newly removed firms is observable to investors.  If this 
information is anticipated and incorporated into the announcement period returns, we 
should observe a relation between the changes in the firms’ cost of equity and returns 
around index change announcements.  Therefore, to analyze whether decreases (increases) 
in the cost of equity drive the announcement reaction for addition (deletion) firms, we 
conduct a multivariate regression using the cumulative excess returns as the dependent 
variable.  We measure the cumulative excess returns from the announcement date 
through the actual completion date to capture the effect of the pre-announced change.  
The independent variables include the change in cost of equity, change in liquidity 
proxies, and change in shadow cost measure.  In addition, we control for the three 
variables suggested by Chen, et al (2004) as they may be related to the announcement 
returns around index revisions.  In particular, we control for firm age, whether the firm 
traded on the NYSE, and relative size.  Firm age is measured as the log of the number of 
months between a firm’s first appearance in CRSP and the announcement date.  We 
define a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm traded on the NYSE prior to index 
inclusion or removal.  Relative size is the log of the ratio of firm size to the S&P 500 
Index market capitalization at the announcement date.  Lastly, we include the market to 
book ratio as a control variable.  Market to book ratio is the ratio of the market value of 
assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is estimated as the 
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book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 6 with the results for inclusion events in 
Panel A and the results for deletion events in Panel B.   
In general, a decline in the cost of equity for inclusion firms is expected to be 
associated with a positive abnormal return.  We perform the regressions based on three 
models.  Model 1 includes the cost of capital changes, liquidity proxy variable changes, 
and changes in shadow cost.  Model 2 includes the above variables plus the three control 
variables suggested by Chen, et al (2004).  In Model 3, we add additional control 
variables to Model 2.  In Models 1 and 2, we confirm the negative relation between cost 
of capital change and abnormal returns by observing a positive and significant coefficient 
on the change in cost of capital.  The liquidity and shadow cost changes are not directly 
related to the announcement excess returns.  Interestingly, Chen, et al (2004) show that 
the change in shadow cost is negatively related to abnormal returns, while our results 
show the impact of shadow cost is negative but insignificant.  As Chen, et al (2004) 
indicate that changes in shadow cost have an impact on the changes in cost of equity, our 
analysis suggests that the shadow cost change has no significant impact on excess returns 
once we control for the changes in cost of equity.  In other words, changes in shadow 
costs have an indirect effect on abnormal returns through their impact on the cost of 
capital.  In Model 3, we add the market to book ratio and the interaction between market 
to book ratio and cost of capital changes.  Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) suggest that 
addition firms benefit from more value-creating investments as a result of a lower cost of 
capital.  Therefore, newly added firms to the S&P 500 will benefit most when their cost 
of equity falls AND they face opportunities for further growth.  Following Adam and 
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TABLE 6:  Multivariate Analysis of Excess Returns 
 
The sample consists of all firms added or deleted from the S&P 500 during the period of 
1990 - 2007.  We exclude added firms and deleted firms where the added firm acquires 
the deleted firm, where two index firms merge and the merged firm remains, and where 
an added firm is a subsidiary spun-off from a deleted firm.  The dependent variable in 
each regression is the excess abnormal return from the index change announcement date 
through the implementation date.  The cost of capital change is estimated from four-
factor model.  The three liquidity measures and shadow cost are measured for a year 
before and after the inclusion or deletion event beginning one month prior to or after the 
announcement month.  The illiquidity ratio is the average of the absolute value of the 
daily return divided by the dollar volume traded on that day.  The illiquidity ratio is 
multiplied by 10
7
.   Volume is the log of the average daily number of shares traded 
multiplied by the closing price.  The turnover ratio is the average monthly share volume 
traded divided by the number of shares outstanding.  Finally, the shadow cost is the ratio 
of the product of the residual standard deviation and firm size divided by the product of 
the S&P 500 index market capitalization and the number of shareholders.  The residual 
standard deviation is the standard deviation of the difference between the firm's return 
and the S&P 500 total return.  Firm size is measured as the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by the closing price on the announcement date.  The S&P 500 index market 
capitalization is measured in dollars on the announcement date.  The number of 
shareholders is measured before the event date at the closest point prior to the event, and 
the number of shareholders after the event is measured at least nine months after the 
announcement date.  Relative size is the log of the ratio of firm size to the S&P 500 index 
market capitalization and is measured on the announcement date.  Firm age is the log of 
the number of months between a firm's first appearance in the CRSP database and the 
announcement month, and we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm traded on 
the NYSE prior to the index change.  The market/book ratio is the ratio of the market 
value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is estimated 
as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. 
Parameter estimates are presented with t-statistics below.  [* indicates significance at the 
10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.] 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
 
  
4.4858 *** 11.4314 * 10.4332 *
7.77 1.87 1.71
-0.9730 * -0.9209 * 0.7160
-1.94 -1.81 1.07
-78.9969 -67.3369 -83.0231
-1.15 -0.97 -1.23
0.3625 0.4085 0.5094
0.62 0.68 0.87
-0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0023
-0.21 -0.33 -0.47
-0.0251 -0.0114 0.0546
-0.81 -0.34 1.38
#N/A ### -0.4191 -0.3230
#N/A -0.56 -0.45
#N/A ### -0.7101 -0.7557
#N/A -1.34 -1.44
#N/A ### -0.7379 -0.2177
#N/A -0.70 -0.19
#N/A ### #N/A ### 0.2149
#N/A #N/A 1.58
#N/A ### #N/A ### -0.1820 ***
#N/A #N/A -2.71
N 281 281 278
R-Squared 0.0288 0.0377 0.0861
 Panel A:  Inclusion firms
Intercept
Volume Change
Illiquidity Ratio Change
COC Change
Turnover Change
ShadowCost Change
Relative Size
Firm Age
NYSE Dummy
Market/Book Ratio
COC Change * 
Market/Book Ratio
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
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TABLE 6 (continued) 
 
  
-8.5180 *** -16.4203 -20.7934 *
-6.42 -1.52 -1.80
0.8042 1.6833 2.8643
0.56 1.12 0.80
-0.0120 -0.0278 -0.1332
-0.06 -0.13 -0.34
0.7300 0.5304 0.7033
0.60 0.43 0.54
-0.0072 -0.0052 -0.0042
-1.10 -0.74 -0.59
-0.2216 -0.1412 0.5705
-0.22 -0.13 0.45
#N/A ### 1.7106 * 1.4195
#N/A 1.70 1.36
#N/A ### -0.5698 -0.1243
#N/A -0.32 -0.07
#N/A ### 3.0498 3.3692
#N/A 0.85 0.94
#N/A ### #N/A ### 1.6358
#N/A #N/A 0.76
#N/A ### #N/A ### -0.5597
#N/A #N/A -0.22
N 99 99 99
R-Squared 0.0231 0.0626 0.0792
Market/Book Ratio
COC Change * 
Market/Book Ratio
ShadowCost Change
Relative Size
Firm Age
NYSE Dummy
Intercept
COC Change
Turnover Change
Volume Change
Illiquidity Ratio Change
Panel B:  Deletion firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
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Goyal (2008), we include the market to book ratio to represent the firms’ investment 
opportunity set.  We also include an interaction term of the change in cost of capital and 
market to book ratio.  We find that market to book ratio has an insignificant impact on 
abnormal returns.  Interestingly, we find that the coefficient on the interaction term is 
negative.  This indicates that firms with larger investment opportunity sets have larger 
announcement returns when their cost of capital declines.  These firms are able to take 
better advantage of the reduction in cost of capital because more of these investment 
opportunities become positive NPV projects, benefiting shareholders.  For deletion firms 
in Panel B, there is no significant relation between the cost of capital changes and the 
excess returns around announcement
1
.  Overall, the results from this section suggest, for 
inclusion firms, that the cost of capital changes are inversely related to the price increases 
around S&P 500 index changes.  Additionally, newly included firms with larger 
investment opportunity sets benefit more from the decline in cost of equity than those 
with smaller investment opportunity sets.  The results support the important link between 
the cost of equity change and the price response of inclusion stocks.  Our final analysis 
explores the factors that explain the cost of equity changes to further distinguish between 
the investor awareness and liquidity hypotheses.   
                                                          
1
 We conduct the same analysis using the change in the cost of equity using the market 
model and report these results in Table A of the appendix.  Only the results on the 
interacted term in Model 3 persist using this model to estimate the cost of equity.  This 
model does not account for momentum which may be an important factor in inclusion 
firms.  In Table B of the appendix, we repeat the analysis using all values adjusted by the 
control firms.  The dependent variable is the adjusted change in the cost of equity 
measured by the four factor model.  The results from Table 6 do not remain when we take 
into account the control firms.    
39 
 
Factors Explaining Cost of Equity Changes To examine if liquidity and/or 
investor awareness are the main determinants for the change of cost of capital around 
index revisions, we perform a multivariate regression analysis.  We include the change in 
cost of capital as the dependent variable.  We measure the cost of capital using the cost of 
equity estimated by the market model and the four-factor model.  The independent 
variables include the change in illiquidity ratio, volume, turnover, and shadow cost.  We 
also include the relative size of the sample firm as a control variable.  Cost of equity 
changes may also be driven by the changes in firm’s capital structure, so we include the 
changes in firm leverage.  In particular, we measure firm leverage during each fiscal year 
for three years prior to and following the announcement date.  Then we compute the 
average leverage ratio before and after the event and use the difference in these averages 
as the change in leverage.  Additionally, we include a variable to capture the change in 
information asymmetry.  Chen, et al (2004) suggest that a lower level of information 
asymmetry may be a cause of cost of capital reduction for inclusions.  To control for 
information asymmetry changes, we measure the cumulative abnormal return on days -1, 
0, and +1 surrounding a quarterly earnings announcement.  We measure the average of 
the absolute value of these returns for the 5 years before and after the event date and 
compute the change in the average reaction.  A decline or increase in the average stock 
reaction to quarterly earnings announcements is a proxy for a decrease or increase in 
information asymmetry, respectively.  Both Lobo and Tung (1997) and Dierkens (1991) 
use this variable to proxy for information asymmetry.  We perform the multivariate 
regressions for the inclusion firms and deletion firms individually and report the results in 
Table 7.   
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TABLE 7:  Multivariate Analysis of Cost of Capital Changes 
 
The sample consists of all firms added or deleted from the S&P 500 during the period of 
1990 - 2007.  We exclude added firms and deleted firms where the added firm acquires 
the deleted firm, where two index firms merge and the merged firm remains, and where 
an added firm is a subsidiary spun-off from a deleted firm.  The dependent variable in 
each regression is the change in the cost of capital estimated from the four-factor model.  
The three liquidity measures and shadow cost are measured for a year before and after the 
inclusion or deletion event beginning one month prior to or after the announcement 
month.  The change in these measures is the difference between the measure before and 
after the announcement date.  The illiquidity ratio is the average of the absolute value of 
the daily return divided by the dollar volume traded on that day. The illiquidity ratio is 
multiplied by 10
7
. Volume is the log of the average daily number of shares traded 
multiplied by the closing price. The turnover ratio is the average monthly share volume 
traded divided by the number of shares outstanding.  Finally, the shadow cost is the ratio 
of the product of the residual standard deviation and firm size divided by the product of 
the S&P 500 index market capitalization and the number of shareholders.  The residual 
standard deviation is the standard deviation of the difference between the firm's return 
and the S&P 500 total return.  Firm size is measured as the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by the closing price on the announcement date.  The S&P 500 index market 
capitalization is measured in dollars on the announcement date.  The number of 
shareholders is measured before the event date at the closest point prior to the event, and 
the number of shareholders after the event is measured at least nine months after the 
announcement date.  Relative size is the log of the ratio of firm size to the S&P 500 index 
market capitalization and is measured on the announcement date.  Leverage is defined as 
the ratio of the book value of total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) to 
the market value of assets.  The market value of assets is defined as the book value of 
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity.  We measure the 
average leverage in the three years prior to the announcement date and the three years 
following the announcement date.  The change in leverage is the difference of the 
average after the announcement and before the announcement date.  The abnormal 
reaction to quarterly earnings announcements is measured for every quarter for days [-1, 
+1].  We find the average of the abnormal reaction for the 20 quarters preceding and 
following the announcement date respectively.  The change in the quarterly earnings 
announcement is the difference in the average abnormal reaction following the event and 
preceding the event.  Parameter estimates are presented with t-statistics below.  [ * 
indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.] 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
 
Intercept -0.1880 *** 1.2315 ** 1.2627 ** 1.3366 **
-2.79 1.98 2.03 2.17
Illiquidity Ratio Change -3.9150 -6.2583 -6.0142 #N/A ###
-0.61 -0.96 -0.92 #N/A
Volume Change 0.0171 -0.0089 -0.0194 #N/A ###
0.24 -0.12 -0.27 #N/A
Turnover Change -0.0039 *** -0.0043 *** -0.0043 *** -0.0043 ***
-7.00 -7.31 -7.33 -7.35
Shadow Cost Change 0.0100 *** 0.0039 0.0030 0.0027
2.74 0.86 0.67 0.61
Relative Size #N/A ### -0.2076 ** -0.2126 ** -0.2219 **
#N/A -2.31 -2.37 -2.49
Leverage Change #N/A ### -1.8774 *** -2.0281 *** -1.9444 ***
#N/A -2.70 -2.87 -2.84
#N/A ### #N/A ### 0.0306 0.0316
#N/A #N/A 1.15 1.21
N 281 256 256 256
R-Squared 0.1691 0.2096 0.2138 0.2111
Intercept 0.3738 *** 1.1273 *** 1.2489 *** 2.0755 ***
4.30 3.27 3.48 4.71
Illiquidity Ratio Change 0.0918 *** 0.0969 *** 0.0991 *** #N/A ###
7.50 7.40 7.51 #N/A
Volume Change -0.1243 -0.1863 ** -0.1853 ** #N/A ###
-1.43 -2.16 -2.15 #N/A
Turnover Change -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005
-0.91 -0.71 -0.87 -0.83
Shadow Cost Change 0.0496 0.0309 0.0316 -0.0019
1.07 0.63 0.65 -0.03
Relative Size #N/A ### -0.1568 ** -0.1753 ** -0.3189 ***
#N/A -2.26 -2.47 -3.60
Leverage Change #N/A ### -0.7325 -0.6025 -1.1265
#N/A -1.06 -0.86 -1.29
#N/A ### #N/A ### -0.0295 -0.0046
#N/A #N/A -1.20 -0.15
N 99 91 91 91
R-Squared 0.3914 0.5204 0.5285 0.1863
Panel B:  Deletion firms
Model 1 Model 2
Quarterly Earn. Ann. 
Reaction Change
Model 3 Model 4
Panel A: Inclusion firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Quarterly Earn. Ann. 
Reaction Change
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For brevity, we present the results using the change in cost of capital based on the 
four-factor model.  The results using the cost of capital based on the market model are 
similar those based on the four-factor model.  These results are available in the Appendix 
in Table C
2
.  The first three models in Table 7 are structured as follows.  Model 1 
includes the changes in liquidity measures (Illiquidity Ratio Change, Volume Change, 
Turnover Change) and shadow cost (Shadow Cost Change).  In Model 2 we include 
additional variables to control for firm size (Relative Size) and leverage (Leverage 
Change), and in Model 3 we consider possible changes in information asymmetry 
(Quarterly Earn. Ann. Reaction Change).  For inclusion firms, we observe in Model 1 
that the change in cost of equity is negatively related to the change in turnover and 
positively related to the change in shadow cost.  However, in Models 2 and 3, the impact 
of shadow cost on the change in cost of equity is insignificantly different from zero.  The 
coefficient on the turnover change, however, remains consistently significant.  
Interestingly, while illiquidity ratio, volume, and turnover are all proxy variables for 
liquidity changes, only turnover change is significant in predicting the change in the cost 
of equity for inclusion firms.  We believe this is due to the fact that illiquidity ratio and 
volume are calculated using the stock price.  Thus the decrease in illiquidity ratio and 
increase in volume are more likely to be driven by the price increases surrounding the 
events. On the other hand, turnover ratio is not based on share price.  For this reason, we 
                                                          
2
 Additionally, we conduct the same analysis on an adjusted basis for the four-factor 
model.  These results are available in the appendix Table D.  For the cost of capital 
change and all independent variables, we compute the adjusted value as the difference 
between the sample and control firm.  The main results persist in these adjusted 
regressions suggesting that the affect of liquidity and shadow cost on cost of capital 
changes are not merely due to industry factors.  
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believe that turnover is the cleaner measure of liquidity for our analysis.  To ensure that 
the effect of turnover changes on the changes in cost of equity exist independent of the 
other two liquidity proxy variables, we estimate Model 4.  This model includes the 
change in only one liquidity measure, turnover, and we find that the negative effect of 
turnover on the change in cost of capital remains consistent.  Of the control variables, two 
are significant in predicting the changes in cost of equity for additions.  First, larger firms 
have a larger decline in the cost of equity.  This implies that larger firms benefit more 
from inclusion to the S&P 500 Index in terms of declines in the cost of equity.  Secondly, 
changes in leverage and cost of equity are inversely related.  This implies that firms that 
have an increase in leverage experience a decline in cost of equity.   
We implement the same four models for deletion firms, and only the change in 
the illiquidity ratio and volume are significant in predicting the cost of equity changes for 
deletion firms in Model 1.  This result remains consistent when control variables are 
added in Models 2 and 3.  Interestingly, the coefficients on firm size and leverage have 
the same sign as those in the inclusion regressions.  In particular, large firms enjoy some 
protection from increases in the cost of equity and firms with larger increases in leverage 
have smaller increases in the cost of equity.  Turnover, the one liquidity proxy variable 
free from ties to the stock price, is insignificant in predicting the changes in cost of equity 
for deletions.   
 To sum up, we find that liquidity increases for added stocks and decreases for 
deleted stocks.  On the other hand, shadow cost decreases for added stocks but remains 
constant for deleted stocks.  This finding supports both the liquidity and investor 
awareness hypotheses.  In our multivariate regression we show that the drop in cost of 
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equity for added stocks is mainly driven by an increase in turnover, and the increase in 
cost of equity for deleted stocks can be partially explained by an increase in illiquidity 
ratio and volume.  Shadow cost changes are not a significant predictor of the cost of 
capital changes for either additions or deletions.  Taken together, the results from the 
multivariate analyses support the liquidity hypothesis.   
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1.4 Conclusion 
 
 
 Analysis of the cost of capital for newly included and excluded firms to the S&P 
500 Index allows us to distinguish between the liquidity and investor awareness 
hypotheses.  Using buy-and-hold returns as a proxy for the cost of equity, we find support 
for the liquidity hypothesis as the cost of equity increases upon index inclusion and 
decreases when firms are removed from the index.  Results using the market model and 
four-factor model to estimate the cost of equity further confirm the liquidity hypothesis.  
The cost of equity decreases after additions and increases following deletions. Further 
analysis of the liquidity measures and shadow cost imply support for both liquidity and 
investor awareness hypotheses.  In particular, we find that liquidity increases (decreases) 
for added (deleted) stocks.  On the other hand, shadow cost increases for added stocks but 
remains constant for deleted stocks.  Using a multivariate regression framework, we find 
that the change in cost of equity for addition firms is mainly due to an increase in 
liquidity, and the change in cost of equity for deleted firms is due to a decrease in 
liquidity.  In examining the determinants of the announcement reaction for index 
inclusion events, we show that firms with a larger investment opportunity set may be 
more poised to take advantage of the reduction in the cost of capital.  
CHAPTER 2:  S&P 500 INDEX RECONSTITUTIONS AND INFORMATION 
ASYMMETRY 
 
 
Information asymmetry between management and shareholders is costly to 
existing shareholders.  Theoretical models, such as Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), find 
that reductions in information asymmetry can lead to decreases in the cost of capital and 
increases in the value of stock.  Similarly, Easley and O’Hara (2004) show that the 
presence of informed and uniformed traders causes a higher required rate of return for 
firms with more private information.  Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1998) provide 
empirical support for this theory.  Therefore events that reduce information asymmetry 
positively impact shareholders.   
Several studies of the S&P 500 Index reconstitutions suggest that firms added to 
the S&P 500 Index may experience a reduction in information asymmetry.  In particular, 
Chen, et al (2004), Hedge and McDermott (2003), and Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) 
point to reductions in information asymmetry as a possible source of gains to 
shareholders around S&P 500 Index inclusion.  However, there have yet been studies that 
empirically test the reduction in information asymmetry and the relationship between 
information asymmetry changes and positive returns to newly included firms.  This paper 
directly tests these propositions by presenting the changes in several measures of 
information asymmetry.  First, we verify that firms added to the index accrue gains 
around the inclusion, and firms removed from the index have negative abnormal returns.  
We show that inclusion firms have an increase in firm size and the number of analysts 
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and a decline in the market to book ratio, analyst forecast error, and forecast dispersion.  
The findings show a reduction in information asymmetry for added firms.  For deletion 
firms, we observe a decline in firm size, the number of shareholders, and analysts 
following the firm and increases in earnings announcement reactions, volatility of 
earnings per share, and volatility of stock returns.  In other words for newly removed 
firms, we find increases in information asymmetry. 
To further explore this issue, we link the abnormal announcement reaction the 
level of information asymmetry by partitioning firms into quartiles based on the pre-
inclusion (deletion) level of each information asymmetry proxy variable.  We find that 
inclusion firms with higher levels of information asymmetry measured by R&D, earnings 
announcement reactions, and analyst forecast error have the highest abnormal return at 
the announcement, indicating that these firms benefit most from the reduction in 
information asymmetry following inclusion.  The results for deletion firms are 
inconclusive. 
Finally, we focus on a measure of information asymmetry, stock analyst earnings 
per share (EPS) forecast accuracy, whose change is not endogenous to index 
reconstitution events.  We show that, after controlling for firm characteristics suggested 
by previous literature to impact forecasting errors, analyst forecast errors decrease 
significantly following firm inclusion events.  In addition, an increased number of 
analysts following the firm reduces the mean forecast error from all analysts following 
the firm.  The mean forecast is referred to as the consensus forecast of all analysts.  We 
confirm the finding of Aboody and Lev (2000) that research and development is a likely 
source of information asymmetry because analyst forecast error is positively related to 
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research and development expense.  There is no significant change in analyst forecast 
error when a firm is removed from the index.  One potential criticism of using the 
consensus-level forecast error in studies of S&P 500 Index changes is that the pool of 
analysts covering a stock typically increases following addition and decreases following 
removal from the index.  Therefore, consensus forecasts are computed using a pool of 
analysts that is different before and after the index reconstitution.  We suggest further 
research into the accuracy of analyst forecasts around S&P 500 index changes at the 
individual analyst level, in addition to the analyses at the consensus level.  The focus of 
this research is to examine whether the accuracy of analyst forecasts improve following 
index additions exist because of increased monitoring efforts by analyst on index stocks, 
driven by the high profile nature of the S&P 500 Index or a reduction in information 
asymmetry.  In addition, it is important to study if the reduction in forecast errors is a 
permanent phenomenon indicating sustained reduction in information asymmetry.  
 
  
49 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
 
 Previous studies of S&P 500 Index reconstitutions have sought to understand the 
price reactions surrounding these events.  Five hypotheses emerge in this literature to 
explain the observation of a positive and sustained stock reaction to index additions and a 
short-term negative stock reaction to index deletions.  The imperfect substitutes 
hypothesis is the sole hypothesis to contradict the efficient market hypothesis because 
proponents of this hypothesis claim that the long-run demand curve for stocks becomes 
downward sloping upon addition to the S&P 500 Index.  A downward-sloping long-run 
demand curve contradicts the finding that stocks are perfect substitutes with flat long-run 
demand curves in Scholes (1972).  Since Standard and Poors claims that no inside 
information about firm performance is used to select stocks for the index, the addition of 
a stock to the index should not change the price of the stock if demand curves are flat.  
However, if demand curves for S&P 500 stocks are downward sloping, we would expect 
a permanent price increase at addition and a permanent price decline at deletion from the 
index.  Shleifer (1986) and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) provide support for this 
hypothesis, while Edmister, et al (1994) and Hrazdil (2007) conclude that the long-run 
demand curves for stocks are flat.   
 The remaining hypotheses are consistent with the Scholes (1972) finding of flat 
long-run demand curves.  The first of these hypotheses that support market efficiency is 
the price pressure hypothesis.  When stocks are added to or removed from the S&P 500 
index, the initial activity of buying and selling by index funds rebalancing portfolios 
could cause a temporary price increase surrounding additions and decrease at deletion 
even if long-run demand curves are flat.  Many studies of index additions find long-term 
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price increases at addition, contradictory to the price pressure hypothesis.  However, both 
Harris and Gurel (1986) and Elliott and Warr (2003) find support for this hypothesis.   
Three alternate hypotheses state that index reconstitutions convey some information 
which causes the positive price shock at addition and negative price shock at deletion.  
The type of information conveyed in the index change event differs among the four 
remaining hypotheses.  The liquidity hypothesis purports that price increases upon 
addition are due to improvements in liquidity, whereas deleted stocks lose value because 
of declines in liquidity.  Since Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show that share price 
increases with reductions in bid-ask spread and several studies of finds liquidity 
improvements following index addition, this hypothesis claims that the positive 
information conveyed in index addition is liquidity improvement for added stocks.  
Contrary to the temporary price pressure experienced by index fund rebalancing, these 
liquidity improvements can be sustained over time and help explain the permanent 
positive reaction.  Erwin and Miller (1998), Hedge and McDermott (2003), and Becker-
Blease and Paul (2006) all find support for the liquidity hypothesis.   
The certification hypothesis claims that positive price reactions to additions stem 
from positive information about future performance of firms added to the S&P 500 Index.  
Similarly, price declines following deletions are due to a negative signal about future firm 
performance.  This hypothesis is contrary to the stated practice of Standard and Poors that 
firm performance is not a selection criteria for the index.  Dhillon and Johnson (1991), 
Denis, et al (2003), Kappou, et al (2007), and Cai (2007) support this hypothesis.  In 
particular, Dhillon and Johnson (1991) show that bond and option prices, which are not 
subject to the price pressure or liquidity improvements of stocks, suggest improvements 
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in future performance.  Denis, et al (2003) and Kappou, et al (2007) show that analyst 
earnings forecasts and earnings per share improve following addition.  Cai (2007) shows 
that positive information about the added firm’s industry is conveyed in addition  
announcements.  On the other hand, Hrazdil and Scott (2007) provide evidence against 
this hypothesis because they show that improvements in earnings are due to management 
manipulation of discretionary accruals.   
Finally, Chen, et al (2004) draw upon the asymmetric reaction of index additions 
and deletions to develop the investor awareness hypothesis.  In this framework, prior to 
addition to the S&P 500 investors demand a shadow premium (Merton, 1987) because of 
lack of awareness about a stock.  Upon addition, investors become more aware of the 
stock and the required rate of return falls from a declining shadow premium.  However, 
when firms are removed from the index, investors do not revert back to a state of being 
unaware of the stock.  Therefore the shadow premium remains constant after deletions.  
The hypothesis supports an asymmetric stock price reaction to addition and deletion 
events.    
In order to study the effect of information asymmetry in S&P 500 index changes, 
we draw upon the existing literature that suggests several proxy variables for the level of 
information asymmetry of a particular firm.  The first set of variables relates to firm 
policy decisions that lead to an information disparity between firm insiders and outside 
investors.  The level of research and development expenditures and intangible assets 
capture those aspects of a firm that are more difficult to value by an outsider.  Research 
and development activities, as compared to other firm expenditures, are not transparent 
because they are unique to a particular firm and have no market prices.  Aboody and Lev 
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(2000) identify research and development as a source of information asymmetry that 
leads to insider trading gains.  Similar to research and development activities, intangible 
assets are more difficult to value and understand by an outsider.  For example, high levels 
of intangible assets serve as a proxy for information asymmetry in Barth and Kasznick 
(2002).   
The next set of information asymmetry proxy variables includes firm 
characteristics such as size, number of shareholders, and the market to book ratio.  Larger 
firms typically attract more analyst coverage and investor scrutiny and thus have lower 
information asymmetry.  Small firms, with lower analyst coverage, are considered to 
have higher information asymmetry.  Opler and Titman (1995) and McLaughlin, et al 
(1998) employ this proxy for information asymmetry.  In addition, ownership structure 
can be a proxy for information asymmetry.  O’Neill and Swisher (2003) find that the 
information asymmetry component of the bid-ask spread is lower for firms with high 
institutional ownership.  Institutional investors who hold larger amounts of a firm’s stock 
can spread out the cost of information gathering over their large investment.  There is less 
motivation to free-ride, and therefore institutional holdings are inversely related to 
information asymmetry.  Similarly, a larger number of shareholders indicate lower 
concentrated ownership and many minority shareholders.  Changes in the number of 
shareholders may be endogenous to the event of index inclusion.  Lastly, the presence of 
growth opportunities as compared to assets in place allows managers to have more inside 
information about the investment opportunity set of the firm (Smith and Watts, 1992).  
The market to book ratio measures the level of growth opportunities relative to assets in 
place and serves as a proxy for information asymmetry.  McLaughlin, et al (1998) use 
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this proxy in their study of information asymmetry and seasoned equity and debt 
offerings.   
The next set of proxy variables for information asymmetry is associated with 
variability in a firm’s stock and earnings.  Dierkens (1991) uses the absolute value of the 
abnormal return surrounding quarterly earnings announcement dates as a proxy for 
information asymmetry.  This proxy captures the stock response to the unanticipated 
component of quarterly earnings and should be larger for firms with more information 
asymmetry.  We also employ the EPS volatility and the stock return volatility to proxy 
for the difficulty in understanding firm performance by an outsider.  Lang, et al (2003) 
use the standard deviation of stock returns to examine the level of information asymmetry 
around cross-listing events.   
The final group of proxy variables relates to the presence of stock analysts and 
their ability to provide accurate earnings forecasts.  These measures include the number 
of analysts following the firm, analyst forecasting accuracy, and analyst forecast 
dispersion.  Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) suggest that an increase in the number of 
analysts decreases information asymmetry because of the additional attention on a firm.  
Yu (2008) also uses analyst coverage to measure the prevalence of earnings management 
which is a practice that occurs more frequently in firms with high information 
asymmetry.  However, Chung, et al (1995) show that the number of analysts following a 
firm increases with information asymmetry.  This positive relationship is due to larger 
payoff for analysts for the private information gained through their analysis.  As Yu 
(2008) highlights, increases in analyst coverage for S&P 500 index inclusion firms are 
endogenous.  In line with the number of analysts following a firm, the accuracy and 
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dispersion of analyst forecasts of earnings per share is frequently used as a measure of 
information asymmetry.  Thomas (2002), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1998), 
Gilson, et al (1998), and Clarke and Shastri (2001) use the accuracy and dispersion of 
analyst forecasts of earnings to proxy for the level of information asymmetry.  One 
potential criticism of this measure is that forecast error may be due to higher firm risk 
rather than information asymmetry.   
 Our study is related to studies that examine the factors determining analyst 
forecast error.  Haw, et al (1994) study forecast errors prior to and following mergers and 
show temporary increases in that forecast errors following the deals.  Similarly, Bernard 
(2008) shows that forecast errors following CEO turnover events shrink due to increased 
company disclosures related to the turnover event.  Finally, Lang, et al (2003) study how 
the information environment changes for firms that cross-list in the United States and 
point to improvements in forecast accuracy which link to increases in market value 
following the cross-listing.  
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2.2 Sample Selection and Data 
 
 
Sample firms in our study include those added to or removed from the S&P 500 
index from 1990 through 2007.  Although a longer history of index changes exists, 
Standard and Poors modified the announcement procedure for index changes in October 
1989.  Prior to this change, index reconstitutions were announced and implemented on 
the same trading day.  According to Benish and Whaley (1996), this creates price 
pressure from index funds rebalancing their portfolios simultaneously.  To alleviate this 
effect, Standard and Poors began preannouncing index changes several days before 
implementation in October 1989.  In our sample, the mean (median) length between the 
announcement date and actual change date is 5.26 (5) days.   
To create the list of index changes, we collect the monthly list of S&P 500 index 
constituents from Compustat.  For each month, we identify firms that have been added or 
removed.  We then use news accounts from Lexis-Nexis to verify the index change 
announcement and implementation dates.  This procedure identifies 838 total sample 
firms with 419 additions and 419 deletions.  We further exclude those sample firms that 
are associated with the following types of index changes: (1) When a non-index firm 
acquires and replaces an existing index firm (11 cases involving 11 added and 11 deleted 
firms), (2) when an S&P 500 firm acquires another index firm and the acquired firm is 
removed from the index (5 cases involving 5 deleted firms), (3) when two existing index 
firms merge and the resulting merged firm remains on the index (9 cases involving 9 
added and 18 deleted firms), and (4) when an index firm is replaced by a spun-off 
subsidiary (17 cases involving 17 added and 17 deleted firms).  The final sample on 
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which our analysis is conducted contains 382 added firms and 368 deleted firms. Table 8 
displays the number of events per year of our sample.   
We also create a sample of matching peers for the sample firms.  We require that 
the matched firms have valid Compustat data for the fiscal year prior to the index change 
as well as CRSP prices for the seven days prior to and after the event date.  We exclude 
matching firms currently in the S&P 500 index and firms that were removed from or 
added to the index within five years of the event.  For each sample firms, we identify all 
firms with the same three-digit SIC code in Compustat and choose the peer that is closest 
in size (as measured by sales) to the sample firms.  We use cumulative abnormal returns 
computed in EVENTUS to measure the quarterly earnings announcement reactions, and 
calculate our proxies for information asymmetry using data from CRSP and Compustat.  
We use data from I/B/E/S to calculate the analyst earnings forecasts.   
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TABLE 8:  Index Addition and Deletion Frequencies 
 
Our sample includes all newly added and removed firms from the S&P 500 Index from 
1990 through 2007.  Our initial sample includes 419 additions and deletions, but we 
exclude those sample firms associated with the following types of index changes:  (1) 
When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an existing index firm (11 cases involving 
11 added and 11 deleted firms), (2) when an S&P 500 firm acquires another index firm 
and the acquired firm is removed from the index (5 cases involving 5 deleted firms), (3) 
when two existing index firms merge and the resulting merged firm remains on the index 
(9 cases involving 9 added and 18 deleted firms), and (4) when an index firm is replaced 
by a spun-off subsidiary (17 cases involving 17 added and 17 deleted firms).  The final 
sample on which our analysis is conducted contains 382 added firms and 368 deleted 
firms. 
  
Number of Additions Number of Deletions
1990 9 9
1991 9 7
1992 7 7
1993 10 9
1994 14 14
1995 27 25
1996 22 21
1997 24 21
1998 37 34
1999 37 37
2000 53 51
2001 28 28
2002 22 22
2003 8 8
2004 18 18
2005 16 16
2006 29 29
2007 12 12
Total 382 368
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2.3 Methodology and Results 
 
 
In this paper, we employ several methods to examine changes in information 
asymmetry for the newly included or excluded firms on the S&P 500.  We follow the 
methodology of Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) who test whether information 
asymmetry motivates spinoffs and if reductions in information asymmetry help explain  
the gain surrounding spinoffs.  Specifically, we first verify that abnormal returns 
surrounding index inclusion (removal) announcements are positive (negative) and show 
the changes in our measures of information asymmetry.  Next, we use quartile analysis to 
link abnormal returns to information asymmetry measures.  Finally, we focus on the 
errors in analyst forecasts because changes in these measures are non-endogenous to the 
inclusion or removal of a firm from the index.   
Abnormal Returns Surrounding Index Changes  Table 9 shows, for the two 
sample windows, the cumulative abnormal returns for sample firms, matched pairs, and 
the difference between these firms.  We compute abnormal returns using the market 
model with the returns to the S&P 500 index as the market return.  We calculate the 
model parameters using daily returns for one year ending 45 days before the event 
announcement.  We then use the model parameters to compute the abnormal returns 
surrounding the event.  The event window is measured as the number of trading days 
between the announcement date and the implantation date of index change.  The 
maximum length of the event window is 51 days and the minimum is 1 day, with the 
average (median) length being 5.26 (5) days. We first measure the cumulative abnormal 
return for the entire event window.  In addition, to standardize the abnormal returns, we 
compute a daily abnormal return by dividing the CAR for the entire event window by the 
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TABLE 9:  Abnormal Returns 
 
Our sample includes all newly added and removed firms from the S&P 500 Index from 
1990 through 2007.  Our initial sample includes 419 additions and deletions, but we 
exclude those sample firms associated with the following types of index changes: (1) 
When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an existing index firm, (2) when an S&P 
500 firm acquires another index firm and the acquired firm is removed from the index, 
(3) when two existing index firms merge and the resulting merged firm remains on the 
index, and (4) when an index firm is replaced by a spun-off subsidiary.  Our final sample 
contains 382 added firms and 368 deleted firms.  Matched pairs are firms in the same 3-
digit SIC code closest in size to the sample firm based on sales.  Any firm that was an 
S&P 500 constitutent in the 5 years prior to and following the inclusion or deletion 
announcement cannot be a matched pair.  Cumulative abnormal returns are computed in 
EVENTUS using the standard market model and the CRSP value-weighted index.  We 
report CARS over two event windows.  The first event window encompasses the 
announcement date through the implementation date of the index change.  The number of 
days in this window may vary between events.  The second period is a daily abnormal 
return over the entire event.  We divide the CAR over the entire event window by the 
number of days in that window. [ ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1-percent, 5-
percent, and 10-percent levels, respectively.] 
 
  
Mean 5.06% *** 0.46% 4.60% ***
Median 4.08% *** 0.06% 4.25% ***
N 343 343 343
Mean 0.96% *** 0.08% 0.88% ***
Median 0.77% *** 0.02% 0.80% ***
N 343 343 343
Mean -3.44% *** -0.31% -3.13% ***
Median -0.94% *** -0.24% -0.85% ***
N 340 340 340
Mean -0.65% *** -0.11% -0.53% **
Median -0.18% *** -0.04% -0.17% ***
N 340 340 340
Event Window 
Abnormal 
Return
Daily 
Abnormal 
Return
Additions
Deletions
Sample Firms Matched Pairs Difference
Sample Firms Matched Pairs Difference
Event Window 
Abnormal 
Return
Daily 
Abnormal 
Return
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number of days in the window.  Thus, the daily abnormal return measures the average 
abnormal return per day.  Table 9 confirms the previously documented result that 
abnormal returns for additions, as well as the difference between the addition firms and 
their matched sample, are significantly positive.  The raw return is the return for the 
sample firms, whereas adjusted returns are the sample firm returns minus the matched 
peer firm returns.  Specifically, the median event window abnormal return for newly 
added firms is 4.08%, and this is 4.25% higher (difference significant at the 1% level) 
than that of the matched pairs.  For the daily abnormal returns, the addition firms have an 
average of 0.88% above the matched pair firms (significant at the 1% level).  For 
deletions, the raw and adjusted abnormal returns are significantly negative.  The mean 
deletion sample firm has an event window abnormal return of -3.44% compared to -
0.31% for the matched pairs, and the difference is significant at the 1% level.  The results 
confirm the findings of previous research of significant announcement effects for index 
additions and deletions.  
Information Asymmetry Proxy Variable Analysis  From the literature on 
information asymmetry, we include eleven proxy variables to examine the level of 
information asymmetry surrounding changes to the S&P 500 index.  Table 10 provides 
the definitions of these proxy variables.  We present the level of our information 
asymmetry proxy variables in Table 11.  Panel A (C) shows the level of these proxies for 
the sample addition (deletion) firms and the matched pairs before the index change.  
Addition firms have more R&D but less intangible assets than their matched 
counterparts, although only the difference in sample means for R&D is significant (at the 
10% level).  Sample firms are larger and have a higher market to book ratio than the 
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TABLE 10:  Description of Information Asymmetry Proxy Variables 
 
 
Firm Policy Factors
Research and Development
Research and development is the ratio of the research
and development expense to total assets. We measure
this value in the fiscal year prior to and following the
index change.
Intangible Assets
Intangible assets is equal to one minus the ratio of
property, plant, and equipment plus current assets to
total assets. We measure this value in the fiscal year
prior to and following the index change. 
Firm Characteristics
Firm Size 
Firm size is the log of the market value of the stock at
the end of the fiscal year. We measure this value in the
fiscal year prior to and following the index change.
Number of Shareholders
The number of shareholders is measured in thousands in
the fiscal year prior to and following the index change.
Market/Book Ratio
The market to book ratio measures the market value of
assets to the book value of assets where the market
value of assets is calculated as the book value of assets
plus the market value of equity minus the book value of
equity.We measure this value in the fiscal year prior to
and following the index change. 
Variability Factors
Earnings Announcement Rxn
The earnings announcement reaction measures the
abnormal return in the three-day window surrounding
the announcement of quarterly earnings. Specifically,
we measure the cumulative abnormal return on days [-1,
+1] where day 0 is the earnings announcement date.
We then average the cumulative abnormal return over
the 20 quarters preceding or the 20 quarters following
the index change. 
Volatility of EPS
The volatility of EPS is the standard deviation of the
annual EPS for five years preceding or the five years
following the index change. 
Volatility of Returns
The volatility of stock returns is the standard deviation of 
the monthly stock returns for the 60 months preceding
or the 60 months following the index change. 
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TABLE 10 (continued) 
 
 
  
Analyst Forecast Factors
Number of Analysts
The number of analysts is the number of analysts making
one fiscal year ahead forecasts in any given year. We
average the number of analysts over the five fiscal years
prior to or after the index change. 
Analyst Error
The consensus forecast is the mean of all individual
analyst forecasts. The analyst forecast error is the
absolute value of the difference between consensus
forecast and the actual EPS scaled by the consensus
forecast. In tables 4 and 5, we include analyst forecasts
for one fiscal year ahead and average the forecast error
over the five years prior to or following the index
change. In table 6, we include all analyst forecast errors
for both one and two fiscal years ahead for the period of 
five year before the index change through five years after 
the index change. 
Forecast Dispersion
Forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of all
individual analyst forecasts divided by the consensus
forecast. We include only the forecasts for one fiscal
year ahead and average the forecast dispersion over the
five fiscal year prior to and following the index change. 
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matched pairs (the mean differences are both significant at the 1% level).  Standard and 
Poors selects large firms for the S&P 500 index, thus the result on firm size is consistent 
with this selection criteria.  Hedge and McDermott (2003) highlight that firms are often 
selected to the index following periods of positive momentum, and this may contribute to 
higher market to book ratios for sample firms.   The mean difference in abnormal stock 
returns to the quarterly earnings announcements is positive though insignificant, however 
the median difference between addition firms and matched pairs is negative.  
Interestingly, both the mean and median volatility of stock returns is lower for newly 
added firms than their matched pairs.  We also show that there are more stock analysts 
following addition firms, which is consistent with the larger firm size for sample firms as 
larger firms tend to attract more analysts (Bhushan, 1989, and Barth, et al, 2001). Finally, 
addition firms have larger analyst forecast errors than their matched pairs with the mean 
difference significant at the 1% level. Colak (2009) studies the IPO characteristics of 
firms added to the S&P 500, S&P 400, and S&P 600 indexes.  He finds that at the time of 
the IPO these firms have less uncertainty than other IPO firms indicated by better 
underwriter reputation and less underpricing.  He argues that the Standard and Poors 
committee exhibits risk aversion in their selection of firms to the index but does not 
examine whether the difference in information level at the time of the IPO persists to the 
time of index inclusion.  Our analysis indicates that, compared to the matched pairs, 
newly selected S&P 500 firms have significantly higher information asymmetry 
measured by research and development, market to book ratio, and analyst forecast error, 
but less information asymmetry measured by firm size, volatility of returns, and the 
number of analysts.  Thus, our contradictory findings suggest that the hypothesis 
64 
T
A
B
L
E
 1
1
: 
 I
n
fo
rm
at
io
n
 A
sy
m
m
et
ry
 M
ea
su
re
s 
 O
u
r 
sa
m
p
le
 i
n
cl
u
d
es
 a
ll
 n
ew
ly
 a
d
d
ed
 a
n
d
 r
em
o
v
ed
 f
ir
m
s 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e 
S
&
P
 5
0
0
 I
n
d
ex
 f
ro
m
 1
9
9
0
 t
h
ro
u
g
h
 2
0
0
7
. 
 O
u
r 
in
it
ia
l 
sa
m
p
le
 
in
cl
u
d
es
 4
1
9
 a
d
d
it
io
n
s 
an
d
 d
el
et
io
n
s,
 b
u
t 
w
e 
ex
cl
u
d
e 
th
o
se
 s
am
p
le
 f
ir
m
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 t
y
p
es
 o
f 
in
d
ex
 c
h
an
g
es
: 
(1
) 
W
h
en
 a
 n
o
n
-i
n
d
ex
 f
ir
m
 a
cq
u
ir
es
 a
n
d
 r
ep
la
ce
s 
an
 e
x
is
ti
n
g
 i
n
d
ex
 f
ir
m
, 
(2
) 
w
h
en
 a
n
 S
&
P
 5
0
0
 f
ir
m
 a
cq
u
ir
es
 a
n
o
th
er
 i
n
d
ex
 f
ir
m
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
ac
q
u
ir
ed
 f
ir
m
 i
s 
re
m
o
v
ed
 f
ro
m
 t
h
e 
in
d
ex
, 
(3
) 
w
h
en
 t
w
o
 e
x
is
ti
n
g
 i
n
d
ex
 f
ir
m
s 
m
er
g
e 
an
d
 t
h
e 
re
su
lt
in
g
 m
er
g
ed
 f
ir
m
 r
em
ai
n
s 
o
n
 t
h
e 
in
d
ex
, 
an
d
 (
4
) 
w
h
en
 a
n
 i
n
d
ex
 f
ir
m
 i
s 
re
p
la
ce
d
 b
y
 a
 s
p
u
n
-o
ff
 s
u
b
si
d
ia
ry
. 
 O
u
r 
fi
n
al
 s
am
p
le
 c
o
n
ta
in
s 
3
8
2
 a
d
d
ed
 f
ir
m
s 
an
d
 3
6
8
 d
el
et
ed
 
fi
rm
s.
  
M
at
ch
ed
 p
ai
rs
 a
re
 f
ir
m
s 
in
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
3
-d
ig
it
 S
IC
 c
o
d
e 
cl
o
se
st
 i
n
 s
iz
e 
to
 t
h
e 
sa
m
p
le
 f
ir
m
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 s
al
es
. 
 A
n
y
 f
ir
m
 t
h
at
 w
as
 a
n
 
S
&
P
 5
0
0
 c
o
n
st
it
u
te
n
t 
in
 t
h
e 
5
 y
ea
rs
 p
ri
o
r 
to
 a
n
d
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 t
h
e 
in
cl
u
si
o
n
 o
r 
d
el
et
io
n
 a
n
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
t 
ca
n
n
o
t 
b
e 
a 
m
at
ch
ed
 p
ai
r.
 R
es
ea
rc
h
 
an
d
 d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
is
 t
h
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
re
se
ar
ch
 a
n
d
 d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t 
ex
p
en
se
 t
o
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
 I
n
ta
n
g
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s 
is
 m
ea
su
re
d
 a
s 
o
n
e 
m
in
u
s 
th
e 
su
m
 
o
f 
p
ro
p
er
ty
, 
p
la
n
t,
 a
n
d
 e
q
u
ip
m
en
t 
p
lu
s 
cu
rr
en
t 
as
se
ts
 d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
 F
ir
m
 s
iz
e 
is
 t
h
e 
lo
g
 o
f 
th
e 
m
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e
 o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 a
n
d
 t
h
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
s 
is
 m
ea
su
re
d
 i
n
 t
h
o
u
sa
n
d
s.
  
T
h
e 
m
ar
k
et
 t
o
 b
o
o
k
 r
at
io
 m
ea
su
re
s 
th
e 
m
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
as
se
ts
 t
o
 t
h
e 
b
o
o
k
 v
a
lu
e 
o
f 
as
se
ts
 w
h
er
e 
th
e 
m
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
as
se
ts
 i
s 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 a
s 
th
e 
b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
as
se
ts
 p
lu
s 
th
e 
m
ar
k
et
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
 m
in
u
s 
th
e 
b
o
o
k
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
eq
u
it
y
. 
 R
&
D
, 
in
ta
n
g
ib
le
s,
 f
ir
m
 s
iz
e,
 m
ar
k
et
 t
o
 b
o
o
k
 r
at
io
, 
an
d
 t
h
e 
n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sh
ar
eh
o
ld
er
s 
ar
e 
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
 f
o
r 
th
e 
fi
sc
al
 y
e
ar
 p
ri
o
r 
to
 
an
d
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 t
h
e 
ev
en
t 
d
at
e.
  
T
h
e 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
an
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
t 
re
ac
ti
o
n
 i
s 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
th
re
e 
d
a
y
 c
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
ab
n
o
rm
al
 r
et
u
rn
 f
o
r 
th
e 
2
0
 
q
u
ar
te
rs
 p
re
ce
d
in
g
 o
r 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 t
h
e 
an
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
t 
d
at
e.
  
T
h
e 
v
o
la
ti
li
ty
 o
f 
E
P
S
 i
s 
th
e 
st
an
d
ar
d
 d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 o
f 
q
u
ar
te
rl
y
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
p
er
 s
h
ar
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
fi
v
e 
y
ea
r 
p
er
io
d
s 
p
re
ce
d
in
g
 a
n
d
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 t
h
e 
an
n
o
u
n
ce
m
en
t 
d
at
e,
 a
n
d
 w
e
 m
ea
su
re
 t
h
e 
st
an
d
ar
d
 d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 o
f 
m
o
n
th
ly
 s
to
ck
 
re
tu
rn
s 
o
v
er
 t
h
e 
sa
m
e 
p
er
io
d
s.
  
T
h
e 
an
al
y
st
 f
o
re
ca
st
 e
rr
o
r 
is
 a
b
so
lu
te
 v
al
u
e 
o
f 
th
e 
ra
ti
o
 o
f 
th
e 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n
 t
h
e 
m
ea
n
 a
n
al
y
st
 
fo
re
ca
st
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
g
s 
p
er
 s
h
ar
e 
an
d
 t
h
e 
ac
tu
al
 e
ar
n
in
g
s 
p
er
 s
h
ar
e 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 t
h
e 
m
ea
n
 f
o
re
ca
st
. 
 W
e 
m
ea
su
re
 t
h
is
 e
rr
o
r 
fo
r 
th
e 
fo
re
ca
st
s 
d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
e 
fi
v
e 
y
ea
rs
 b
ef
o
re
 o
r 
af
te
r 
th
e 
ev
en
t 
an
d
 c
o
m
p
u
te
 t
h
e 
av
er
ag
e 
o
v
er
 e
ac
h
 p
er
io
d
. 
 T
h
e 
fo
re
ca
st
 d
is
p
er
si
o
n
 i
s 
th
e 
st
a
n
d
ar
d
 
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
 o
f 
an
al
y
st
 f
o
re
ca
st
s 
d
iv
id
ed
 b
y
 t
h
e 
m
ea
n
 f
o
re
ca
st
. 
 W
e 
m
ea
su
re
 t
h
is
 d
is
p
er
si
o
n
 f
o
r 
th
e 
fo
re
ca
st
s 
d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
e 
fi
v
e 
y
ea
rs
 b
ef
o
re
 
o
r 
af
te
r 
th
e 
ev
en
t 
an
d
 c
o
m
p
u
te
 t
h
e 
av
er
ag
e 
o
v
er
 e
ac
h
 p
er
io
d
. 
 W
e 
te
st
 t
h
e 
sa
m
p
le
 a
n
d
 m
at
ch
ed
 f
ir
m
s 
as
 w
el
l 
as
 b
ef
o
re
 a
n
d
 a
ft
e
r 
th
e 
ev
en
t 
fo
r 
sa
m
p
le
 f
ir
m
s 
u
si
n
g
 t
h
e 
m
ea
n
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 t
-t
es
t 
fo
r 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 i
n
 m
ea
n
s 
an
d
 W
il
co
x
o
n
-M
an
n
-W
h
it
n
ey
 t
es
t 
fo
r 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 i
n
 
m
ed
ia
n
s.
  
[ 
*
*
*
, 
*
*
, 
an
d
 *
 d
en
o
te
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
1
-p
er
ce
n
t,
 5
-p
er
ce
n
t,
 a
n
d
 1
0
-p
er
ce
n
t 
le
v
el
s,
 r
es
p
ec
ti
v
el
y
 f
o
r 
th
e 
t-
te
st
 f
o
r 
m
ea
n
s 
an
d
 W
il
co
x
o
n
 r
an
k
ed
 s
ig
n
 t
es
t 
fo
r 
m
ed
ia
n
s.
] 
65 
T
A
B
L
E
 1
1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
) 
 
 
N
F
ir
m
 P
o
lic
y 
F
ac
to
rs
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d
 D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t
1
1
6
6
.0
5
4
.7
8
4
.7
1
2
.4
4
1
.3
3
*
0
.0
0
In
ta
ng
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s
2
3
7
2
3
.1
3
1
6
.4
8
2
4
.7
0
1
8
.9
2
-1
.5
7
-3
.2
3
F
ir
m
 C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s
F
ir
m
 S
iz
e 
2
6
3
8
.5
8
8
.5
5
7
.0
7
7
.1
5
1
.5
0
*
*
*
1
.3
2
N
um
b
er
 o
f 
S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s
2
6
2
4
3
.7
8
4
.2
6
1
7
.5
4
2
.9
7
2
6
.2
4
0
.7
8
M
ar
k
et
/B
o
o
k
 R
at
io
2
6
3
3
.9
2
2
.3
2
1
.8
9
1
.3
8
2
.0
3
*
*
*
0
.5
5
V
ar
ia
b
ili
ty
 F
ac
to
rs
E
ar
ni
ng
s 
A
nn
o
un
ce
m
en
t 
R
xn
3
2
4
4
.8
3
4
.2
8
4
.7
5
4
.1
3
0
.0
8
-0
.0
5
*
*
*
V
o
la
til
ity
 o
f 
E
P
S
2
5
4
0
.5
9
0
.4
0
0
.6
3
0
.5
0
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
4
V
o
la
til
ity
 o
f 
R
et
ur
ns
2
9
5
0
.1
1
0
.1
0
0
.1
2
0
.1
1
-0
.0
1
*
*
-0
.0
1
*
*
*
A
na
ly
st
 F
o
re
ca
st
 F
ac
to
rs
N
um
b
er
 o
f 
A
na
ly
st
s
2
6
6
1
3
.8
2
1
3
.2
0
9
.9
4
8
.4
0
3
.8
9
*
*
*
4
.4
5
A
na
ly
st
 E
rr
o
r
2
3
0
3
.1
6
1
.4
7
1
.3
1
0
.7
3
1
.8
5
*
*
*
0
.5
6
F
o
re
ca
st
 D
is
p
er
si
o
n
2
5
2
3
.0
3
2
.5
0
3
.8
6
3
.0
0
-0
.8
3
-0
.8
7
P
a
n
el
 A
: 
 L
ev
el
 o
f 
b
ef
o
re
-e
v
en
t 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 a
sy
m
m
et
ry
 f
o
r 
sa
m
p
le
 a
n
d
 m
a
tc
h
ed
 f
ir
m
s 
fo
r 
in
d
ex
 a
d
d
it
io
n
s
S
am
p
le
 F
ir
m
s
M
at
ch
ed
 P
ai
rs
D
iff
er
en
ce
M
ea
n
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
M
ed
ia
n
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
66 
T
A
B
L
E
 1
1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
) 
 
 
 
V
ar
ia
b
le
N
F
ir
m
 P
o
lic
y 
F
ac
to
rs
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d
 D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t
1
7
1
5
.9
3
4
.4
9
6
.0
9
4
.5
2
0
.1
7
0
.0
0
In
ta
ng
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s
2
7
1
2
3
.3
1
1
6
.4
8
2
7
.1
0
2
3
.2
1
3
.8
0
*
*
*
1
.3
6
*
*
*
F
ir
m
 C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s
F
ir
m
 S
iz
e 
3
2
8
8
.5
7
8
.5
5
8
.8
0
8
.8
0
0
.2
3
*
*
*
0
.2
8
*
*
*
N
um
b
er
 o
f 
S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s
3
1
8
4
0
.9
5
4
.2
6
5
3
.5
7
7
.6
0
1
2
.6
2
0
.4
4
*
*
*
M
ar
k
et
/B
o
o
k
 R
at
io
3
2
8
3
.6
7
2
.1
0
2
.5
2
1
.7
3
-1
.1
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
5
V
ar
ia
b
ili
ty
 F
ac
to
rs
E
ar
ni
ng
s 
A
nn
o
un
ce
m
en
t 
R
xn
3
3
8
4
.8
3
4
.2
7
5
.1
2
4
.7
8
0
.2
9
*
*
0
.3
0
*
*
*
V
o
la
til
ity
 o
f 
E
P
S
3
1
3
0
.5
8
0
.3
9
0
.6
2
0
.4
0
0
.0
4
-0
.0
2
V
o
la
til
ity
 o
f 
R
et
ur
ns
3
2
5
0
.1
2
0
.1
0
0
.1
2
0
.1
1
0
.0
1
*
*
0
.0
1
*
*
*
A
na
ly
st
 F
o
re
ca
st
 F
ac
to
rs
N
um
b
er
 o
f 
A
na
ly
st
s
3
1
1
1
3
.6
3
1
3
.0
0
1
7
.0
4
1
6
.6
0
3
.4
1
*
*
*
3
.2
0
*
*
*
A
na
ly
st
 E
rr
o
r
3
0
4
2
.9
6
1
.2
6
0
.7
9
0
.3
2
-2
.1
7
*
*
*
-0
.8
9
*
*
*
F
o
re
ca
st
 D
is
p
er
si
o
n
3
0
8
5
.7
1
2
.4
8
2
.6
5
1
.7
6
-3
.0
6
-0
.3
9
*
*
*
M
ed
ia
n
B
ef
o
re
 I
nd
ex
 C
ha
ng
e
D
iff
er
en
ce
A
ft
er
 I
nd
ex
 C
ha
ng
e
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
M
ea
n
P
a
n
el
 B
: 
 L
ev
el
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 a
sy
m
m
et
ry
 f
o
r 
sa
m
p
le
 f
ir
m
s 
b
ef
o
re
 a
n
d
 a
ft
er
 i
n
d
ex
 a
d
d
it
io
n
67 
T
A
B
L
E
 1
1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
) 
 
 
 
V
ar
ia
b
le
N
F
ir
m
 P
o
lic
y 
F
ac
to
rs
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d
 D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t
4
9
4
.1
4
2
.0
3
2
.9
8
1
.2
9
1
.1
6
*
0
.3
4
In
ta
ng
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s
1
1
9
2
5
.9
9
2
3
.1
5
2
1
.8
6
1
6
.7
5
4
.1
2
*
*
2
.8
9
S
iz
e 
F
ac
to
rs
F
ir
m
 S
iz
e 
1
0
2
6
.8
0
6
.8
8
6
.3
8
6
.5
1
0
.4
2
*
*
*
0
.2
9
N
um
b
er
 o
f 
S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s
1
1
0
2
4
.5
2
7
.9
3
1
3
.3
4
2
.2
3
1
1
.1
8
3
.7
6
M
ar
k
et
/B
o
o
k
 R
at
io
1
0
1
1
.5
2
1
.1
9
1
.6
4
1
.3
7
-0
.1
2
-0
.0
7
V
ar
ia
b
ili
ty
 F
ac
to
rs
E
ar
ni
ng
s 
A
nn
o
un
ce
m
en
t 
R
xn
1
3
0
4
.4
8
3
.9
9
5
.1
1
4
.4
2
-0
.6
2
*
*
-0
.3
5
*
*
*
V
o
la
til
ity
 o
f 
E
P
S
1
0
2
0
.8
6
0
.9
4
0
.7
5
0
.7
0
0
.1
1
0
.1
2
V
o
la
til
ity
 o
f 
R
et
ur
ns
9
9
0
.1
2
0
.1
1
0
.1
3
0
.1
2
-0
.0
1
0
.0
0
*
*
*
A
na
ly
st
 F
o
re
ca
st
 F
ac
to
rs
N
um
b
er
 o
f 
A
na
ly
st
s
1
1
5
1
2
.1
0
1
0
.2
0
8
.8
2
7
.0
0
3
.2
8
*
*
*
2
.6
5
A
na
ly
st
 E
rr
o
r
8
7
0
.6
4
0
.6
1
1
.2
2
0
.6
4
-0
.5
8
-0
.0
9
F
o
re
ca
st
 D
is
p
er
si
o
n
1
0
0
3
.7
4
3
.3
9
2
.7
7
3
.4
9
0
.9
7
-0
.4
6
M
ed
ia
n
M
ea
n
P
a
n
el
 C
: 
 L
ev
el
 o
f 
b
ef
o
re
-e
v
en
t 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 a
sy
m
m
et
ry
 f
o
r 
sa
m
p
le
 a
n
d
 m
a
tc
h
ed
 f
ir
m
s 
fo
r 
in
d
ex
 d
el
et
io
n
s
D
iff
er
en
ce
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
M
at
ch
ed
 P
ai
rs
S
am
p
le
 F
ir
m
s
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
68 
 
 
6 
T
A
B
L
E
 1
1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
) 
 
V
ar
ia
b
le
N
F
ir
m
 P
o
lic
y 
F
ac
to
rs
R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d
 D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t
8
1
3
.9
2
1
.7
0
3
.7
7
1
.5
4
-0
.1
5
0
.0
0
In
ta
ng
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s
1
4
0
2
5
.3
3
2
2
.7
9
2
6
.3
0
2
1
.9
3
0
.9
7
0
.3
5
S
iz
e 
F
ac
to
rs
F
ir
m
 S
iz
e 
1
3
1
6
.8
5
6
.9
0
6
.1
8
6
.3
7
-0
.6
7
*
*
*
-0
.1
9
*
*
*
N
um
b
er
 o
f 
S
ha
re
ho
ld
er
s
1
3
4
2
4
.3
2
8
.1
6
1
9
.7
0
5
.4
9
-4
.6
2
*
*
-0
.7
5
*
*
*
M
ar
k
et
/B
o
o
k
 R
at
io
1
3
0
1
.4
6
1
.1
8
1
.4
4
1
.2
2
-0
.0
2
0
.0
3
V
ar
ia
b
ili
ty
 F
ac
to
rs
E
ar
ni
ng
s 
A
nn
o
un
ce
m
en
t 
R
xn
1
3
5
4
.4
6
3
.9
7
5
.4
4
4
.9
9
0
.9
9
*
*
*
0
.8
8
*
*
*
V
o
la
til
ity
 o
f 
E
P
S
1
3
0
0
.8
7
0
.9
7
1
.0
4
1
.0
8
0
.1
7
*
*
*
0
.1
2
*
*
*
V
o
la
til
ity
 o
f 
R
et
ur
ns
1
1
2
0
.1
2
0
.1
1
0
.1
5
0
.1
2
0
.0
3
*
*
*
0
.0
2
*
*
*
A
na
ly
st
 F
o
re
ca
st
 F
ac
to
rs
N
um
b
er
 o
f 
A
na
ly
st
s
1
3
8
1
1
.9
9
1
0
.2
0
7
.6
8
4
.9
0
-4
.3
2
*
*
*
-4
.2
0
*
*
*
A
na
ly
st
 E
rr
o
r
1
1
7
0
.2
2
0
.5
4
1
.5
0
0
.4
7
1
.2
8
0
.0
5
F
o
re
ca
st
 D
is
p
er
si
o
n
1
2
9
0
.5
0
3
.2
1
-0
.0
9
3
.3
3
-0
.5
9
0
.3
0
M
ed
ia
n
M
ea
n
A
ft
er
 I
nd
ex
 C
ha
ng
e
P
a
n
el
 D
: 
 L
ev
el
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 a
sy
m
m
et
ry
 f
o
r 
sa
m
p
le
 f
ir
m
s 
b
ef
o
re
 a
n
d
 a
ft
er
 i
n
d
ex
 d
el
et
io
n
B
ef
o
re
 I
nd
ex
 C
ha
ng
e
D
iff
er
en
ce
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
69 
 
proposed by Colak (2009) should be further investigated to see if the Standard and Poors 
selection committee exhibits bias against firms with high levels of information 
asymmetry.  Additionally, it is important to examine whether other firm characteristics, 
aside from the stated selection criteria of size and liquidity, can be used as predictors of 
committee selection of new index firms.     
Panel C of Table 11 shows a similar comparison between the information 
asymmetry proxy variables of deletion firms and their matched pairs.  Deletion sample 
firms have significantly higher mean values of R&D (significant at the 10% level) and 
intangible assets (significant at the 5% level). Deletion firms are also larger than the 
matched pairs.  Since we require that matched firms are not included in the S&P 500 
Index during the five years preceding or following the deletion, matched pair firms are 
likely to be smaller than the index firms.  Notably, in the period prior to the event, 
deletion firms have significantly smaller abnormal returns to earnings announcements 
than their matched pairs, and the mean and median differences are both significant (at the 
5% and 1% levels respectively).  Not surprisingly, deletion firms also have a larger 
number of analysts following the firms.  These results indicate that while the deletion 
firms are in the S&P 500 index, they have lower information asymmetry than the 
matched pair firms immediately before the events.   
Panel B (D) of Table 11 displays the levels of the information asymmetry proxies 
before and after the index inclusion (removal) as well as the difference between these 
periods.  For addition firms, we observe no significant changes in research and 
development expense but a mean (median) increase of 3.80% (1.36%) in intangible assets 
with both the mean and median differences significant at the 1% level.  The firm policy 
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factors, research and development expense and intangible assets, are more useful in 
cross-sectional analysis to compare levels of information asymmetry across firms rather 
than across time for a single firm.  Thus, we do not conclude from the increase in 
intangible assets that addition firms have higher information asymmetry following 
inclusions.  This finding may be due to a shift in firm policy.  In the second group of 
proxy variables about firm characteristics, we show that firm size increases upon addition 
and that the number of shareholders increases.  Both the mean and median increases in 
firm size and the median increase in the number of shareholders are significant at the 1% 
level.  If we observe a group of firms cross-sectionally, larger firm size and number of 
shareholders typically indicate less information asymmetry.  In our analysis, however, the 
increase in firm size and number of shareholders following additions to the S&P 500 
index is endogenous because of the pre-event positive momentum in stock returns and the 
post-event increased demand of index funds.  We observe a decline in the market to book 
ratio from a mean of 3.67 before inclusion to 2.52 afterwards, with the difference 
significant at the 1% level.  This decline in the market to book ratio is less likely to be 
endogenous than firm size and number of shareholders and provides the first evidence 
that information asymmetry declines following index inclusion.   
The findings from the next group of factors pertaining to firm variability show 
increases in the abnormal reaction to quarterly earnings announcements and the volatility 
of returns.  In fact, the median increase in abnormal returns to earnings announcements is 
0.30% (significant at the 1% level), and the median increase in volatility of stock returns 
is 0.89% (significant at the 1% level).  The mean change in EPS volatility is positive 
while the median difference is negative, and neither value is statistically significant.  The 
71 
 
significant increases in abnormal returns to earnings announcement and stock volatility 
may be attributable to the following reasons.  First, these firms may experience an 
increase in information asymmetry following index inclusion.  Second, inclusion firms 
may have an increase in firm risk from changes in their capital structure.  Kappou, et al 
(2007) and Chen, et al (2004) claim that new S&P 500 index members may be able to 
attract more capital because of the reputation of the index.  If these firms increase their 
leverage ratios, risk to stockholders increases.  To further explore this second 
explanation, we compute the change in leverage around inclusion events and test the 
correlation between the leverage change and the change in abnormal returns to earnings 
announcements and the change in stock volatility.  Index inclusion firms have an average 
(median) leverage ratio of 0.1489 (0.0971) prior to inclusion and 0.1576 (0.1038) after.  
The mean difference in leverage is significant at the 5% level.  The correlation between 
the change in leverage and the change in earnings announcement reaction is 0.1566 
(significant at the 1%) level.  The correlation between the leverage change and change in 
stock return volatility is 0.2254 (significant at the 1% level).  For a robustness check, we 
also compute the correlation between the change in analyst forecast accuracy (a measure 
of information asymmetry) and the changes in the two volatility variables (abnormal 
returns to earnings announcements and stock return volatility), and we find that these 
correlations are both negative but insignificant.  Therefore, the evidence supports the 
latter explanation for the increases in earnings announcement reaction and volatility of 
stock returns.  Namely, increases in firm risk due to leverage increases explain the rise in 
the firm volatility variables rather than increases in information asymmetry.   
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Our final set of information asymmetry proxy variables relates to analyst forecasts 
of earnings per share.  We show that the mean and median number of analysts following 
newly added firms increases by 3.41 and 3.20 analysts respectively, and both of these 
increases are significant at the 1% level.  As highlighted in Yu (2008), this increase is 
endogenous to the addition events and is not necessarily evidence of changes in 
information asymmetry.  However, the error in analyst forecasts and the dispersion of 
these forecasts are less likely to be endogenous to the index changes.  Both analyst 
forecast error and forecast dispersion decline after inclusions, which indicates a reduction 
in information asymmetry.  In particular, the mean (median) change in forecast error is -
2.17% (-0.89%), and both of these changes are significant at the 1% level.  The mean 
change in forecast dispersion is -3.06%, and the median decline in forecast dispersion is  
-0.39% (significant at the 1% level).  The overall evidence for inclusion firms supports a 
decline in information asymmetry following the index reconstitution.  Our proxy 
variables unrelated to firm policy and changes in leverage, the market/book ratio and 
analyst forecast errors and dispersion indicate that information asymmetry falls.    
Panel D of Table 11 shows the level and changes in the information asymmetry 
proxy variables before and after removal from the S&P 500 index.  We observe no 
significant change in the firm policy factors including research and development and 
intangible assets.  For firm characteristics, the mean and median changes in firm size and 
number of shareholders are all negative and significant.  The mean (median) decline in 
firm size is -0.67 (-0.19), and both changes are significant at the 1% level.  Additionally, 
the number of shareholders falls by an average of 4,620 (significant at the 5% level) 
73 
 
people.  These changes, however, are endogenous to the deletion events and are not 
necessarily indicative of increases in information asymmetry.   
For the variability measures, we bserve increases in the mean and median for all 
three variables:  earnings announcement reaction, volatility of EPS, and volatility of stock 
returns.  The absolute value of the abnormal stock return surrounding quarterly earnings 
announcements increases by an average of 0.99% (significant at the 1% level) following 
removal events, and the median increase is 0.88% (significant at the 1% level).  The 
mean changes in the volatility of EPS and stock returns are 0.17 and 0.03 (both 
significant at the 1% level) respectively, and the median changes are similarly positive 
and statistically significant.  This result is similar to that of addition firms because we 
observe increases in these factors, but the changes in these proxy variables are 
uncorrelated with changes in leverage as we observed for inclusion firms.  Thus, the 
increases in earnings announcement reaction, volatility of EPS, and volatility of stock 
returns suggest an increase in information asymmetry following removal from the index.   
In the final set of proxy variables, the only significant change is in the number of 
analysts following the firm, a measure endogenous to the removal of the firm from the 
index.  The mean (median) change in analyst following is -4.32 (-4.20) people and both 
of these values are significant at the 1% level.  Both analyst forecast error and forecast 
dispersion increase following index removal, but these changes are insignificantly 
different from zero.  Therefore, for deletion firms, we observe some evidence of 
information asymmetry increases following index removal.     
 Information Asymmetry and Abnormal Returns:  Quartile Analysis  We study 
information asymmetry changes around index reconstitutions to explain the abnormal 
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returns surrounding these events.  In Table 12, we partition the sample firms into 
quartiles based on the level of the information asymmetry proxy variable prior to the 
index change and evaluate the median abnormal return in each quartile.  We refer to these 
quartiles as Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 in this section, and firms in Q1 (Q4) have the lowest 
(highest) values for each proxy.  Then, we compute the median difference in the 
abnormal return between the Q1 and Q4.  We expect that addition firms with higher pre-
inclusion information asymmetry will have higher abnormal returns because these firms 
benefit most from the reduction in information asymmetry.  For deletion firms whose 
information asymmetry may increase, those with lower pre-removal information 
asymmetry may have larger losses at announcement. 
We present the results for addition firms in Panel A of Table 12.  Inclusion firms 
in Q4, with the highest levels of R&D, have an abnormal return of 1.21% and firms in Q1 
have an abnormal return of 0.36%.  The difference between these quartiles is 
significantly different at the 1% level, and the abnormal returns increase monotonically 
with the increases in R&D.  Because R&D is a firm policy decision and often related to a 
firm’s industry (Aboody and Lev, 2000), we did not see a change in R&D after inclusion.  
However, abnormal returns are related to the level of R&D indicating that firms with 
high R&D benefit most from the decrease in information asymmetry caused by other 
factors.  The median abnormal returns in the quartiles based on intangible asset levels are 
neither monotonically increasing across quartiles nor significantly different between Q1 
and Q4. 
We next observe the abnormal returns for the quartiles by firm characteristic 
proxy variables.  The difference in median abnormal return between Q4 and Q1 is -0.67% 
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TABLE 12:  Abnormal Return Breakdown by Information Asymmetry Proxy Variables 
 
Our sample includes all newly added and removed firms from the S&P 500 Index from 
1990 through 2007.  Our initial sample includes 419 additions and deletions, but we 
exclude those sample firms associated with the following types of index changes: (1) 
When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an existing index firm, (2) when an S&P 
500 firm acquires another index firm and the acquired firm is removed from the index, 
(3) when two existing index firms merge and the resulting merged firm remains on the 
index, and (4) when an index firm is replaced by a spun-off subsidiary.  Our final sample 
contains 382 added firms and 368 deleted firms.    Research and development is the ratio 
of research and development expense to total assets.  Intangible assets is measured as one 
minus the sum of property, plant, and equipment plus current assets divided by total 
assets.  Firm size is the log of the market value of equity and the number of shareholders 
is measured in thousands.  The market to book ratio measures the market value of assets 
to the book value of assets where the market value of assets is calculated as the book 
value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity.  R&D, 
intangibles, firm size, market to book ratio, and the number of shareholders are calculated 
for the fiscal year prior to the event date.  The earnings announcement reaction is the 
average three day cumulative abnormal return for the 20 quarters preceding the 
announcement date.  The volatility of EPS is the standard deviation of quarterly earnings 
per share for the five year periods preceding the announcement date, and we measure the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the same period.  The analyst forecast 
error is absolute value of the ratio of the difference between the mean analyst forecast of 
earnings per share and the actual earnings per share divided by the mean forecast.  We 
measure this error for the forecasts during the five years before the event and compute the 
average.  The forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts divided by 
the mean forecast.  We measure this dispersion for the forecasts during the five years 
before the event and compute the average over each period.  The quartiles indicate the 
level of the proxy variable.  The variable measured is the daily average cumulative 
abnormal return between the announcement and completion dates of the index change.  
The last column is the difference between the first and fourth quartiles abnormal returns.  
[ ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent levels, 
respectively.]   
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TABLE 12 (continued) 
 
 
  
Firm Policy Factors
Research and Development 0.36 0.57 0.67 1.21 0.85 ***
Intangible Assets 0.84 0.62 0.65 0.81 -0.03
Firm Characteristics
Firm Size 1.19 0.80 0.60 0.52 -0.67 *
Number of Shareholders 0.62 0.65 0.86 0.72 0.10
Market/Book Ratio 0.70 0.79 0.76 0.91 0.21 
Variability Factors
Earnings Announcement Rxn 0.73 0.76 0.37 1.12 0.39 *
Volatility of EPS 0.75 0.77 0.74 0.84 0.09
Volatility of Returns 0.68 0.65 0.66 1.07 0.39
Analyst Forecast Factors
Number of Analysts 0.63 0.62 0.90 0.92 0.29
Analyst Error 0.44 0.85 1.05 1.06 0.62 **
Forecast Dispersion 0.73 0.88 1.13 0.86 0.13
Firm Policy Factors
Research and Development -0.86 -0.77 -0.85 -0.65 -0.19
Intangible Assets -1.10 -0.63 -1.09 -0.58 -0.12 *
Firm Characteristics
Firm Size -1.72 -1.05 -0.79 -0.64 0.12 **
Number of Shareholders -0.87 -1.07 -0.56 -0.72 1.09
Market/Book Ratio -2.02 -0.90 -0.72 -0.77 1.77 *** 
Variability Factors
Earnings Announcement Rxn -0.52 -0.58 -1.15 -0.81 -0.32
Volatility of EPS -0.76 -0.88 -1.60 -1.12 -0.03
Volatility of Returns -0.49 -0.90 -1.33 -0.97 -0.73
Analyst Forecast Factors
Number of Analysts -1.02 -1.07 -0.79 -0.55 0.65 **
Analyst Error -1.27 -0.94 -0.98 -0.82 0.57 *
Forecast Dispersion -1.11 -0.56 -0.62 -1.07 0.48
Quartile 
Q4 - Q1
Quartile Difference 
Panel B:  Deletion Sample
1 2 3 4
Difference 
Panel A:  Addition Sample
1 2 3 4 Q4 - Q1
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for the breakdown using firm size and the abnormal returns are monotonically decreasing 
across the quartiles.  The result supports that firms with the highest information 
asymmetry (small firm size) benefit most from the inclusions.  For the number of 
shareholders and market to book quartiles, the differences in abnormal returns between 
Q4 and Q1 are insignificant, but the Q4 abnormal return for the market to book 
breakdown is the highest of all quartiles.  For the firm variability variables, firms with the 
highest levels of earnings announcement reactions, volatility of EPS, and volatility of 
stock returns all have the highest abnormal returns around announcement.  Only the 
difference between Q4 and Q1 for the earnings announcement reactions is significant.  In 
particular, the Q1 median abnormal return is 0.73%, the Q4 abnormal return is 1.12%, 
and the difference of 0.39% is significant at the 10% level.  In general, firms with higher 
variability have larger abnormal returns.  
The final set of proxy variables for inclusion firms deals with analyst forecasts.  
For the breakdown by analyst forecast error, the Q4 abnormal return is 1.06% and the Q1 
abnormal return is 0.44%.  The difference between these values is significant at the 5% 
level, indicating that firms with larger forecast error and higher information asymmetry 
prior to inclusion have stronger announcement returns.  Interestingly, firms with the 
largest number of analysts in Q4 have the highest median announcement abnormal return.  
This finding contradicts our hypothesis that firms with higher information asymmetry 
have larger abnormal returns.  Chung, et al (1995) presents an explanation for this finding 
because they show that more analysts follow firms with higher information asymmetry 
because the value of private information in these firms is higher.  So, firms with higher 
information asymmetry may have more analyst coverage prior to inclusion. 
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Panel B of Table 12 reports a similar analysis by quartiles for firms removed from 
the index.  Partitioning firms into quartiles by the level of R&D and intangible assets 
shows no significant differences between firms with high and low pre-removal levels of 
these variables.  However, we show interesting results when we partition firms by firm 
size and market to book ratio.  Firms in Q1 of firm size (smallest firms)  and of market to 
book ratio (lowest ratio) incur the largest announcement period losses.  This result on 
firm size is contradictory in terms of information asymmetry because firm size is 
inversely related to information asymmetry.  This finding may be related to firm 
performance factors because firms that are removed from the index due to low market 
capitalization
3
 could be performing poorly leading to a decline in market value.  In this 
case, the announcement by Standard and Poors that these firms will be removed from the 
index leads to larger losses than for firms removed for other reasons.   
Partitioning deletion firms based on the firm variability factors leads to 
insignificant differences in abnormal return between the quartiles.  However, we find 
significant differences in abnormal returns by analyst forecast variables.  Firms with the 
lowest analyst coverage (Q1) have lower abnormal returns than those with higher analyst 
coverage (Q4).  In particular, the Q1 abnormal return is -1.02%, whereas the Q4 
abnormal return is -0.55%.  The difference is significant at the 5% level.  The difference 
between the Q4 and Q1 abnormal returns for analyst forecast error partitioning is 0.57% 
                                                          
3
 Sometimes Standard and Poors cites firm size as a reason for removal.  Twenty-five 
firms in our sample were removed for this reason.   
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(significant at the 10% level).  From this section, we observe mixed results in terms of the 
relationship between information asymmetry and announcement returns for deletions
4
. 
Overall the evidence suggests that inclusion firms with more information 
asymmetry prior to inclusion accrue larger abnormal gains upon addition.  Specifically, 
firms with higher R&D expense, smaller firm size, larger earnings announcement 
reaction, and larger forecast errors have higher gains.  The results for deletion firms were 
mixed and mostly insignificant, so we conclude that there is little relation between the 
pre-deletion level of information asymmetry and the losses at the announcement of 
removal from the S&P 500 index.           
 Multivariate Analysis of Analyst Forecast Errors  Among the information 
asymmetry proxy variables examined above, stock analyst forecast errors should not 
change simply as a result of the index reconstitutions, i.e. they are not endogenous to the 
events.  Therefore, we conduct a more in-depth analysis of the changes in forecast errors 
using regressions and present the results in Table 13.  As the dependent variable in these 
regressions, we include analyst forecast measured by the errors of annual EPS forecasts 
for the five years prior to the event and the five years following the event.  These are 
forecast errors for forecasts made for one and two fiscal years ahead in the month directly 
preceding the fiscal-year end for the firm.  We follow Haw, et al (1994), and define the
                                                          
4
 In Panel B of Appendix Table E, we present similar results by partitioning firms into 
groups either above or below the median value of the information asymmetry proxy.  The 
results on firm size and market/book ratio remain consistent for the deletion firms, but 
there is no significant difference in abnormal returns when partitioning into two groups 
by the number of analysts and forecast error.  However, firms with larger earnings 
announcement reactions and volatility of returns have larger abnormal returns.  The wide 
variety in results based upon the number of groups in partitioning also supports the 
conclusion that information asymmetry is less related to announcement returns for 
deletion firms.    
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TABLE 13:  Analyst Forecast Error Regression Results 
 
Our sample includes all newly added and removed firms from the S&P 500 Index from 
1990 through 2007.  Our initial sample includes 419 additions and deletions, but we 
exclude those sample firms associated with the following types of index changes: (1) 
When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an existing index firm, (2) when an S&P 
500 firm acquires another index firm and the acquired firm is removed from the index, 
(3) when two existing index firms merge and the resulting merged firm remains on the 
index, and (4) when an index firm is replaced by a spun-off subsidiary.  Our final sample 
contains 382 added firms and 368 deleted firms.  The dependent variable in the 
regressions is the scaled analyst forecast error.  The scaled analyst forecast error is 
absolute value of the ratio of the difference between the mean analyst forecast of earnings 
per share and the actual earnings per share divided by the mean forecast.  We include the 
one-year and two-year ahead forecast errors from the five years before and after the 
event.  We include a dummy variable to indicate observations occuring after the event 
announcement date, and a one year lag of the scaled forecast error.  The scaled forecast 
dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts divided by the mean forecast, and 
include a one year lag of the scaled forecast dispersion.  Research and development is the 
ratio of research and development expense to total assets.  Intangible assets is measured 
as one minus the sum of property, plant, and equipment plus current assets divided by 
total assets.  Firm size is the log of the market value of equity and the number of 
shareholders is measured in thousands.  The market to book ratio measures the market 
value of assets to the book value of assets where the market value of assets is calculated 
as the book value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of 
equity.  R&D, intangibles, firm size, market to book ratio, and the number of 
shareholders are calculated for the fiscal year prior to the event date.  [***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent levels, respectively.]   
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TABLE 13 (continued) 
 
Post-Event Flag -0.8824 *** -2.1848 *** -0.3803 -0.2677 ***
-3.55 -3.86 -0.61 -4.77
Number of Analysts -0.1078 *** -0.0923 * 0.1241 ** -0.0166
-3.89 -1.73 2.10 -0.31
Lag Forecast Dispersion 0.1801 *** 0.1861 *** 0.1473 *** 0.1507 ***
13.47 9.32 7.35 7.53
Research & Development 0.0925 -0.0341 -0.0313
1.49 -0.55 -0.50
Intangible Assets 0.0676 *** 0.1003 *** 0.0995 ***
2.59 2.72 3.64
Market/Book Ratio 0.0768 0.0609
0.79 0.62
Firm Size -3.5636 ***
-7.71
Firm Size Residuals -3.4120 ***
-7.35
R-Squared 0.3148 0.3156 0.3439 0.3421
Number of Observations 4725 2113 2108 2108
Number of Firms 310 143 143 143
Post-Event Flag 1.8142 1.3988 0.9211 1.2546
1.28 1.08 0.71 0.96
Number of Analysts -0.0656 0.0261 0.2951 * -0.0935
-0.39 0.18 1.86 -0.63
Lag Forecast Dispersion -0.0682 *** -0.0191 -0.0351 -0.0327
-2.71 -0.51 -0.94 -0.87
Research & Development 0.0585 -0.1413 -0.1074
0.21 -0.49 -0.37
Intangible Assets 0.0328 0.0381 0.0388
0.48 0.52 0.53
Market/Book Ratio 0.2395 0.1899
0.60 0.47
Firm Size -3.6220 ***
-4.01
Firm Size Residuals -3.1837 ***
-3.55
R-Squared 0.1182 0.1445 0.1608 0.1574
Number of Observations 1803 940 936 936
Number of Firms 120 68 68 68
Panel A:  Addition Sample
Panel B:  Deletion Sample
Model 3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 4
Model 1 Model 2 Model 4
Model 3
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main variable of interest as a dummy variable equal to one if the forecast occurred after 
the index inclusion or deletion.  We expect analyst forecasts to become more accurate 
after the inclusion of a firm to the index if information asymmetry declines (a negative 
coefficient on the dummy variable), and larger errors after removal of a firm from the 
index (a positive coefficient on the dummy variable).  We also control for other factors 
known to influence forecast accuracy.  Specifically, we include the number of analysts 
who follow the firm and whose individual forecasts enter the consensus, and we expect 
that more analysts forecasting EPS should make the consensus forecast more accurate. 
Both Haw, et al (1994) and Bernard (2008) find that more analyst coverage reduces 
forecast error.  Similar to Bernard (2008), to control for firm specific factors that impact 
analysts’ ability to make accurate forecasts, we include the lagged forecast error from the 
previous fiscal year for the same forecast length.  For example, if the current forecast is 
the two-year ahead forecast, we include the two-year ahead forecast error from the 
previous year.  We hypothesize that firms with larger forecast error will continue to have 
larger errors.  As described in Aboody and Lev (2000), firm’s use of R&D and other 
intangible assets creates information asymmetry because these activities and assets are 
firm specific and do not have a market value.  To ensure that the change in analyst 
forecast accuracy does not stem from changes in firm policies regarding R&D and 
intangible assets, we include R&D and intangible assets.  We control for the market to 
book ratio of the firm because higher market to book ratios indicate more growth 
opportunities which are difficult to value.  Finally, we control for firm size because larger 
firms typically have less information asymmetry and analyst effort may differ based on 
the size of the firm they cover.    To consider the possible correlation between firm size 
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and the number of analysts, we include the residuals from the regression of firm size on 
the number of analyst (firm size residuals).  We perform firm fixed effects in our 
regressions, but for brevity we suppress the coefficients in Table 13.   
We present the results for inclusion firms in Panel A of Table 13.  In three of our 
models, the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating the forecast occurs after the 
inclusion announcement is negative and statistically significant.  This means that analyst 
forecast errors are reduced after a firm is included on the S&P 500 index and supports the 
decrease in information asymmetry that is found in Chen, et al (2004), Hedge and 
McDermott (2003), and Becker-Blease and Paul (2006).  Note that in the above analysis, 
forecast errors at the consensus level are used.  Since analysts may exert more effort on 
analyzing newly added stocks because of the high profile nature of the S&P 500, our 
finding can be further supported if the errors of individual analysts declined temporarily 
following inclusion events.  However, if these errors were permanently reduced, we 
believe that the information asymmetry reduction would be supported.  To further 
explore these two explanations for our results, further research using individual forecast 
error is suggested.   
Consistent to our hypothesis, the number of analysts is negatively related to 
consensus forecast error in Models 1 and 2.  However, when we include firm size, the 
sign on the coefficient on the number of analyst changes from negative to positive.  We 
suspect that, after including firm fixed effects, firm size and the number of analysts are 
highly correlated.  In fact, studies by Bhushan (1989) and Barth, et al (2001) support this 
suspicion.  Therefore, in Model 4, we include only the residual of a regression of firm 
size on the number of analysts to remove the multicollinearity.  In Model 4, the impact of 
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the number of analysts on forecast error is negative.  We believe that a study of 
individual forecast errors would mitigate the difficulty of disentangling the correlation 
between the number of analysts and firm size.   
We also include the lagged values for analyst forecast error and the values have 
the hypothesized impact on the current forecast error.  Namely, firms with higher 
prediction error in the past have higher error in the current forecast.  This result on this 
variable is consistent with the findings of Bernard (2008).  We show that the level of 
research and development is positively related to the analyst forecast error.  This 
confirms the proposition by Aboody and Lev (2000) that research and development is a 
cause of information asymmetry.  Similarly, the coefficient on intangible assets is 
positive suggesting that firms with more intangible assets have higher information 
asymmetry measured by analyst forecast error.  In Model 3, we also control for firm size 
and the market to book ratio.  We find that firm size and forecast error are inversely 
related indicating that analysts have more accurate forecasts of larger firms.  However, as 
discussed above, firm size and the number of analysts are correlated.  We, therefore, 
include in Model 4 the firm size residual the regression of firm size on the number of 
analysts in Model 4.  The coefficient on the residual term is negative, confirming that 
larger firms have more accurate forecasts
5
.   
One potential criticism of this analysis is the use of consensus level forecasts 
because the group of analysts may have changed prior to and after the event.  New 
                                                          
5
 We present similar results using the median rather than mean analyst forecast in Table F 
of the Appendix.  The coefficient on the post-event dummy variable is negative, but 
insignificant, in model 3.  Aside from this difference, all remaining conclusions are the 
same.   
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analysts that begin following the firm have less experience with the firm-specific 
characteristics and could potentially introduce biases to the forecast accuracy.  We plan to 
perform future research to adjust for the bias and examine whether the improvements to 
forecast accuracy are permanent. 
In Panel B of Table 13, we show the same analysis for deletion firms.  Consistent 
with the finding in Table 11  that information asymmetry does not increase following 
index removal, the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating the period after removal 
is insignificantly different from zero.  In fact, the only consistent finding is that larger 
firms (measured by the firm size in Model 3 or the residual firm size in Model 4) have 
more accurate forecasts.  This strengthens the conclusion that information asymmetry 
does not appear to increase for firms removed from the S&P 500 index.    
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2.4 Conclusion 
 
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the stock returns around S&P 
500 index changes by examining the changes in information asymmetry around these 
events.  While several studies, including Chen, et al (2004), Hedge and McDermott 
(2003), and Becker-Blease and Paul (2006), imply that information asymmetry is reduced 
following inclusion, our study is the first to provide a direct test for this proposition.  We 
find that the information asymmetry problem is mitigated following index inclusions 
supported by the decreases in  market to book ratio, analyst forecast error, and forecast 
dispersion following inclusions.  Additionally, we show that firms with higher 
information asymmetry prior to inclusion accrue larger gains at announcement suggesting 
that these firms enjoy an increased benefit from inclusion.  Finally, we conduct a detailed 
analysis of analyst forecast errors and show a significant decline in forecast error 
following inclusion suggesting a reduction in information asymmetry.  We also find that 
analyst forecast errors are reduced when firms are followed by more analysts, have a 
smaller lagged forecast error, have fewer intangible assets, and are larger in size.   
For firms removed from the index, the preponderance of evidence in our study 
suggests that there is no change in information asymmetry following deletion from the 
S&P 500 Index.  Some proxy variables for information asymmetry show declines in 
information asymmetry while others point to increases.  We observe little relationship 
between the announcement returns and the level of information asymmetry when we 
partition the deletion sample into quartiles by the pre-removal levels of information 
asymmetry proxies.  Finally, our multivariate regression analysis of analyst forecast 
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errors shows an insignificant increase in analyst forecast error following removal from 
the S&P 500 Index.     
  
CHAPTER 3:  BONDHOLDER REACTIONS TO S&P 500 INDEX 
RECONSTITUTIONS 
 
 
 During the period from 1990 through 2007, Standard and Poors changed the 
constituents in the S&P 500 index over 400 times.  In prior studies of index changes, 
newly added stocks experienced a positive and sustained price reaction. One hypothesis 
explaining this reaction is that Standard and Poors, in selecting stocks, certifies some 
positive information about the company.  Since Standard and Poors maintains that they 
do not use information about future firm performance to make decisions on index 
changes, the positive price reaction is inconsistent with flat long-run demand curves 
proposed by Scholes (1972).  This paper examines the certification hypothesis by 
examining the reaction of bondholders to S&P 500 index changes and finds no additional 
support for the certification hypothesis.  Additionally, we further examine the types of 
information suggested in the certification hypothesis: improved firm performance and 
better access to capital markets.  Our findings of insignificant bond price reaction to 
index changes cannot help distinguish between improvements in firm future performance 
and additional access to capital markets.   
Five hypotheses emerge from the existing literature on index changes.  The 
imperfect substitutes hypothesis, contradicting a belief in efficient markets, states that the 
long-run demand curves for S&P 500 index stocks is downward sloping rather than flat.  
The remaining four hypotheses support the efficient markets hypothesis.  The price 
pressure hypothesis purports that the activity by index funds rebalancing portfolios 
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creates a short-term price increase for additions and decline for removed stocks.  For 
additions, however, empirical evidence of a sustained price increase is inconsistent with 
this hypothesis.  The liquidity hypothesis suggests that newly added index firms 
experience a long-lasting increase in liquidity which reduces the cost of equity and 
increases the stock price.  The certification hypothesis states that the inclusion (removal) 
of a stock in the S&P 500 conveys positive (negative) information which creates a 
sustained positive (negative) price shock.  Finally, the investor awareness hypothesis was 
developed in response to the asymmetric price reactions of addition and deletion events.  
This hypothesis claims that reductions in the shadow cost associated with the lack of 
investor awareness of a stock cause the sustained price reactions for additions.  However, 
removed firms experience a temporary price decline because investor awareness remains 
the same upon removal from the index.   
 We investigate bondholder wealth effects surrounding index changes to examine 
the certification hypothesis.  Bondholder yield changes are particularly suited for the 
examination of the certification hypothesis because bonds are not influenced by factors 
from the other hypotheses
6
.  Unlike stocks, bond prices should not be affected when stock 
liquidity changes.  Additionally, the short-run price pressure or slope of the long-run 
demand curve for stocks should not affect bond yields.   Lastly, the shadow cost imposed 
from lack of investor awareness of a stock does not impact bond returns.  Thus, any 
significant bondholder wealth effects around index changes can help support the 
                                                          
6
 Interestingly, several papers look at option markets to disentangle the effects of multiple 
hypotheses on stock return.  In particular, Dhillon and Johnson (1991) look at stock 
returns to optioned and non-optioned stocks and Sui (2004) supports the certification 
hypothesis by examining the risk-neutral densities of options of addition and deletion 
firms.   
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certification hypothesis.  A closely related study is Dhillon and Johnson (1991).  They 
use a sample of 39 bonds for index additions from 1978 through 1988 to find positive but 
insignificant cumulative returns surrounding the announcement date.  In our study, we  
find similar results.  In particular, we find insignificant yield changes for bonds of the 
added firms on the individual bond basis (multiple bonds per firm are regarded as 
independent observations) and the firm basis (using the average yield change of all bonds 
for a given firm).  For deletion firms, we find positive and statistically significant yield 
changes on the individual bonds basis, but insignificant changes on the firm basis  
Furthermore, we explore the possible types of information that may be conveyed 
upon selection by Standard and Poors for addition (removal) from the index.  The 
certification hypothesis is broad and does not specify the nature of this information.  The 
studies that investigate the certification hypothesis differ on the type of information 
included during index reconstitutions.  Dhillon and Johnson (1991) and Jain (1987) point 
to a general “positive information” conveyed at announcement.  Denis, et al (2003) and 
Kappou, et al (2007) show that earnings per share increases following announcement, 
indicating an improvement in firm performance.  If the information was conveyed by 
index inclusion, we expect bondholders to benefit from the smaller likelihood of default.  
Therefore, a significant decrease in yield (increase in price) would be consistent with the 
certification of improved operating performance.   
Certain positive information for stockholders can have a negative impact on 
bondholders.  For example, Kappou, Brooks, and Ward (2007) and Chen, Noronha, and 
Singal (2004) claim that new S&P 500 index members may be able to attract more capital 
because of the reputation of the index.  Better access to capital markets can lead to an 
91 
 
increase in a firm’s investment opportunity set.  This occurs because funding can be 
obtained at a lower cost and consequently more value-creating investment opportunities 
can be taken.  The lower cost of capital and/or increased investment opportunity set 
benefits stockholders, but it might lead to a negative impact on bondholders.  In 
particular, if firms increase their debt significantly as the result of the better access to 
capital markets, bondholders will be adversely impacted.  Bond yields would increase 
due to the increased risk of default and the further dilution of current bondholder claims 
in the event of liquidation.  Thus, the direction of bondholder reactions will distinguish 
between the types of positive information conveyed in the announcement.  Our univariate 
and multivariate analyses of bond yields surrounding index inclusion and deletion events 
yield insignificant changes and thus do not help distinguish between these two types of 
information in the certification hypothesis.     
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3.1 Literature Review 
 
 
 The preponderance of literature surrounding S&P 500 index changes agrees that 
newly added firms experience a positive and sustained price increase following the 
announcement by Standard and Poors
7
.  Given the statement from Standard and Poors 
that they do not use information about future performance to select stocks for inclusion in 
conjunction with an assumption of a flat long-run demand curve, this price increase is 
puzzling.  Five hypotheses emerge from the extant literature on S&P 500 index changes:  
imperfect substitutes, liquidity, certification, investor awareness, and price pressure.  The 
imperfect substitutes hypothesis states that the long-run demand curve for newly added 
stocks must be downward sloping, a conclusion in opposition to Scholes (1972) who 
argues for market efficiency.  The remaining four hypotheses maintain Scholes’ (1972) 
proposition of market efficiency but argue for various types of information that could be 
conveyed in the selection of stocks to be included on or removed from the index.  We 
describe each hypothesis below focusing particularly on the certification hypothesis 
tested in this study. 
 If stocks have a flat long-run demand curve, then stocks with the same risk level 
should be perfect substitutes.  Stock price must remain unchanged when no information is 
conveyed, because investors can sell the stock for a substitute if the price begins to 
increase.  The imperfect substitutes hypothesis claims that stocks on the S&P 500 index 
do not have a flat long-run demand curve and therefore do not have perfect substitutes.  
When stocks are added to the index, both demand and price increase and remain elevated.  
                                                          
7
 Harris and Gurel (1986) find a short-term rather than sustained price increase for added 
firms.   
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When stocks are removed from the index, demand and price decline and remain low.  
Empirical evidence on this hypothesis is mixed.  Shleifer (1986) finds positive abnormal 
stock returns around inclusion events and suggests they are related to the purchases of 
index funds, which is a proxy for increased demand.  Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) look 
at the price responses before October 1989 when index changes are not pre-announced 
and afterwards when Standard and Poors pre-announces the changes several days prior to 
the implementation of the new index.  They conclude that there is a permanent 
component to the increased demand and prices stemming from downward sloping long-
run demand curves.   
 While these two studies support the imperfect substitutes hypothesis, Edminster, 
et al (1994) and Hrazdil (2007) find evidence to contradict this hypothesis.  Edminster, et 
al  (1994) observe that many addition firms have rising prices in the period preceding the 
inclusion, leading to biased coefficients in the market model estimated using pre-
inclusion data.  They use an estimation period after the inclusion event to calculate the 
unbiased excess returns and show that these excess returns are unrelated to the increased 
demand from index funds.  Therefore, they conclude that stocks on the index are perfect 
substitutes.  Hrazdil (2007) examines the change in the S&P 500 weighting method from 
market-based to free-float.  This change caused the weights of certain stocks in the index 
to change, which would create buying and selling pressure from index fund rebalancing.  
With downward sloping demand curves, abnormal returns around this event would be 
related to the change in a stock’s index weight.  Hrazdil (2007) finds no such relationship 
and confirms the conclusion of Edmister, et al (1994) that stocks on the S&P 500 index 
have perfect substitutes.  
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 The price pressure hypothesis supports a short-term increase in price for added 
stocks and a short-term decrease in price for removed stocks stemming from the 
temporary demand imbalance from index funds rebalancing to mimic the index.  Harris 
and Gurel (1986) purport that price and volume increases following index additions that 
are reversed within two weeks and relate the magnitude of the price increase to the 
outstanding size of index funds.  Elliott and Warr (2003) use a different tactic to support 
the price pressure hypothesis.  They show that Nasdaq traded stocks have a larger and 
more sustained price increase than NYSE stocks and suggest that their finding supports   
the price pressure hypothesis.  They argue that the auction market (NYSE) is better able 
to handle increased demands than the dealer market (Nasdaq) and thus the price increase 
is smaller than in the dealer market.   
 The liquidity hypothesis relates to the price pressure hypothesis because in both 
hypotheses increased trading leads to price changes.  In the price pressure hypothesis, the 
increased trading is temporary from rebalancing of index funds, whereas in the liquidity 
hypothesis liquidity improvements are sustained past the initial rebalancing period.  
Consequently, the liquidity hypothesis is consistent with a permanent price increase after 
index addition events.  Three main studies find support for this hypothesis.  Erwin and 
Miller (1998) show that the bid-ask spread declines, trading volume increases, and price 
rises for newly added stocks that did not have traded options before inclusion.  The prices 
of these stocks rise due to increased liquidity.  Hedge and McDermott (2003) relate the 
change in bid-ask spreads to the announcement returns for inclusion stocks and show that 
the improved liquidity is a permanent effect.  This implies that a sustained price increase 
may be due to improved liquidity.  Finally, Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) link liquidity 
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improvements to expanded growth opportunities in the inclusion firms.  They 
hypothesize that liquidity improvements decrease the cost of capital which consequently 
enlarges the investment opportunity set and raises firm value.  All three studies support a 
sustained price increase upon addition with evidence of improved liquidity.      
 Chen, et al (2004) find that the price increases for addition firms are permanent, 
whereas the price decline for deleted firms is short-lived.  Given this asymmetric price 
behavior, they propose the investor awareness hypothesis which draws upon the Merton’s 
(1987) model of market segmentation.  In particular, when investors are aware of a subset 
of stocks in the market, they demand a premium, or shadow cost, to compensate for lack 
of diversification.  In essence, the lack of investor awareness increases the cost of capital 
by the amount of the shadow cost.  Therefore, when firms are added to the index, more 
investors become aware of the stocks and the shadow cost component of the required 
return falls.  This reduction in shadow cost and required rate of return is sustained, 
leading to a sustained price improvement.  On the contrary, when firms are removed from 
the index, investor awareness does not automatically decline.  So the short-term price 
decline is due to price pressure from rebalancing rather than an increase in shadow cost.   
The final hypothesis, the certification hypothesis, is the basis for the analysis of 
bond yield spread changes in this paper.  The certification hypothesis states that Standard 
and Poors, in selecting certain stocks for the index, conveys certain information about 
newly added (removed) stocks.  Work by Dhillon and Johnson (1991), Denis, et al 
(2003), Kappou, et al (2007), and Cai (2007) supports this hypothesis.  On the other hand, 
Hrazdil and Scott (2007) provide evidence against this hypothesis.  In the earliest study 
of the certification hypothesis, Dhillon and Johnson (1991) examine returns to bonds and 
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options of newly added firms.  As stated previously, bonds and options are not 
susceptible to changes in stock liquidity, price pressure, and shadow cost, so changes in 
their value can only be attributable to positive information.  They find, for their sample 
bond returns for 39 firms, positive and significant increases in bond prices on the 
announcement date, but insignificant cumulative returns in the days surrounding the 
announcement.  Additionally, call option prices increase while put option prices decline 
on the announcement date.  Taken together, their evidence supports the certification 
hypothesis but does not identify the nature of the positive information.  Denis, et al 
(2003) and Kappou, et al (2007) find evidence to support the certification hypothesis by 
examining the changes in the forecast and realized earnings per share.  In particular, 
Denis, et al (2003) compute the change in forecast earnings from before to after the index 
change and show that investor expectations about future performance improve following 
inclusion events.  They verify that these improvements are not due to industry or market-
wide effects.  Kappou, et al (2007) measure realized improvements in EPS following 
index inclusion.  Two reasons may explain these observations of improved EPS 
following addition.  Either Standard and Poors has superior information about firm 
performance and specifically selects firms on this basis or firms selected to the index 
have superior monitoring or access to capital markets which allows them to perform 
better after inclusion. Denis, et al (2003) clearly state that their tests cannot distinguish 
between these reasons.  The first explanation would be contrary to the stated practice of 
Standard and Poors.  Regardless of which explanation holds true, these two studies find 
improved operational performance consistent with the certification hypothesis.  On the 
other hand, Hrazdil and Scott (2007) refute the findings of improved EPS.  They suggest 
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that the improved earnings are a byproduct of manipulation of discretionary accruals 
rather than of significant improvements in operations. 
Finally, Cai (2007) decomposes the positive information conveyed in index 
inclusion announcements into information about the added firm’s industry and 
information specific to the added firm.  They examine the returns to both the added firm 
and industry peers and show that a portion of the positive announcement reaction to index 
addition is attributable to information about the firm’s industry.  Since Standard and 
Poor’s selects firms to reflect the national industry breakdown, firms from growing 
industries are most likely to be added to the index.  On the contrary, firms from saturated 
industries are more likely to removed from the index  
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3.2 Sample 
 
 
Our sample consists of firms added to or removed from the S&P 500 index during 
the period from 1990 through 2007.  We begin our sample in 1990 because Standard and 
Poors changed its timeline for announcing index revisions in October 1989.  Prior to this 
date, the announcement and implementation of index changes occurred simultaneously.  
Index funds were forced to rebalance portfolios without an advance notice.  According to 
Benish and Whaley (1996), this created a large amount of price pressure on the day of the 
index revision.  After October 1989, Standard and Poors began pre-announcing index 
changes several days prior to the actual reconstitution.  In our sample, the mean (median) 
length of time between the announcement and actual index change is 5.26 (5) days.    
We begin the sample selection using a monthly list of S&P 500 index constituents 
from Compustat.  For each month, we identify newly added or removed firms.  We verify 
the index change announcement and implementation dates using news accounts in Lexis-
Nexis.  This procedure identifies 838 sample firms with 419 additions and 419 deletions.  
We further exclude those sample firms that are associated with the following types of 
index changes: (1) When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an existing index firm 
(11 cases involving 11 added and 11 deleted firms), (2) when an S&P 500 firm acquires 
another index firm and the acquired firm is removed from the index (5 cases involving 5 
deleted firms), (3) when two existing index firms merge and the resulting merged firm 
remains on the index (9 cases involving 9 added and 18 deleted firms), and (4) when an 
index firm is replaced by a spun-off subsidiary (17 cases involving 17 added and 17 
deleted firms).  The final sample of index changes contains 382 added firms and 368 
deleted firms. 
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To ensure that the changes in bond yield spread are not due to changes in the 
industry, we select a matching peer firm for each sample firm.  We require that the 
matched firms have valid Compustat data for the fiscal year prior to the index change as 
well as CRSP prices for the seven-day period around the event date.  We exclude 
matching firms currently in the S&P 500 index and exclude firms that were removed 
from or added to the index within five years of the event.  For each sample firm, we 
identify all peer firms within the same three-digit SIC code and use the one that is closest 
in size to the sample firm as the matched firm.  For both sample and control firms, we 
gather accounting information from Compustat and use the I/B/E/S database for analyst 
forecasts of earnings per share.   
 With the sample and control firms, we then collect bond prices from three 
sources:  TRACE, FISD (NAIC), and Bloomberg.  The TRACE (Trade Reporting and 
Compliance Engine) database starts in 2002 and contains all secondary over-the-counter 
trades of public bonds.  The FISD (Fixed Income Securities Database) contains bond 
prices for trades from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).  
Following Bessembinder, et al (2009), if multiple trades occur on the same day, we use 
the weighted average price where the weights are determined by the size of the trade.  
Finally, Bloomberg provides daily prices.  For a bond to appear in our final sample, we 
require that it has at least one price within each of the following windows:  [30 days prior 
to announcement date, announcement date] and [completion date, 30 days after 
completion date].  The announcement date is the day on which the index change is 
preannounced, and the completion date is the day on which the index change occurs.  If 
the bond has multiple dates with prices in either window, we use the observation closest 
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to the announcement or completion date.  If multiple pricing sources have price 
information for a given bond on a given day, we use the TRACE data first, followed by 
the NAIC data.  If neither of these two sources yields valid prices, we use the Bloomberg 
data.   
 This selection process yields a final sample of 359 bonds from 112 addition 
sample firms, and 692 bonds from 177 deletion sample firms.  We have a sample of 198 
bonds from 76 addition matched firms, and 306 bonds from 94 deletion matched firms.  
Table 14 provides the descriptive statistics for the included sample firms and bonds.  
Sample firms have a higher average number of bonds per firm than peer firms.  Both 
addition and deletion sample firms have an average of 1.24 bonds per firm, whereas 
matched pair firms for both additions and deletions have 1.14 and 1.15 bonds per firm 
respectively.  Both addition and deletion sample firms are larger in size (measured by 
sales) than the matched pair counterparts.  Leverage is defined as the ratio of the book 
value of total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) to the market value of 
assets. The market value of assets is defined as the book value of assets minus the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity.  Both addition and deletion sample firms 
have lower leverage than the control firms.  The addition (deletion) sample has leverage 
of 0.228 (0.231), whereas the control firms have leverage of 0.282 and 0.289 for 
additions and deletions, respectively.  The unlevered volatility of stock returns is the 
standard deviation of the 24 months of unlevered stock returns ending two months prior 
to the announcement date.  Unlevered stock returns are calculated by multiplying the 
return by 1 minus the leverage ratio for the given year.  While there is no difference 
between the average unlevered volatility of the deletion firms and matched sample, 
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addition sample firms have a lower unlevered volatility (6.4%) than the matched sample 
(7.9%).  Finally, we show the Standard and Poors issuer rating.  The S&P issuer ratings 
are converted to a numeric scale where AAA = 1, AAA- = 2, …., D = 23, and NR = 24.  
The addition sample firms have an average rating of 9.192, which corresponds to a rating 
between BBB and BBB+.  Addition control firms have an average rating of 10.677, 
corresponding to a rating between BBB- and BBB.  The average rating for deletion 
sample firms is 8.965, which corresponds to a rating between BBB+ and A-.  Lastly, the 
deletion sample firms have an average rating of 10.458, corresponding to a rating 
between BBB- and BBB.  At the firm level, sample firms appear to be less risky in terms 
of leverage and rating for both additions and deletions.  We also measure certain key 
bond characteristics.  Fewer addition sample bonds are senior (78%) and callable (43.7%) 
than the addition control bonds (83.3% senior and 55.6% callable).  The same pattern 
holds for deletion bonds.  Bonds across all samples have an average remaining maturity 
between 8.4 and 9.2 years.   
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3.3 Methodology 
For event studies of stock returns, daily returns in the period surrounding the 
event are used to compute the abnormal reaction to the announcement (MacKinlay, 
1997).  Lack of daily trading, and thus daily prices, remains a major challenge in 
performing event studies using bond returns.  A majority of event studies on bondholder 
wealth effects use monthly prices.  However, Bessembinder, et al (2009) demonstrate that 
tests using monthly bond prices cannot detect abnormal returns as well as those using 
daily returns.  They suggest the use of daily bond returns because of this difference.  
Their study uses the entire database of bond prices to compute returns, whereas in event 
studies only the sample bonds are relevant for testing.  Additionally, computing returns 
around the event requires daily prices for two or more subsequent days.  These 
restrictions on the available bond data often yield a sample too small for analysis.   
We adopt a methodology that requires fewer data points to overcome the above 
problem. In particular, Maquieira, et al (1998) and Nishikawa, et al (2008) compute 
changes in yields rather than cumulative bond returns surrounding the events.
8
  Following 
their method, we search for the last price in the window of [30 days prior to 
Announcement Date, Announcement Date] and the first price in the window [Completion 
Date, 30 days after Completion Date].  Using these two prices, we compute the yield to 
maturity for each bond before and after the event dates.  A bond’s yield to maturity is 
then used to compute the yield spread which is the difference between the yield to 
                                                          
8  Maquieira, et al (1998) examine bondholder reaction to stock-for-stock mergers.  
Nishikawa, et al (2008) study bondholder wealth effects surrounding open market 
repurchases. 
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maturity on the bond and the value from the Treasury yield curve with the same maturity.  
We use linear interpolation to determine the Treasury yield with the matching maturity.  
In particular, from the Treasury yields reported by Datastream for the 1-, 3-, and 6-month 
as well as the 1-, 2-, 3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, 20-, and 30-year Treasuries, we use linear 
interpolation to complete the full Treasury yield curve from maturities of one month to 30 
years.  Yield spread change is defined to be the difference in yield spread prior to and 
after the index change.  We then employ the standard event study methodology using the 
yield spread change rather than abnormal returns.  In the following analyses, we present 
the raw change in yield spread.  We also conduct the same analyses using the relative 
change in yield spread, which is the raw change dividend by the yield spread prior to the 
event date.  The results from this set of analyses are available in the Appendix.    
In addition to measuring the yield spread changes, we measured the change in 
operating performance and leverage around the index reconstitutions in order to 
distinguish between different types of “positive information.”  As in Denis, et al (2003) 
and Kappou, et al (2007), we use the realized changes in earnings per share and changes 
in analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share to measure operational improvement.  In 
newly added firms, we expect a decline in bond yield if investors expect improvements in 
future performance.  The use of analyst forecasts serves as a proxy for investor 
expectations about future performance.  The I/B/E/S database contains monthly forecasts 
for both quarterly and annual EPS values for up to four quarters and five years ahead of 
the given month.  Following Denis, et al (2003), we use annual EPS forecasts for up to 
five years, although the majority of firms only have forecasts for one or two fiscal years 
ahead.  For each firm, we get the mean and median analyst forecast from the month most 
105 
 
closely preceding the announcement date and the month immediately following the 
reconstitution date.  Firms without forecast information in the six months prior to the 
announcement date and/or in the six months following the completion date are excluded.  
For example, if a firm was added to the index in June 2002 (with the announcement and 
completion dates within the month of June) and had a fiscal year end of December, we 
collect the mean and median forecast in May 2002 for the fiscal year ending in December 
2002, December 2003, and so on.  We also collect the forecasts in July 2002 for the fiscal 
year ending December 2002, December 2003, etc.  Then the change in analyst forecast is 
computed as the difference between the forecast immediately prior and after the event for 
the same fiscal year end.  If the I/B/E/S database contains forecasts for more than one 
fiscal year ahead, the average change in forecast is used.   
While changes in analyst forecasts serve as one proxy for changes in investor 
expectations, we also use the realized changes in earnings per share assuming that 
investors are rational.  Denis, et al (2003) and Kappou, et al (2007) use the realized 
earnings as a proxy for changes in investor expectations at announcement of index 
change events.  We follow Kappou, et al (2007) to measure the absolute change in 
earnings from before and after the inclusion/exclusion event.  We measure the average 
earnings per share in the three fiscal years before the announcement date and find the 
difference of this value from the average earnings per share in the three fiscal years 
following the completion date.   
Both improvements in operating performance and better access to capital markets 
have positive impacts on stock returns.  The same does not hold true for bondholders.  In 
particular, improvement in earnings per share is a signal of positive changes in operating 
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performance that benefits bondholders, whereas additional access to capital markets may 
be detrimental to bondholders.  If newly added firms increase their financial leverage due 
to better access to capital markets, the firm’s default probability increases and existing 
bondholder claims to the firm are diluted
9
.  Thus, we measure the change in firm leverage 
surrounding index reconstitutions to see how further access to capital markets impacts 
bondholders.   For a given year, leverage is defined as the ratio of the book value of total 
debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) to the market value of assets.  Market 
value of assets is defined as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus 
the market value of equity.  We calculate the change in leverage as the difference in 
average leverage before and after the event.  The average leverage before the event is the 
mean of the leverage values in years -1, -2, and -3, where year 0 as the announcement 
year.  The average leverage after the event is the mean of the leverage values in years 1, 
2, and 3.  We also examine leverage changes by using the ratio of the leverage after the 
event to the leverage before the event, as well as using only long-term debt in calculating 
leverage.  We find similar results (not reported in the paper) using these alternative 
measures
10
   
  
                                                          
9
 For example, see studies of bondholder reactions to other leverage increasing events 
such as leveraged buyouts (Asquith and Wizman (1990), Cook, et al (1992), Warga and 
Welch (1993), Billett, et al (2010), and Baran and King (2010)) and leveraged 
recapitalizations (Handa and Radhadkrishnan (1991) and Halpern, et al (2009)). 
10
 These results are available upon request. 
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3.4 Empirical Results 
 
 
Table 15 presents the univariate results of yield spread changes for both the 
addition and deletion samples.  We include the raw results as well as those after 
winsorization at the 5% and 95% level.  We winsorize the yield spread changes because 
of extreme values in the deletion sample.  Standard and Poor’s removes firms from the 
S&P 500 index for a variety of reasons:  rebalancing index composition to better reflect 
the industry breakdown in the U.S., mergers or acquisitions of index firms, spinoffs from 
index constituents that decrease the constituent size, bankruptcy or delisting from an 
exchange, and low market capitalization.  One of these confounding events often 
accompanies the announcement of removal from the S&P 500 index.  Since bankruptcy, 
spinoffs, and delisting harm bondholders, it is not surprising that we observe a large 
decline on bond value around many deletions.   
In Table 15, we present the analysis at the bond and firm level.  In studies of 
bondholder wealth effects, including multiple bonds per firm may bias the standard errors 
downward because of the return correlation of bonds with the same issuer.  Some studies, 
therefore, choose a single representative bond for each firm or use a weighted average 
return of all bonds with the same issuer to obtain a single observation per firm
11
.  In the 
firm-level results, we compute the firm-level yield spread change as the average of the 
yield spread changes for all bonds from a single issuer.   
The mean and median yield spread changes for the addition sample are positive at 
                                                          
11
 Billet, King, and Mauer (2004) use a weighted-average of a target’s bond returns to 
create one observation per target and Asquith and Wizman (1990) choose a representative 
bond from each target to rectify this problem.  
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TABLE 15:  Univariate Yield Spread Changes 
 
Our sample includes all newly added and removed firms from the S&P 500 Index from 
1990 through 2007.  We exclude those sample firms associated with the following types 
of index changes: (1) When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an existing index 
firm, (2) when an S&P 500 firm acquires another index firm and the acquired firm is 
removed from the index, (3) when two existing index firms merge and the resulting 
merged firm remains on the index, and (4) when an index firm is replaced by a spun-off 
subsidiary.  Matched pairs are firms in the same 3-digit SIC code closest in size to the 
sample firm based on sales.  For these sample and control firms, we gather daily pricing 
data from TRACE, FISD, and Bloomberg and require that bonds have a valid price in 
both the [-30, Announcement date] and [Completion date, +30] windows to compute 
yield spread changes. The yield spread is the difference between the yield to maturity and 
the value from the Treasury yield curve with the same maturity.  The yield spread change 
is the difference between the yield spread before and after the event announcement date.  
The yield spread changes are reported as percentages.  [ ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent levels, respectively.] 
 
 
Mean 0.095 -0.017 0.044 -0.041
Median 0.008 -0.034 0.012 -0.034 *
N 336 181 336 181
Mean -0.009 -0.004 -0.043 0.000
Median -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
N 104 71 104 71
Mean 8.146 * 0.174 ** 2.226 *** 0.398 **
Median 0.016 ** 0.005 0.027 *** 0.002
N 566 271 566 271
Mean 8.285 0.195 1.173 *** 0.374
Median 0.007 0.006 0.022 0.001
N 160 84 160 84
Sample Firms
Sample Firms
Unwinsorized Winsorized (5,95%)
Sample Firms Control Firms Control Firms
Sample Firms
Panel A:  Addition Sample by Bond
Panel B:  Addition Sample by Firm
Panel C:  Deletion Sample by Bond
Panel D:  Deletion Sample by Firm
Unwinsorized
Sample Firms Control Firms Control Firms
Sample Firms Control Firms Control Firms
Sample Firms Control Firms Control Firms
Winsorized (5,95%)
Unwinsorized Winsorized (5,95%)
Sample Firms
Unwinsorized Winsorized (5,95%)
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the bond level.  This indicates that inclusion to the S&P 500 index is detrimental to 
bondholders.  This is consistent with the proposition by Kappou, et al (2007) and Chen, et 
al (2004) that these firms have better access to capital markets and might increase 
leverage following inclusion.  However, when we conduct the analysis at the firm level, 
the mean and median yield spread changes are negative albeit insignificant.  A negative 
yield change indicates that inclusion to the index benefits bondholders.  This result is 
consistent with Denis, et al (2003) and Kappou, et al (2007) who show that future 
performance improves following index inclusion.  The difference in the bond-level and 
firm-level results is probably due to the fact that firms with a large number of bonds carry 
more weight in the bond-level analysis, but their weight diminishes significantly in the 
firm-level analysis.  On the other hand, the results for the newly deleted firms from the 
S&P 500 index are consistent between the bond-level and firm-level results.  The mean 
and median yield spread changes are positive for the winsorized and unwinsorized 
samples both the bond-level and firm-level analyses.  These findings indicate that 
bondholders accrue losses during these events, which is not surprising due to the negative 
reasons for deletion events.  We also conduct the same analysis using the relative change 
in yield spreads and find similar results.  These results are available in Table G of the 
Appendix. 
One reason for the insignificant results in the univariate analysis may be that 
certain information may harm bondholders while other information may be positive for 
bondholders.  Thus in an overall sample, these results become mixed and insignificant.  
To further explore the nature of the information conveyed through the certification of 
Standard and Poors, we divide our sample into subgroups and examine the yield spread 
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changes within each subgroup.  We first divide our sample by improvements in operating 
performance.  We use the change in forecasted earnings and divide the sample based on 
the median change in forecasted earnings.  Bondholders in firms with forecasted earnings 
changes above the median should accrue gains because of the decline in default 
probability stemming from operating performance improvement.  We also divide firms 
by the median change in leverage.  Firms with changes in leverage above the median are 
more likely to have losses to bondholders.  In Table 16, we create four subgroups based 
upon these breakdowns: high forecasted earnings change and high leverage change, high 
forecasted earnings change with low leverage change, low forecasted earnings change 
with high leverage change, low forecasted earnings change with low leverage change.   
We predict that bonds in the above median forecasted earnings change and below median 
leverage change (upper right quadrant) will have negative yield spread changes, whereas 
firms in the opposite group (lower left quadrant) will have positive yield spread changes.  
The remaining two quadrants have mixed positive and negative effects.  In the addition 
sample, we do not find results consistent with these predictions.  None of the results shed 
any light on the type of information conveyed by Standard and Poors based on the 
analysis.  In Table H of the Appendix, we use realized changes in earnings as an alternate 
proxy variable for changes in investor expectations of future performance.  Tables I and J 
of the Appendix contain the results using relative change in yield spread.   
As a final component of our analysis, we conduct multivariate regressions to 
explore the determinants of yield spread changes.  We include the forecast or realized 
change in earnings per share as a proxy for the change in investor expectations of future 
performance and the change in firm leverage to proxy for a firm’s access to capital 
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TABLE 16:  Yield Changes Subgroup Analysis 
 
Our sample includes all newly added and removed firms from the S&P 500 Index from 
1990 through 2007.  We exclude those sample firms associated with the following types 
of index changes: (1) When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an existing index 
firm, (2) when an S&P 500 firm acquires another index firm and the acquired firm is 
removed from the index, (3) when two existing index firms merge and the resulting 
merged firm remains on the index, and (4) when an index firm is replaced by a spun-off 
subsidiary.  Matched pairs are firms in the same 3-digit SIC code closest in size to the 
sample firm based on sales.  For these sample and control firms, we gather daily pricing 
data from TRACE, FISD, and Bloomberg and require that bonds have a valid price in 
both the [-30, Announcement date] and [Completion date, +30] windows to compute 
yield spread changes. The yield spread is the difference between the yield to maturity and 
the value from the Treasury yield curve with the same maturity.  The yield spread change 
(reported as a percentage) is the difference between the yield spread before and after the 
event announcement date.  We divide the sample using two dummy variables.  We 
compute the change in leverage from before the event to after the event and assign firms 
to a group that is above or below the median leverage change in the addition or deletion 
sample.  Similarly, we calculate the change in EPS forecasts from before to after the 
event and partition the sample based on the median EPS change.  [ ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent levels, respectively.] 
 
0.337 -0.012 0.104 -0.009
0.001 ** 0.028 ** 0.009 0.030
79 74 79 74
-0.051 0.063 -0.031 0.061
-0.040 ** -0.002 ** -0.015 -0.002
79 51 79 51
0.104 -0.136 -0.051 -0.134
-0.019 0.028 -0.019 0.029
23 20 23 20
-0.126 * 0.129 -0.116 0.128
-0.098 0.018 -0.053 0.018
28 16 28 16
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Winsorized (5,95%)Unwinsorized
Above Median 
Forecast EPS 
Change
Below Median 
Forecast EPS 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Forecast EPS 
Change
Below Median 
Forecast EPS 
Change
Panel B:  Addition Sample by Firm
Panel A:  Addition Sample by Bond
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markets.  We control for two bond characteristics: an investment-grade rating dummy 
variable and remaining maturity.  We also control for firm size using the log of assets and 
firm risk using the unlevered stock volatility.  Table 17 contains the results of these 
regressions. In Model 1, we include the realized change in EPS and the change in 
leverage and add the control variables in Model 2.  Models 3 and 4 are similar except that 
we replace the realized change in EPS with the forecast change in EPS.  In Panel A (B), 
we present the bond-level (firm-level) addition results, and in Panel C (D), we present the 
bond-level (firm-level) deletion results.  For additions, all independent variables are 
insignificant in predicting the yield spread change.  Interestingly, at the bond-level, the 
leverage change for addition firms is positively (albeit insignificantly) related to yield 
spread changes, but at the firm-level this relationship is negative.  The impact of the 
realized and forecast EPS changes is also inconsistent between specifications.  These sign 
changes are further confirmation that there is no strong relationship between the bond 
price reaction to index inclusion and the two types of positive information identified in 
the literature.  For deletion firms at the bond-level (Panel C), the change in leverage is 
positively related to the yield spread changes in Models 2 and 4 where the control 
variables are included.  This result is consistent with larger increases in leverage being 
detrimental to bondholders in deletions, however this result does not persist across the 
other models in the analysis by bond (Models 1 and 3 in Panel C) or in the firm-level 
analysis (Panel D).  Lastly, firm size is positively related (although insignificant) to yield 
spread changes in both the inclusion and deletion results at the bond-level but negatively 
related at the firm-level.   This likely occurs because large firms typically have more 
bond issues so their impact is larger in the bond-level results.    
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TABLE 17:  Regression Analysis of Yield Spread Changes 
 
Our sample includes all newly added and removed firms from the S&P 500 Index from 
1990 through 2007.  Our initial sample includes 419 additions and deletions, but we 
exclude those sample firms associated with the following types of index changes: (1) 
When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an existing index firm, (2) when an S&P 
500 firm acquires another index firm and the acquired firm is removed from the index, 
(3) when two existing index firms merge and the resulting merged firm remains on the 
index, and (4) when an index firm is replaced by a spun-off subsidiary.  Matched pairs 
are firms in the same 3-digit SIC code closest in size to the sample firm based on sales.  
For these sample and control firms, we gather daily pricing data from TRACE, FISD, and 
Bloomberg and require that bonds have a valid price in both the [-30, Announcement 
date] and [Completion date, +30] windows to compute yield spread changes. The yield 
spread is the difference between the yield to maturity and the value from the Treasury 
yield curve with the same maturity.  The yield spread change is the difference between 
the yield spread before and after the event announcement date.  The yield spread changes 
are reported as percentages.  The actual EPS change measures the difference in the 
average annual EPS in the three year period prior to the index change and the three year 
period following the index change.  The forecast EPS change masures the difference in 
the forecasted EPS values from prior to after the index change.  The leverage change is 
the change in the leverage level from before the event to after the index change.  We have 
a dummy variable to indicate investment grade bonds and measure the remaining bond 
maturity in years.  For the firm-level regressions, we compute the average time to 
maturity of all firm bonds.  We include the log of assets as firm size and control for the 
unlevered stock volatility.  [ ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1-percent, 5-
percent, and 10-percent levels, respectively.] 
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TABLE 17 (continued) 
 
 
Intercept 0.081 -0.109 0.072 -0.122
1.29 -0.31 1.16 -0.34
Actual EPS Change -0.003 0.003 #N/A ### #N/A ###
-0.45 0.23 #N/A #N/A
Forecast EPS Change #N/A ### #N/A ### 0.058 -0.016
#N/A #N/A 0.39 -0.10
Leverage Change 0.632 0.980 0.692 0.958
0.81 1.14 0.86 1.16
Investment Grade #N/A ### -0.191 #N/A ### -0.186
#N/A -0.95 #N/A -0.95
Remaining Maturity #N/A ### -0.006 #N/A ### -0.006
#N/A -1.10 #N/A -1.09
Firm Size #N/A ### 0.022 #N/A ### 0.023
#N/A 0.72 #N/A 0.76
Stock Volatility #N/A ### 3.087 #N/A ### 3.047
#N/A 0.81 #N/A 0.82
N 283 245 283 245
R-Squared 0.003 0.017 0.003 0.017Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8
Intercept -0.032 0.903 -0.016 0.770
-0.51 0.83 -0.25 0.72
Actual EPS Change 0.014 0.016 #N/A ### #N/A ###
 0.74 0.77 #N/A #N/A
Forecast EPS Change #N/A ### #N/A ### -0.185 -0.125
#N/A #N/A -1.27 -0.92
Leverage Change -0.744 -0.627 -1.066 -0.904
-0.71 -0.59 -0.98 -0.79
Investment Grade #N/A ### 0.044 #N/A ### 0.041
#N/A 0.26 #N/A 0.25
Remaining Maturity #N/A ### -0.005 #N/A ### -0.004
#N/A -0.59 #N/A -0.46
Firm Size #N/A ### -0.072 #N/A ### -0.058
#N/A -0.76 #N/A -0.61
Stock Volatility #N/A ### -4.088 #N/A ### -3.859
#N/A -1.09 #N/A -1.03
N 87 74 87 74
R-Squared 0.030 0.048 0.032 0.043
Panel A:  Addition Sample by Bond
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel B:  Addition Sample by Firm
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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TABLE 17 (continued) 
Intercept 13.367 -7.215 14.704 -0.785
0.70 -0.63 0.78 -0.07
Actual EPS Change 17.952 0.107 #N/A ### #N/A ###
 1.19 0.10 #N/A #N/A
Forecast EPS Change #N/A ### #N/A ### -18.112 -7.137 *
#N/A #N/A -0.67 -1.90
Leverage Change -252.180 43.509 ** -411.692 37.142 **
-0.96 2.45 -0.97 2.23
Investment Grade #N/A ### -4.995 #N/A ### -4.137
#N/A -1.04 #N/A -0.91
Remaining Maturity #N/A ### 0.357 * #N/A ### 0.326
#N/A 1.75 #N/A 1.62
Firm Size #N/A ### 0.627 #N/A ### 0.065
#N/A 0.78 #N/A 0.10
Stock Volatility #N/A ### 38.316 #N/A ### 7.580
#N/A 0.83 #N/A 0.18
N 130 98 128 98
R-Squared 0.104 0.179 0.038 0.213Model5 Model6 Model7 Model8
Intercept 89.988 3.114 80.298 10.351
1.18 0.29 1.04 0.72
Actual EPS Change 34.692 -1.194 #N/A ### #N/A ###
1.15 -1.29 #N/A #N/A
Forecast EPS Change #N/A ### #N/A ### 3.881 -0.391
#N/A #N/A 0.11 -0.12
Leverage Change -819.735 21.031 -957.974 20.684
-1.12 1.24 -0.98 1.12
Investment Grade #N/A ### -1.004 #N/A ### -1.952
#N/A -0.19 #N/A -0.28
Firm Avg. Maturity #N/A ### 0.164 #N/A ### 0.123
#N/A 0.83 #N/A 0.63
Firm Size #N/A ### -0.581 #N/A ### -0.868
#N/A -0.59 #N/A -0.72
Stock Volatility #N/A ### 15.447 #N/A ### -27.716
#N/A 0.19 #N/A -0.31
N 39 32 37 32
R-Squared 0.217 0.099 0.093 0.055
Panel D:  Deletion Sample by Firm
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel C:  Deletion Sample by Bond
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
 
In this study, we investigate the yield spread changes on bonds of firms that are 
added to or removed from the S&P 500 index.  We use the yield spread changes to 
explore the certification hypothesis, which suggests that Standard and Poors conveys 
positive (negative) information about firms that they select to add to (remove from) the 
S&P 500 index.  Bondholder wealth effects are particularly suited to exploring the 
certification hypothesis because changes in long- and short- run demand for equity, 
liquidity, and investor awareness should not affect bond values.  Thus improvements or 
declines in bond value are only attributable to information about the firm conveyed in the 
inclusion or removal of the stock from the index.  In our overall sample, we do not find 
significant changes in bond prices for either newly added or newly removed firms from 
the S&P 500 index.  This insignificant finding may stem from the type of information 
certified by Standard and Poors in announcing index reconstitutions.   
Existing literature identifies two types of information that may be conveyed in 
index changes:  improvements in operating performance and better access to capital 
markets.  We attempt to distinguish the type of information conveyed through our 
univariate and multivariate analysis.  First, we partition the sample of addition and 
deletion firms by the changes in operating performance (measured by realized EPS 
changes and changes in EPS forecasts) as well as changes in leverage to represent access 
to capital markets.  We then test these subsamples and find no significant results to 
support the certification hypothesis.  Furthermore, we conduct a multivariate regression 
using our proxy variables for improvements in operating performance and access to 
capital markets, and these results are insignificant and inconsistent across models. 
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Therefore, we are not able to distinguish between the type of information certified in the 
selection of firm to be added or removed from the index.    
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APPENDIX 
 
 
TABLE A:  Multivariate Analysis of Excess Returns using Market Model 
 
The sample consists of all firms added or deleted from the S&P 500 during the period of 
1990 - 2007.  We exclude added firms and deleted firms where the added firm acquires 
the deleted firm, where two index firms merge and the merged firm remains, and where 
an added firm is a subsidiary spun-off from a deleted firm.  The dependent variable in 
each regression is the excess abnormal return from the index change announcement date 
through the implementation date.  The cost of capital change is estimated from the market 
model.  The three liquidity measures and shadow cost are measured for a year before and 
after the inclusion or deletion event beginning one month prior to or after the 
announcement month.  The illiquidity ratio is the average of the absolute value of the 
daily return divided by the dollar volume traded on that day.  The illiquidity ratio is 
multiplied by 10
7
.   Volume is the log of  the average daily number of shares traded 
multiplied by the closing price.  The turnover ratio is the average monthly share volume 
traded divided by the number of shares outstanding.  Finally, the shadow cost is the ratio 
of the product of the residual standard deviation and firm size divided by the product of 
the S&P 500 index market capitalization and the number of shareholders.  The residual 
standard deviation is the standard deviation of the difference between the firm's return 
and the S&P 500 total return.  Firm size is measured as the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by the closing price on the announcement date.  The S&P 500 index market 
capitalization is measured in dollars on the announcement date.  The number of 
shareholders is measured before the event date at the closest point prior to the event, and 
the number of shareholders after the event is measured at least nine months after the 
announcement date.  Relative size is the log of the ratio of firm size to the S&P 500 index 
market capitalization and is measured on the announcement date.  Firm age is the log of 
the number of months between a firm's first appearance in the CRSP database and the 
announcement month, and we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm traded on 
the NYSE prior to the index change.  The market/book ratio is the ratio of the market 
value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is estimated 
as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity. Parameter estimates are presented with t-statistics below.  [ * indicates 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.] 
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TABLE A (continued) 
 
 
  
4.6052 *** 11.0490 * 8.5218
7.91 1.79 1.40
-0.2974 -0.1848 1.5865 **
-0.66 -0.39 2.26
-74.8330 -64.1982 -81.7575
-1.09 -0.92 -1.21
0.3401 0.3883 0.4747
0.57 0.64 0.81
0.0015 0.0011 0.0031
0.29 0.22 0.60
-0.0302 -0.0160 0.0547
-0.96 -0.48 1.37
#N/A ### -0.3095 -0.0640
#N/A -0.41 -0.09
#N/A ### -0.7438 -0.7294
#N/A -1.40 -1.39
#N/A ### -0.8405 -0.1022
#N/A -0.78 -0.09
#N/A ### #N/A ### 0.2432 *
#N/A #N/A 1.72
#N/A ### #N/A ### -0.2252 **
#N/A #N/A -2.43
N 281 281 278
R-Squared 0.0170 0.0267 0.0799
Market/Book Ratio
COC Change * 
Market/Book Ratio
NYSE Dummy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept
COC Change
Illiquidity Ratio Change
Volume Change
Turnover Change
ShadowCost Change
Relative Size
Firm Age
 Panel A:  Inclusion firms
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TABLE A (continued) 
 
 
  
-8.4471 *** -17.1968 -20.7948 *
-6.59 -1.56 -1.76
0.4705 0.9487 2.9221
0.56 1.07 0.89
0.0108 0.0216 -0.2040
0.06 0.11 -0.48
0.7920 0.6326 1.2937
0.64 0.51 0.81
-0.0079 -0.0063 -0.0077
-1.20 -0.90 -0.98
-0.1861 -0.1143 0.6212
-0.18 -0.10 0.49
#N/A ### 1.6395 1.3359
#N/A 1.65 1.29
#N/A ### -0.3629 0.0364
#N/A -0.20 0.02
#N/A ### 3.1345 3.3988
#N/A 0.88 0.94
#N/A ### #N/A ### 0.8912
#N/A #N/A 0.39
#N/A ### #N/A ### -1.4862
#N/A #N/A -0.56
N 99 99 99
R-Squared 0.0231 0.0616 0.0792
Relative Size
Firm Age
NYSE Dummy
Market/Book Ratio
Residual COC Change * 
Market/Book Ratio
ShadowCost Change
Panel B:  Deletion firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept
Residual COC Change
Illiquidity Ratio Change
Volume Change
Turnover Change
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TABLE B:  Multivariate Analysis of Adjusted Excess Returns 
 
The sample consists of all firms added or deleted from the S&P 500 during the period of 
1990 - 2007.  We exclude added firms and deleted firms where the added firm acquires 
the deleted firm, where two index firms merge and the merged firm remains, and where 
an added firm is a subsidiary spun-off from a deleted firm.  The dependent variable in 
each regression is the excess abnormal return from the index change announcement date 
through the implementation date.  The cost of capital change is estimated from four-
factor model.  The three liquidity measures and shadow cost are measured for a year 
before and after the inclusion or deletion event beginning one month prior to or after the 
announcement month.  The illiquidity ratio is the average of the absolute value of the 
daily return divided by the dollar volume traded on that day.  The illiquidity ratio is 
multiplied by 10
7
.   Volume is the log of  the average daily number of shares traded 
multiplied by the closing price.  The turnover ratio is the average monthly share volume 
traded divided by the number of shares outstanding.  Finally, the shadow cost is the ratio 
of the product of the residual standard deviation and firm size divided by the product of 
the S&P 500 index market capitalization and the number of shareholders.  The residual 
standard deviation is the standard deviation of the difference between the firm's return 
and the S&P 500 total return.  Firm size is measured as the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by the closing price on the announcement date.  The S&P 500 index market 
capitalization is measured in dollars on the announcement date.  The number of 
shareholders is measured before the event date at the closest point prior to the event, and 
the number of shareholders after the event is measured at least nine months after the 
announcement date.  Relative size is the log of the ratio of firm size to the S&P 500 index 
market capitalization and is measured on the announcement date.  Firm age is the log of 
the number of months between a firm's first appearance in the CRSP database and the 
announcement month, and we include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm traded on 
the NYSE prior to the index change.  The market/book ratio is the ratio of the market 
value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is estimated 
as the book value of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity. Parameter estimates are presented with t-statistics below.  All variables are 
adjusted by subtracting the value for the control firms.  [ * indicates significance at the 
10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.] 
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TABLE B (continued) 
 
 
 
  
5.1295 *** 8.0188 *** 6.8999 ***
9.30 6.71 5.56
-0.6249 -0.7693 -0.1154
-1.31 -1.59 -0.18
-0.1589 -0.4667 -0.6064 *
-0.51 -1.42 -1.87
0.4065 0.5436 0.5495 *
1.24 1.64 1.70
-0.0046 -0.0055 -0.0049
-1.23 -1.47 -1.34
-0.0042 0.0002 0.0285
-0.12 0.01 0.75
#N/A ### -1.1615 ** -1.6312 ***
#N/A -2.32 -3.19
#N/A ### -0.5980 -1.0374 **
#N/A -1.31 -2.18
#N/A ### -1.9456 * -0.3397
#N/A -1.75 -0.29
#N/A ### #N/A ### 0.4991 ***
#N/A #N/A 3.40
#N/A ### #N/A ### -0.0615
#N/A #N/A -1.03
N 240 240 236
R-Squared 0.0190 0.0583 0.1212
Market/Book Ratio
COC Change * 
Market/Book Ratio
NYSE Dummy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept
COC Change
Illiquidity Ratio Change
Volume Change
Turnover Change
ShadowCost Change
Relative Size
Firm Age
 Panel A:  Inclusion firms
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TABLE B (continued) 
 
 
 
  
-8.8876 *** -11.5047 *** -11.9321 ***
-7.31 -4.17 -3.91
2.2307 ** 2.2159 ** 1.8707
2.42 2.26 1.01
-0.3599 ** -0.3634 ** -0.3664 *
-2.07 -2.00 -1.81
-0.8397 -0.7844 -0.3787
-0.70 -0.64 -0.26
-0.0047 -0.0033 -0.0031
-0.82 -0.55 -0.51
-0.2702 -0.3101 -0.1124
-1.00 -1.08 -0.30
#N/A ### -0.1141 -0.9300
#N/A -0.11 -0.81
#N/A ### 0.3446 0.4784
#N/A 0.31 0.43
#N/A ### 2.8798 3.7063
#N/A 0.93 1.16
#N/A ### #N/A ### 2.0251
#N/A #N/A 1.41
#N/A ### #N/A ### 0.2835
#N/A #N/A 0.22
N 87 87 87
R-Squared 0.0992 0.1134 0.1377
Relative Size
Firm Age
NYSE Dummy
Market/Book Ratio
COC Change * 
Market/Book Ratio
ShadowCost Change
Panel B:  Deletion firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept
COC Change
Illiquidity Ratio Change
Volume Change
Turnover Change
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TABLE C:  Multivariate Analysis of Cost of Capital Changes using Market Model 
 
The sample consists of all firms added or deleted from the S&P 500 during the period of 
1990 - 2007.  We exclude added firms and deleted firms where the added firm acquires 
the deleted firm, where two index firms merge and the merged firm remains, and where 
an added firm is a subsidiary spun-off from a deleted firm.  The dependent variable in 
each regression is the change in the cost of capital estimated from the market model.  The 
three liquidity measures and shadow cost are measured for a year before and after the 
inclusion or deletion event beginning one month prior to or after the announcement 
month.  The change in these measures is the difference between the measure before and 
after the announcement date.  The illiquidity ratio is the average of the absolute value of 
the daily return divided by the dollar volume traded on that day. The illiquidity ratio is 
multiplied by 10
7
. Volume is the log of the average daily number of shares traded 
multiplied by the closing price. The turnover ratio is the average monthly share volume 
traded divided by the number of shares outstanding.  Finally, the shadow cost is the ratio 
of the product of the residual standard deviation and firm size divided by the product of 
the S&P 500 index market capitalization and the number of shareholders.  The residual 
standard deviation is the standard deviation of the difference between the firm's return 
and the S&P 500 total return.  Firm size is measured as the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by the closing price on the announcement date.  The S&P 500 index market 
capitalization is measured in dollars on the announcement date.  The number of 
shareholders is measured before the event date at the closest point prior to the event, and 
the number of shareholders after the event is measured at least nine months after the 
announcement date.  Relative size is the log of the ratio of firm size to the S&P 500 index 
market capitalization and is measured on the announcement date.  Leverage is defined as 
the ratio of the book value of total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) to 
the market value of assets.  The market value of assets is defined as the book value of 
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity.  We measure the 
average leverage in the three years prior to the announcement date and the three years 
following the announcement date.  The change in leverage is the difference of the 
average after the announcement and before the announcement date.  The abnormal 
reaction to quarterly earnings announcements is measured for every quarter for days [-1, 
+1].  We find the average of the abnormal reaction for the 20 quarters preceding and 
following the announcement date respectively.  The change in the quarterly earnings 
announcement is the difference in the average abnormal reaction following the event and 
preceding the event.  Parameter estimates are presented with t-statistics below.  [ * 
indicates significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.] 
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TABLE C (continued) 
 
Intercept -0.2251 *** 2.1285 *** 2.1486 *** 2.1929 ***
-2.98 3.07 3.09 3.19
Illiquidity Ratio Change -3.5263 -4.4920 -4.3349 #N/A ###
-0.49 -0.62 -0.59 #N/A
Volume Change -0.0312 -0.0428 -0.0495 #N/A ###
-0.40 -0.54 -0.61 #N/A
Turnover Change -0.0043 *** -0.0046 *** -0.0046 *** -0.0046 ***
-6.84 -6.92 -6.92 -7.01
Shadow Cost Change 0.0156 *** 0.0079 0.0074 0.0073
3.81 1.57 1.44 1.44
Relative Size #N/A ### -0.3462 *** -0.3494 *** -0.3568 ***
#N/A -3.45 -3.48 -3.59
Leverage Change #N/A ### -1.6291 ** -1.7261 ** -1.5934 **
#N/A -2.09 -2.18 -2.08
#N/A ### #N/A ### 0.0197 0.0183
#N/A #N/A 0.66 0.63
N 281 256 256 256
R-Squared 0.1828 0.2097 0.2111 0.2094
Intercept 0.4876 *** 1.7136 *** 2.1066 *** 3.2855 ***
3.28 2.77 3.34 4.65
Illiquidity Ratio Change 0.1081 *** 0.1216 *** 0.1287 *** #N/A ###
5.17 5.17 5.54 #N/A
Volume Change -0.3423 ** -0.3693 ** -0.3661 ** #N/A ###
-2.31 -2.38 -2.42 #N/A
Turnover Change 0.0007 0.0008 0.0006 0.0004
0.91 1.02 0.73 0.47
Shadow Cost Change 0.0346 0.0034 0.0056 -0.0421
0.44 0.04 0.07 -0.42
Relative Size #N/A ### -0.2606 ** -0.3203 ** -0.5219 ***
#N/A -2.09 -2.57 -3.68
Leverage Change #N/A ### 0.7642 1.1843 0.7309
#N/A 0.62 0.97 0.52
#N/A ### #N/A ### -0.0955 ** -0.0635
#N/A #N/A -2.20 -1.25
N 99 91 91 91
R-Squared 0.2656 0.3772 0.4115 0.1569
Quarterly Earn. Ann. 
Reaction Change
Panel B:  Deletion firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Quarterly Earn. Ann. 
Reaction Change
Panel A: Inclusion firms
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TABLE D:  Multivariate Analysis of Adjusted Cost of Capital Changes 
 
The sample consists of all firms added or deleted from the S&P 500 during the period of 
1990 - 2007.  We exclude added firms and deleted firms where the added firm acquires 
the deleted firm, where two index firms merge and the merged firm remains, and where 
an added firm is a subsidiary spun-off from a deleted firm.  The dependent variable in 
each regression is the change in the cost of capital estimated from the four factor model.  
The three liquidity measures and shadow cost are measured for a year before and after the 
inclusion or deletion event beginning one month prior to or after the announcement 
month.  The change in these measures is the difference between the measure before and 
after the announcement date.  The illiquidity ratio is the average of the absolute value of 
the daily return divided by the dollar volume traded on that day. The illiquidity ratio is 
multiplied by 10
7
. Volume is the log of the average daily number of shares traded 
multiplied by the closing price. The turnover ratio is the average monthly share volume 
traded divided by the number of shares outstanding.  Finally, the shadow cost is the ratio 
of the product of the residual standard deviation and firm size divided by the product of 
the S&P 500 index market capitalization and the number of shareholders.  The residual 
standard deviation is the standard deviation of the difference between the firm's return 
and the S&P 500 total return.  Firm size is measured as the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by the closing price on the announcement date.  The S&P 500 index market 
capitalization is measured in dollars on the announcement date.  The number of 
shareholders is measured before the event date at the closest point prior to the event, and 
the number of shareholders after the event is measured at least nine months after the 
announcement date.  Relative size is the log of the ratio of firm size to the S&P 500 index 
market capitalization and is measured on the announcement date.  Leverage is defined as 
the ratio of the book value of total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) to 
the market value of assets.  The market value of assets is defined as the book value of 
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity.  We measure the 
average leverage in the three years prior to the announcement date and the three years 
following the announcement date.  The change in leverage is the difference of the 
average after the announcement and before the announcement date.  The abnormal 
reaction to quarterly earnings announcements is measured for every quarter for days [-1, 
+1].  We find the average of the abnormal reaction for the 20 quarters preceding and 
following the announcement date respectively.  The change in the quarterly earnings 
announcement is the difference in the average abnormal reaction following the event and 
preceding the event.  Parameter estimates are presented with t-statistics below.  All 
variables are adjusted by subtracting the value for the control firms.  [ * indicates 
significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.] 
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TABLE D (continued) 
 
Intercept -0.0679 0.1748 0.1706 0.1587
-0.91 1.34 1.30 1.22
Illiquidity Ratio Change -0.0059 -0.0378 -0.0606 #N/A ###
-0.17 -1.01 -1.35 #N/A
Volume Change -0.0547 -0.0545 -0.0590 #N/A ###
-1.23 -1.01 -1.10 #N/A
Turnover Change -0.0026 *** -0.0030 *** -0.0030 *** -0.0031 ***
-5.28 -5.52 -5.59 -5.85
Shadow Cost Change 0.0091 * 0.0075 0.0064 0.0073
1.90 1.44 1.22 1.41
Relative Size #N/A ### -0.2067 *** -0.2049 *** -0.1888 ***
#N/A -2.78 -2.75 -2.65
Leverage Change #N/A ### -0.8062 -0.9761 * -1.0147 *
#N/A -1.51 -1.78 -1.89
#N/A ### #N/A ### 0.0411 * 0.0355
#N/A #N/A 1.74 1.52
N 240 197 195 195
R-Squared 0.1301 0.2106 0.2219 0.2101
Intercept 0.3639 ** 0.3472 ** 0.3677 ** 0.2910 *
2.60 2.21 2.36 1.78
Illiquidity Ratio Change 0.3639 ** 0.3472 ** 0.3677 ** 0.2910 *
2.60 2.21 2.36 1.78
Volume Change 0.0496 ** 0.0772 *** 0.0887 *** #N/A ###
2.61 3.57 3.95 #N/A
Turnover Change 0.2008 0.2365 * 0.2232 * #N/A ###
1.55 1.88 1.79 #N/A
Shadow Cost Change -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001
-0.20 -0.22 -0.48 0.10
Relative Size 0.1227 *** 0.1199 *** 0.1141 *** 0.1161 ***
3.98 3.83 3.67 3.38
Leverage Change #N/A ### -0.1060 -0.1573 -0.1889
#N/A -0.85 -1.24 -1.36
#N/A ### 0.1020 0.2893 0.7370
#N/A 0.14 0.39 0.91
N 87 73 73 73
R-Squared 0.2282 0.3688 0.3946 0.2311
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel A: Inclusion firms
Quarterly Earn. Ann. 
Reaction Change
Quarterly Earn. Ann. 
Reaction Change
Panel B:  Deletion firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
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TABLE E:  Abnormal Return Breakdown by Information Asymmetry Proxy Variables 
 
Our sample includes all newly added and removed firms from the S&P 500 Index from 
1990 through 2007.  Our initial sample includes 419 additions and deletions, but we 
exclude those sample firms associated with the following types of index changes: (1) 
When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an existing index firm, (2) when an S&P 
500 firm acquires another index firm and the acquired firm is removed from the index, 
(3) when two existing index firms merge and the resulting merged firm remains on the 
index, and (4) when an index firm is replaced by a spun-off subsidiary.  Our final sample 
contains 382 added firms and 368 deleted firms.    Research and development is the ratio 
of research and development expense to total assets.  Intangible assets is measured as one 
minus the sum of property, plant, and equipment plus current assets divided by total 
assets.  Firm size is the log of the market value of equity and the number of shareholders 
is measured in thousands.  The market to book ratio measures the market value of assets 
to the book value of assets where the market value of assets is calculated as the book 
value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the book value of equity.  R&D, 
intangibles, firm size, market to book ratio, and the number of shareholders are calculated 
for the fiscal year prior to the event date.  The earnings announcement reaction is the 
average three day cumulative abnormal return for the 20 quarters preceding the 
announcement date.  The volatility of EPS is the standard deviation of quarterly earnings 
per share for the five year periods preceding the announcement date, and we measure the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the same period.  The scaled analyst 
forecast error is absolute value of the ratio of the difference between the mean analyst 
forecast of earnings per share and the actual earnings per share divided by the mean 
forecast.  We measure this error for the forecasts during the five years before the event 
and compute the average.  The scaled forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of 
analyst forecasts divided by the mean forecast.  We measure this dispersion for the 
forecasts during the five years before the event and compute the average over each 
period.  We partition the sample for each proxy variable by the median value.  The  
variable measured is the daily average cumulative abnormal return between the 
announcement and completion dates of the index change.  The last column is the 
difference between the first and fourth quartiles abnormal returns.  [ ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent levels, respectively.]   
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TABLE E (continued) 
 
 
  
Firm Policy Factors
Research and Development 0.39 1.04 0.65 **
Intangible Assets 0.69 0.82 0.13 *
Size Factors
Firm Size 0.99 0.55 -0.44 **
Number of Shareholders 0.64 0.78 0.14
Market/Book Ratio 0.74 0.83 0.09
Variability Factors
Earnings Announcement Rxn 0.76 0.79 0.03
Volatility of EPS 0.86 0.66 -0.20
Volatility of Returns 0.68 0.84 0.16
Analyst Forecast Factors
Number of Analysts 0.62 0.90 0.28
Analyst Error 0.65 1.05 0.40 *
Forecast Dispersion 0.79 0.94 0.15
Firm Policy Factors
Research and Development -0.77 -0.73 0.05
Intangible Assets -0.81 -0.73 0.08
Size Factors
Firm Size -1.11 -0.71 0.40 **
Number of Shareholders -1.05 -0.58 0.47 **
Market/Book Ratio -1.26 -0.72 0.54 ***
Variability Factors
Earnings Announcement Rxn -0.58 -1.06 -0.48 *
Volatility of EPS -0.92 -1.17 -0.24
Volatility of Returns -0.79 -1.15 -0.36 *
Analyst Forecast Factors
Number of Analysts -1.03 -0.60 0.43
Analyst Error -1.05 -0.88 0.16
Forecast Dispersion -0.78 -0.99 -0.21
Panel B:  Deletion Sample
Difference 
Below 
Median
Above 
Median
Difference 
Below 
Median
Above 
Median
Panel A:  Addition Sample
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TABLE F:  Median Analyst Forecast Error Regression Results 
 
Our sample includes all newly added and removed firms from the S&P 500 Index from 
1990 through 2007.  Our initial sample includes 419 additions and deletions, but we 
exclude those sample firms associated with the following types of index changes: (1) 
When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an existing index firm, (2) when an S&P 
500 firm acquires another index firm and the acquired firm is removed from the index, 
(3) when two existing index firms merge and the resulting merged firm remains on the 
index, and (4) when an index firm is replaced by a spun-off subsidiary.  Our final sample 
contains 382 added firms and 368 deleted firms.  The dependent variable in the 
regressions is the scaled analyst forecast error.  The scaled analyst forecast error is 
absolute value of the ratio of the difference between the median analyst forecast of 
earnings per share and the actual earnings per share divided by the median forecast.  We 
include the one-year and two-year ahead forecast errors from the five years before and 
after the event.  We include a dummy variable to indicate observations occuring after the 
event announcement date, and a one year lag of the scaled forecast error.  The scaled 
forecast dispersion is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts divided by the median 
forecast, and include a one year lag of the scaled forecast dispersion.  Research and 
development is the ratio of research and development expense to total assets.  Intangible 
assets is measured as one minus the sum of property, plant, and equipment plus current 
assets divided by total assets.  Firm size is the log of the market value of equity and the 
number of shareholders is measured in thousands.  The market to book ratio measures the 
market value of assets to the book value of assets where the market value of assets is 
calculated as the book value of assets plus the market value of equity minus the book 
value of equity.  R&D, intangibles, firm size, market to book ratio, and the number of 
shareholders are calculated for the fiscal year prior to the event date.  [ ***, **, and * 
denote significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent levels, respectively.]   
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TABLE F (continued) 
  
Post-Event Flag -0.7257 *** -2.1312 *** -0.1487 -2.5983 ***
-2.76 -3.57 -0.22 -4.30
Number of Analysts -0.1024 *** -0.1230 ** 0.1064 * -0.0432
-3.53 -2.17 1.69 -0.76
Lag Forecast Dispersion 0.1994 *** 0.2230 *** 0.1781 *** 0.1815 ***
14.99 10.49 8.29 8.47
Research & Development 0.0393 -0.0914 -0.8993
0.61 -1.40 -1.37
Intangible Assets 0.1320 *** 0.1707 *** 0.1709 ***
4.72 5.84 5.83
Market/Book Ratio 0.1327 0.1235
1.30 1.20
Firm Size -3.7973 ***
-7.69
Firm Size Residuals -3.6953 ***
-7.46
R-Squared 0.3003 0.3007 0.3826 0.3274
Number of Observations 4584 2044 2039 2039
Number of Firms 310 143 143 143
Post-Event Flag 3.4578 *** 3.1607 ** 2.5989 * 2.9272 **
3.51 2.15 1.75 1.97
Number of Analysts 0.0416 0.0607 0.2971 * -0.0584
0.37 0.38 1.71 -0.35
Lag Forecast Dispersion -0.0127 -0.0578 -0.0698 -0.0664
-0.41 -1.11 -1.34 -1.27
Research & Development -0.4922 * -0.6867 ** -0.6412 **
-1.68 -2.17 -2.03
Intangible Assets 0.1681 ** 0.1744 ** 0.1741 **
2.23 2.15 2.13
Market/Book Ratio 0.2621 0.1799
0.62 0.42
Firm Size -3.4789 ***
-3.45
Firm Size Residuals -2.7713
-2.79 ***
R-Squared 0.1371 0.1699 0.1826 0.1784
Number of Observations 1702 871 867 867
Number of Firms 120 68 68 68
Model 1 Model 2 Model 4
Panel B:  Deletion Sample
Panel A:  Addition Sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 4Model 3
Model 3
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TABLE G:  Univariate Yield Spread Percentage Changes 
 
Our sample includes all newly added and removed firms from the S&P 500 Index from 
1990 through 2007.  Our initial sample includes 419 additions and deletions, but we 
exclude those sample firms associated with the following types of index changes: (1) 
When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an existing index firm, (2) when an S&P 
500 firm acquires another index firm and the acquired firm is removed from the index, 
(3) when two existing index firms merge and the resulting merged firm remains on the 
index, and (4) when an index firm is replaced by a spun-off subsidiary.  Matched pairs 
are firms in the same 3-digit SIC code closest in size to the sample firm based on sales.  
For these sample and control firms, we gather daily pricing data from TRACE, FISD, and 
Bloomberg and require that bonds have a valid price in both the [-30, Announcement 
date] and [Completion date, +30] windows to compute yield spread changes. The yield 
spread is the difference between the yield to maturity and the value from the Treasury 
yield curve with the same maturity.  The percentage yield spread change is the difference 
between the yield spread before and after the event announcement date divided by the 
yield spread before the event.  [ ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1-percent, 5-
percent, and 10-percent levels, respectively.] 
 
  
Mean 13.148 *** 1.997 11.880 *** 0.771
Median 0.643 -2.748 1.001 ** -2.159
N 336 181 336 181
Mean 9.794 2.341 9.862 1.468
Median -0.032 0.628 -0.032 0.476
N 104 71 104 71
Mean 47.822 12.965 ** 20.656 *** 12.461 **
Median 0.794 ** 0.448 1.656 *** 0.035
N 566 271 566 271
Mean 42.590 5.203 18.575 * 4.574
Median -0.036 0.638 1.782 * 0.130
N 160 84 160 84
Sample Firms Control Firms Sample Firms Control Firms
Panel A:  Addition Sample by Bond
Unwinsorized Winsorized (5,95%)
Unwinsorized Winsorized (5,95%)
Sample Firms Control Firms Sample Firms Control Firms
Panel D:  Deletion Sample by Firm
Unwinsorized Winsorized (5,95%)
Sample Firms Control Firms Sample Firms Control Firms
Panel C:  Deletion Sample by Bond
Unwinsorized Winsorized (5,95%)
Sample Firms Control Firms Sample Firms Control Firms
Panel B:  Addition Sample by Firm
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TABLE H:  Yield Changes Subgroup Analysis with Realized EPS Change 
 
Our sample includes all newly added and removed firms from the S&P 500 Index from 
1990 through 2007.  We exclude those sample firms associated with the following types 
of index changes: (1) When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an existing index 
firm, (2) when an S&P 500 firm acquires another index firm and the acquired firm is 
removed from the index, (3) when two existing index firms merge and the resulting 
merged firm remains on the index, and (4) when an index firm is replaced by a spun-off 
subsidiary.  Matched pairs are firms in the same 3-digit SIC code closest in size to the 
sample firm based on sales.  We require that bonds have a valid price in both the [-30, 
Announcement date] and [Completion date, +30] windows to compute yield spread 
changes. The yield spread is the difference between the yield to maturity and the value 
from the Treasury yield curve with the same maturity.  The yield spread change is the 
difference between the yield spread before and after the event announcement date.  The 
yield spread changes are reported as percentages.  We divide the sample using two 
dummy variables.  We compute the change in leverage from before the event to after the 
event and assign firms to a group that is above or below the median leverage change in 
the addition or deletion sample.  Similarly, we calculate the change in realized EPS from 
before to after the event and partition the sample based on the median EPS change.  [ 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent levels, 
respectively.] 
 
0.059 0.004 0.044 0.005
-0.043 0.012 0.006 0.017
62 105 62 105
0.198 0.097 * 0.031 0.094
-0.008 0.035 -0.003 0.035
96 20 96 20
-0.040 -0.084 -0.050 -0.083
-0.034 0.025 -0.034 0.025
22 27 22 27
-0.009 0.180 -0.114 0.179
-0.047 0.060 -0.025 0.060
29 9 29 9
Below Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
Panel B:  Addition Sample by Firm
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
Panel A:  Addition Sample by Bond
Unwinsorized Winsorized (5,95%)
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
Below Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
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TABLE H (continued) 
 
 
  
14.041 ** 61.208 11.467 *** 9.570 ***
3.536 ** -0.132 ** 13.999 ** 0.633 **
10 60 10 60
7.762 ** -0.065 6.650 *** 1.352
0.090 ** 0.139 ** 0.090 ** 0.149 **
26 34 26 34
6.734 97.526 5.708 4.159
0.149 -0.131 0.169 -0.066
5 12 5 12
3.629 1.760 3.255 2.770
0.041 0.131 0.041 0.132
11 11 11 11
Above Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
Panel C:  Deletion Sample by Bond
Unwinsorized Winsorized (5,95%)
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
Below Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
Panel D:  Deletion Sample by Firm
Unwinsorized Winsorized (5,95%)
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
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TABLE I:  Percent Yield Changes Subgroup Analysis with Forecast EPS Change 
 
Our sample includes all newly added and removed firms from the S&P 500 Index from 
1990 through 2007.  We exclude those sample firms associated with the following types 
of index changes: (1) When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an existing index 
firm, (2) when an S&P 500 firm acquires another index firm and the acquired firm is 
removed from the index, (3) when two existing index firms merge and the resulting 
merged firm remains on the index, and (4) when an index firm is replaced by a spun-off 
subsidiary.  Matched pairs are firms in the same 3-digit SIC code closest in size to the 
sample firm based on sales.  We require that bonds have a valid price in both the [-30, 
Announcement date] and [Completion date, +30] windows to compute yield spread 
changes. The yield spread is the difference between the yield to maturity and the value 
from the Treasury yield curve with the same maturity.  The percentage yield spread 
change is the difference between the yield spread before and after the event 
announcement date divided by the yield spread before the event.  We divide the sample 
using two dummy variables.  We compute the change in leverage from before the event 
to after the event and assign firms to a group that is above or below the median leverage 
change in the addition or deletion sample.  Similarly, we calculate the change in EPS 
forecasts from before to after the event and partition the sample based on the median EPS 
change.  [ ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent 
levels, respectively.] 
 
25.851 ** 5.944 * 19.887 * 6.120 *
0.465 2.054 0.607 2.118
79 74 79 74
3.091 7.642 ** 4.070 7.429 **
-2.369 -0.372 -0.893 -0.372
79 51 79 51
31.417 8.744 28.008 8.865
-1.126 2.352 -1.126 2.352
23 20 23 20
-5.019 11.397 -0.979 11.227
-6.306 3.668 -3.099 3.668
28 16 28 16
Below Median 
Forecast EPS 
Change
Panel B:  Addition Sample by Firm
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Forecast EPS 
Change
Panel A:  Addition Sample by Bond
Unwinsorized Winsorized (5,95%)
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Forecast EPS 
Change
Below Median 
Forecast EPS 
Change
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TABLE I (continued) 
 
  
-304.504 30.452 -11.089 45.619
-15.104 * -10.554 * -1.721 *** -7.978 ***
7 37 7 37
149.257 ** 326.715 140.958 ** 34.398 ***
78.070 * 3.781 * 78.677 *** 16.860 ***
27 57 27 57
-513.876 16.590 -3.464 20.682
-13.531 -5.083 -0.756 ** -7.978 **
4 11 4 11
199.952 503.846 196.886 19.211
13.413 9.607 13.413 ** 11.588 **
10 12 10 12
Above Median 
Forecast EPS 
Change
Panel C:  Deletion Sample by Bond
Unwinsorized Winsorized (5,95%)
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Forecast EPS 
Change
Below Median 
Forecast EPS 
Change
Panel D:  Deletion Sample by Firm
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Forecast EPS 
Change
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TABLE J:  Percent Yield Changes Subgroup Analysis using Realized EPS Changes 
 
Our sample includes all newly added and removed firms from the S&P 500 Index from 
1990 through 2007.  We exclude those sample firms associated with the following types 
of index changes: (1) When a non-index firm acquires and replaces an existing index 
firm, (2) when an S&P 500 firm acquires another index firm and the acquired firm is 
removed from the index, (3) when two existing index firms merge and the resulting 
merged firm remains on the index, and (4) when an index firm is replaced by a spun-off 
subsidiary.  Matched pairs are firms in the same 3-digit SIC code closest in size to the 
sample firm based on sales.  We require that bonds have a valid price in both the [-30, 
Announcement date] and [Completion date, +30] windows to compute yield spread 
changes. The yield spread is the difference between the yield to maturity and the value 
from the Treasury yield curve with the same maturity.  The percentage yield spread 
change is the difference between the yield spread before and after the event 
announcement date divided by the yield spread before the event.  We divide the sample 
using two dummy variables.  We compute the change in leverage from before the event 
to after the event and assign firms to a group that is above or below the median leverage 
change in the addition or deletion sample.  Similarly, we calculate the change in realized 
EPS from before to after the event and partition the sample based on the median EPS 
change.  [ ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent 
levels, respectively.] 
 
21.301 5.560 ** 18.949 5.684 **
-2.238 1.506 0.322 1.700
62 105 62 105
10.060 ** 12.289 7.477 * 11.747
-0.369 1.866 -0.236 1.866
96 20 96 20
28.425 5.156 31.730 5.246
-0.803 3.660 1.053 4.112
22 27 22 27
-1.493 24.224 -2.803 23.923
-5.725 2.558 -1.874 2.558
29 9 29 9
Below Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
Panel B:  Addition Sample by Firm
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
Panel A:  Addition Sample by Bond
Unwinsorized Winsorized (5,95%)
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
Below Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
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TABLE J (continued) 
 
 
-14.526 303.536 191.593 33.721 ***
46.451 * -3.485 * 78.253 ** 6.218 **
10 60 10 60
78.489 ** 45.869 69.590 *** 48.300
6.646 * 7.957 * 6.646 ** 8.630 **
26 34 26 34
-85.085 494.941 323.373 12.615
-1.721 -4.310 8.916 -2.123
5 12 5 12
33.315 28.324 30.469 29.414 *
3.267 10.290 3.267 12.887
11 11 11 11
Above Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
Panel C:  Deletion Sample by Bond
Unwinsorized Winsorized (5,95%)
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
Below Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
Panel D:  Deletion Sample by Firm
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Above Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Leverage 
Change
Below Median 
Realized EPS 
Change
